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Abstract
STRATEGIC CITIZENSHIP:
DUAL MARGINALIZATION AND ORGANIZED
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
AMONG ECUADORIAN AND DOMINICAN MIGRANTS
By
Howard Caro-López
Adviser: Professor John Torpey
What factors define transnational political participation and citizenship for contemporary
migrants? This dissertation focused on how and why migrant activists from Ecuador and the
Dominican Republic pursued political engagement, how their home country governments
influenced migrants‘ political activities, and how migrant organizations shaped their
transnational activities. The study found that transnational political participation among these
two populations was driven by a dual marginalization narrative, where migrants draw from their
personal experiences to conclude that they are marginalized in both the U.S. and in their
countries of origin based on their status as migrants. Ecuadorian and Dominican political
organization leaders use this dual marginalization to create a political identity to demand
minority-group rights in both home and host countries. Migrant activists make calculated
decisions on where to focus their claims for rights, which I refer to as strategic citizenship
Strategic citizenship is shaped by nation-state actions and local organizations. The
Ecuadorian and Dominican governments influence strategic citizenship through: 1) public
discourse that defines migrants‘ status in society; 2) the rule of law; and 3) policies that shape the
state-migrant relationship. While the Ecuadorian governments‘ actions encouraged greater
migrant participation, the Dominican government‘s approach was more contentious, creating
skepticism among migrants towards engagement. In both cases government policy, reinforced
feelings of dual marginalization. Strategic citizenship was also influenced by the different

v
organizations in which migrant activists were involved. Migrants active in home country
political parties had considerable advantages in resources and government connections, but were
stifled by national party demands, member attrition and unstable leadership. Social movement
and civic organizations struggled to harness resources, but had more stable leadership, more
ideological autonomy and cohesive membership.
I conclude that migrant political transnationalism, when examined through a contentious
politics framework, originates from shared experiences engendered by the migration experience,
which is reinforced by nation-state and used by organized actors frame migrant collective action.
Migrants‘ claims for minority rights in both sending and receiving countries reflect how these
actors perceive their condition to be a consequence of ruling elite actions in each country, as well
as their perceived contributions as subjects of two nation-states.
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CHAPTER 1: STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM: LOCATING
ORGANIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL SCHOLARSHIP
Statement of Research Problem
As immigration has once again become a major political issue in the United States,
immigrant civil society organizations are growing. These newer waves of immigrants are
creating and joining organizations to demand greater rights and protections from the U.S.
government. At the same time, however, these immigrants also remain more intensely invested
in their countries of origin than past immigrant populations, as communication and transportation
technology make sustainable long distance ties possible. Newer immigrants in the U.S. annually
send billions of dollars to their home countries via remittances; actively seek to become dual
citizens of their home countries and the U.S., vote in their country‘s elections, and even
participate in political affinity groups. These forms of bi-national political participation are now
often characterized as the transnationalization of migrant1 politics (Smith 2006). Many policy
makers and scholars alike question what political goals migrants have and whether the
transnationalization of their political participation will allow migrants to become full-fledged
members of either American society or that of their home countries, or if migrants are
increasingly relegated to the margins in both countries.
In Strategic Citizenship I study political mobilization by Ecuadorian and Dominican
migrant organizations in New York City, in order to understand how and why migrants remain
politically involved in two different countries at the same time, along with the conditions that
affect these bi-national political activities. Specifically, this dissertation draws upon the
1

For purposes of this project the terms immigrant and migrant will be used interchangeably. However throughout
the dissertation the term migrant will be used to refer to the populations that are studied. I deliberately use the term
migrant in order to emphasize the fact that human migration includes social processes that are associated with the
country of origin as well as with the destination country.
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theoretical model of contentious politics laid out by scholars such as Sidney Tarrow (1998),
Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam (2001) and later iterations by Keck and Sikkink (1996) and Tarrow
(2005) to analyze how and why migrants mobilize for political engagement in both home and
host countries. Furthermore, while people‘s decision whether or not to participate in political
activity is generally driven by personal experiences, a number of scholars including Tocqueville
2000, Weber 1958, Michels (1962), Lipset (1960), McAdam (1985) and Putnam (1996 and 2000)
have noted that in order to understand political participation, we must also consider how
organizations influence political participation given that active political engagement, including
but not limited to voting, emerges from active involvement in different organizations that bring
like-minded individuals together. The dissertation therefore not only examines organizations as a
whole, but also the members of these organizations, in order to understand how organizations
influence individual behavior and how individuals shape the dynamics of these organizations.
This dissertation explores three central questions: (1) what role do organizations play in
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants‘ political participation? (2) Does participation in
organizations enable their voices to be heard by host and home country governments? (3) How
do these forms of political participation inform our understanding of what it means for
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants to be citizens?
The transnationalization of migrants‘ cultural, economic and political practices has
received increasing attention from scholars in the social sciences since the mid-1990s (GlickSchiller et al. 1994; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Portes et al 1999). This body of scholarship has
yielded important findings about how different aspects of migrants‘ lives unfold across both
migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries with greater intensity than during previous
periods of large-scale migration. This literature also notes that these social practices reflect an
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effort by migrants to respond to the dynamics of contemporary global capitalism, where a
substantial part of economic activity is dependent on the movement of labor from low-income
countries to high-income regions of the world such as North America. For scholars in the U.S.,
much of the research on migrant transnationalism has focused on migration from Mexico and
other parts of Latin America, and on how Latin American migrants have expanded their
transnational activities (Landolt et al 1999; Goldring 1998; Levitt 2001; Itzighsohn 2001; Smith
2006), given that Latin American migrants represent the largest share of the immigrant
population in the U.S. at 53.1 percent, according to 2009 Census American Community Survey
(ACS) data (Migration Policy Institute 2009).
One burgeoning area of interest for scholars studying contemporary patterns of
international migration is the transnationalization of migrants‘ political engagement. Much of
this work has focused on how migrants living in the U.S. become involved in the political life of
their home countries (Goldring 1998; Levitt 2001; Fitzgerald 2002; Orozco 2002; DeSipio et al.
2003; Smith 2006; Itizigsohn and Villacrés 2008; Waldinger 2009). These studies explore the
motivations for participating in home country politics and the impact that migrants have on
governance in these countries.
For some scholars in the U.S. the transnationalization of migrants‘ lives poses a threat to
the cultural and social integrity of the country. Samuel Huntington (2004), for instance, lamented
the rapid growth in Latin American immigration to the U.S., denouncing this phenomenon as a
threat to the Anglo-Protestant cultural fabric that, he insisted, had historically defined the country.
Huntington specifically noted the apparent unwillingness of today‘s Latin American immigrants
to integrate into U.S. society, to learn English, and to renounce their allegiance to their home
countries as a major reason why immigration, in his view, now constitutes a major social
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problem for the country. Though not driven by the same ideological motives as Huntington,
Jones-Correa (1998) also argues that migrants‘ involvement in organizations that foster ties to
their home countries and in home country politics is ultimately problematic. For Jones-Correa,
remaining tied to the home country is simply an attempt by migrants to regain social status lost
after they arrive in the U.S., and offers no real opportunities for migrants to empower themselves.
Furthermore, according to Jones-Correa, these transnational practices also reduce incentives for
migrants to participate in the U.S. political process.
While it is certainly true that many of today‘s migrants remain intensely connected to
their home countries, it is these same immigrants who in recent years have also carried out
massive mobilizations across the U.S. each year on May 1 for citizenship and recognition as
contributing members of American society. Leaders of these mobilizations have consistently
asked the U.S. Congress to pass comprehensive immigration reform legislation, which includes a
pathway to citizenship for all migrants. Collective action such as this, far from demonstrating a
lack of commitment to incorporating into the American political system, seems instead to reflect
migrants‘ strong desire to become members of American society. Yet even as they mobilize for
rights in the U.S., migrants also demand citizenship rights in their home countries, in much the
same way that they do in the U.S.
Thus, when migrants make demands for membership and recognition of their rights, they
do so with the belief that they are also fulfilling obligations to the states of which they seek to be
members. The push to obtain citizenship rights from the state in exchange for their contributions
as subjects of the state reflects a response by migrants to changing economic and political
realities associated with contemporary capitalism and specifically the oft-used concept of
globalization. In his classic theory on citizenship, T.H. Marshall (1950) argues that citizenship is
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the institutionalization of class conflicts, first between aristocracy and bourgeoisie, and later
between the bourgeoisie and the working class. Michael Mann (1987) expands on this view of
citizenship in his comparative historical analysis of that institution in various countries. By
comparing the historical development of citizenship in Britain with that of countries such as the
U.S., France, Germany, Russia and Japan, Mann argues that citizenship regimes are a product of
responses by ruling elites in each country to challenges by different rising social actors, be it the
bourgeoisie, working class or other social groups. Mann also contends, however that the
emergence of any citizenship regime is also shaped by the geopolitical realities that impact
nation states, citing the outbreak of the First World War as a key contributing factor to the fall of
the authoritarian monarchies in Germany where landed elites had up that that point enacted a
viable citizenship modeled that offered basic civil rights but relied on divide-and-conquer
strategies to provide limited political rights to moderate excluded groups and to repress the
working class.
While contemporary scholarship has sought to reframe citizenship as a phenomenon that
is not strictly political but rather also includes cultural dimensions of incorporation into a society
(Appadurai 1996; Ong 1999), I focus on the more conventional notion of citizenship as the set of
legal rights and obligations associated with membership in a nation-state or polity. I avoid
discussing cultural interpretations of citizenship not because they are unimportant- indeed,
equally important to having legal rights is the possibility for individuals to be able to have sense
of belonging to a society in their everyday lives- a point articulated by Kymlicka (1996) in
assessing the importance of claims for rights made by racial and ethnic minorities. Inclusion in
the legal relationship associated with formal citizenship is important in that it provides migrants
a series of resources and opportunities for them to advance their interests as subjects of each state.
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This is particularly important for migrants given that many of them, particularly those in this
study, not only face hurdles in becoming members of the host country, but often find themselves
feeling or actually being disenfranchised by their home countries as a result of making the
difficult decision to leave their home countries to improve their life chances. Thus, when we talk
about immigrants‘ political activities and the transnationalization of immigrant politics, it is
essentially a discussion of how migration and migrant agency have reshaped state-society
relations in the contemporary global economy. It is therefore important to understand how
migrants‘ political organization influences the conflicts between them and their home and hostcountry states that are encapsulated in contemporary forms of citizenship.
An important fact that emerges when examining political engagement among Latin
American migrants is that when they participate in both U.S. and home-country politics, they do
so in order to demand membership and recognition of rights that they believe are available to
them as contributing members of both societies. Their claims for recognition and rights in both
countries are rooted in concrete facts. For instance, Latin American migrants collectively send
US$58 billion annually to countries in the region in the form of cash remittances (World Bank
2010), which for many of the low-income countries in the region constitutes one of the main
sources of ―foreign‖ investment. At the same time, migrants also make up a significant
proportion of the of the U.S. labor force, as they account for approximately 16 percent of the
total civilian workforce as of 2009 (Terrazas 2011.) The fact that Latin American migrants have
a tangible impact on economic activity in both the U.S. and their home countries acts as a
backdrop for them to demand governments in each country to admit them as members of each
country with all the rights afforded to legal citizens.
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This dissertation, therefore, explores the connections between organized political activity
and citizenship by studying how a number of Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations
in New York attempt to advocate on behalf of their respective communities in both the U.S. and
their home countries. Specifically, it examines how these migrant activists and the groups to
which they belong seek to mobilize other migrants to empower themselves against the
marginalization they face in both home and host countries. Scholars such as Jones-Correa (1998)
have problematized bi-national political engagement, especially migrant organization around
home country issues. Using the case of Colombian and Ecuadorian migrants in New York,
Jones-Correa has argued that such efforts are mainly strategies employed by migrants to deal
with status loss as migrants, and that ultimately these forms of engagement curtail their political
incorporation in the U.S., where they are more likely to empower themselves. Yet as migrantsending country governments and households have increasingly relied on remittances and
material resources provided by migrants living abroad to stimulate economic activity and
development projects, these migrants have developed a tangible vested interest in how their
investments in their home countries are utilized and protected, making them an important
constituency in these countries. In many cases, however, migrant-sending governments have
often been slow to enact legal reforms that recognize migrants as subjects of the state who are an
integral part of the state and thus worthy of having the same rights as non-migrant subjects. Thus
migrants‘ involvement in organizations that participate in home-country politics or policy issues
has very real consequences for their own as well as their families and communities‘ quality of
life. Moreover, scholars as Escobar (2004) have noted that for some migrant populations in the
U.S., the quest for citizenship rights in their home countries has actually helped stimulate
migrants to also seek political incorporation into the U.S. While the scope and intensity of this
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sort of collective action varies and is not widespread among migrants, it nevertheless represents
an important site for empowerment.
Consequently, based on interviews and 18 months of participant observation research, I
argue that first-generation Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in New York City join different
civic and political organizations in order to help overcome the marginalization they experience
as migrants. The leaders of these organizations feel that in spite of their contributions in both the
U.S. and their home countries, migrants are victims of prejudice, discrimination and exclusion in
both countries. As a result, Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations attempt to mobilize
migrants by arguing that migrants are victims of what I refer to as dual marginalization – their
relative subordination not just in their new countries, but in their countries of origin as well -and make demands upon governments in both countries for membership and recognition of
rights on the basis of the idea that migrants are a minority group in both countries. John Skrentny
(2002) has argued that the expansion of minority rights in the U.S. after 1965-which includes the
Latino rights and immigrant rights, are in large part a consequence of what government leaders,
as opposed to grassroots actors did to enable these movements to gain legitimacy as
disadvantaged groups. Skrentny points to Washington politicians‘ desire to appeal to new
minority constituencies as a major motivating factor behind the enacting of policies for Latinos,
immigrants, women and the disabled, and thus legitimizing these groups‘ claims for minority
rights. Government activism for minority groups, according to Skrentny, has been curtailed by
growing opposition from European-American constituents, as elected officials have sought to
reclaim whites as a constituency, which has fueled the political backlash against minority rights.
Skrentny‘s research emphasizes the role that governments play in constructing identities, which I
also observe to a degree in my study. It is not simply government activism, however, that helps
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create a minority identity for the migrants in this study, but also the real-life conditions migrants
must cope with and the lack of attention by each country to these needs.
Finally, I argue that how and to what degree these organizations make demands on each
state depends on the perceived opportunities that exist for these migrant organizations to best
make their demands. I refer to this entire complex of issues as strategic citizenship. In making
this argument I rely partially on the idea of opportunity structures present in social movement
scholarship (McAdam 1980, Tarrow 1998, Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam 2001) where
mobilization and collective action are predicated on the extent to which actors identify and can
take advantage of openings to successfully articulate and make demands on the state.
The notion that migrants are agents who actively negotiate their existence and well-being
across multiple countries is not novel in and of itself, and the concept of strategic citizenship
bears some similarity to Ong‘s (1999) concept of flexible citizenship. In her research on Chinese
middle-class migrants from Hong Kong, Ong argues that the logics of accumulation, movement
and displacement associated with global capitalism induces subjects to respond fluidly and
opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. According to Ong, in their quest to
accumulate capital and prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize and are regulated by
practices favoring flexibility, mobility and repositioning in relation to markets, governments and
cultural regimes. For Ong, flexible citizenship strategies, such as multiple passport holdings and
multi-national family enterprises reflect efforts to circumvent different forms of disciplining by
governments and other power-holders. Such strategies aim to maximize opportunities for upward
mobility in an economy that relies on mobility of commodities and labor for accumulation.
The notion of strategic citizenship shares with Ong‘s concept the idea that migrant actors
employ adaptive strategies to advance their interests in response to the logics of contemporary

10
capitalism. Ong‘s study, however, focuses mainly on the strategies employed by Hong Kong‘s
entrepreneurial class, and in particular how individual households or families negotiate the
landscape of global capitalism. Furthermore, Ong emphasizes how the subjects in her study
employ transnational practices as a means to insert themselves into the process of capitalist
accumulation, largely bypassing the matter of how migrants approach the question of organizing
and making demands as a transnational political constituency. While such an approach provides
valuable insight on how migrants seek to empower themselves as individuals, it offers a onesided picture of how political constituencies and political identities are forged within the context
of transnationalized lives. Ong‘s analysis also largely overlooks the role that organizations play
in influencing migrants‘ flexibility and positioning. This is a particularly important issue when
attempting to understand migrant political engagement and mobilization, given that
organizations turn out to be central to the way in which political participation occurs. While
individuals may have significant latitude in employing adaptive strategies to reposition
themselves within global capitalism, organizations often create specific opportunities and
constraints that guide the actions of those within that organization. Finally, Ong‘s theory of
strategic citizenship is based on the idea that migrants‘ attempts to adapt and reposition
themselves favorably within the process of capitalist accumulation do so in order to subvert or
dodge discipline, including that from the state. Yet this measure would appear harder to sustain
in dealing with questions of political participation, mainly because for many migrants, including
those in my study, the objective of political engagement is not to escape government discipline,
but rather to gain political incorporation. While migrant subjects in my study may have strong
criticisms of migrant policies in both the U.S. and their respective home countries, they are
ultimately driven to act because they believe that membership in both polities empowers
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migrants on the whole. As Brubaker (1990) has argued, citizenship is an institutionalized form
of social closure: citizens are included within the social organization that is the state, and noncitizens are excluded. Inclusion involves recognition by the state, and offers citizens the ―right to
have rights2‖ and obligations. The migrants in this study deal with differing levels of social
exclusion by virtue of their situation as migrants.
The concept of strategic citizenship thus aims to bring into focus not only the process of
political mobilization and collective action as a whole, but also to incorporate organizations as a
unit of analysis in understanding migrant agency, and more specifically the capacity to maneuver
across international boundaries in response to the dynamics of contemporary global capitalism.
Strategic citizenship does involve migrants seeking political engagement and ultimately full
membership in both home and host countries, which reflect the sort of flexibility that Ong‘s
theory describes. However my concept of strategic citizenship also includes an understanding of
how such practices arise from discourses or narratives employed by migrants to frame their
political motivations, as well as by the nature of the organizations themselves.
As noted earlier, I argue that migrants‘ lived experiences of xenophobic discrimination in
the U.S. and varying levels of exclusion in their respective home countries have led to a situation
of dual marginalization among Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in New York that compels
them to seek out political engagement in both home and host countries. This dissertation further
contends that the organizations in which Ecuadorians and Dominican migrant activists
participate have a significant impact on the way they make demands for rights. In addition to the
material and human resources these organizations have at their disposal to mobilize support for
their objectives, these organizations also play an important role in strategic citizenship practices
by articulating discourses or narratives that they use not only to frame their activities, but also to
2

Cf. Somers, Margaret 2008
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recruit and mobilize among potential migrant constituents. These organizations also develop
and/or have access to networks with other influential political actors (both state and non-state
actors) that often steer them towards greater participation in U.S. or home country politics.
Finally the internal dynamics of these civic and political organizations, including leadership
hierarchies, ideological commitments between members, and organization size have multiple and
varied effects on their capacity to effectively participate in a transnational context.
Organizational dynamics may allow for strong leaders to set the tone and mandate for
organizations; foster internal power struggles based on ideological rifts and/or resource control;
promote innovation or constrain activities based on isomorphic tendencies (Dimaggio and
Powell 1984).
Finally, this dissertation argues that state policies, and in particular those of the
Ecuadorian and Dominican governments, play a central role in how these migrant actors
mobilize to demand greater rights. These states not only adopt laws and enact policies that
facilitate or limit migrants‘ ability to make demands for greater citizenship rights, but also utilize
rhetoric and establish relationships with different migrant organizations to secure their support.
Government policies, in this instance, either provide incentives for these organizations to make
demands on their home countries, or else push them to focus more intensely on political
incorporation in the United States. Ecuadorian and Dominican government policies towards
migrants also alter the nature of the demands that the migrant actors make when seeking rights as
migrants, not only by creating expectations about what migrants believe is owed to them for their
contributions to the state and society, but in some cases- as I observed with Ecuador‘s migrant
outreach program- by attempting to alter the very structure of organizations with which the state
works in New York and New Jersey.
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While this dissertation focuses on the role of collective action in shaping citizenship for
the Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in New York City, it also explores how their demands
for political inclusion and rights are shaped by the personal experiences of the members of these
organizations. As these Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants take part in cultural, economic,
familial and political practices in both the U.S. and their home countries, they also see
themselves as political subjects of two countries. From their perspective they actively contribute
to the welfare of the U.S. and their home countries through their remittances, labor power and
investments in economic production and development projects. Consequently, the migrants in
this study feel that governments in both countries are bear responsibility for their present
condition in each place, and therefore have an obligation not only to formally include them as
members of the state, but also to extend and protect the rights they should enjoy as citizens.
Furthermore, this dissertation examines how transnational political practices by Ecuadorian and
Dominican organizations in New York City are best understood through the notion of strategic
citizenship. By invoking this term, this study aims to reemphasize the fact that migrants position
themselves to make demands across multiple nation-states precisely because despite their
standing (in many cases) as non-citizens, or what Joppke and Morawska (2003) refer to as
―denizenship‖ (where citizens‘ rights are inflated relative to non-citizens), migrants occupy an
important social position in each society through their economic activities and contributions.
However these adaptive strategies used by Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant activists are in
response to the political realities of contemporary capitalism, where both migrant-sending and
migrant-receiving countries increasingly rely on mobile labor to address economic imperatives
and craft policies that reinforce labor mobility as a principal feature of capitalist accumulation.
Migrants‘ transnational political engagement is in this sense a strategy to seek political inclusion
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and the rights associated with citizenship in democratic states, in order to resolve the social
conflicts between transnational workers and ruling elites in each state attempting to secure their
capacity to accumulate capital. However these strategies are not anti-statist or post-national
(Soysal 1995; Jacobson 1996), but rather seek to redefine citizenship to reflect the new
relationship between the migrant working class and the multiple state elites who seek to exploit
migrant labor. Strategic citizenship is also defined by the structure of opportunities provided by
both state policies to control migrants as well as the organizational capacity that migrant
collective actors have to successfully articulate demands for citizenship rights in one or multiple
sites.
This dissertation is based on my observations and analysis of the experiences and
narratives of 20 first-generation immigrant activists in the Ecuadorian and Dominican
communities in the New York City metropolitan area. From March 2009 until August 2010 I met
with eight different civic and political organizations in both communities, observed their political
activities by acting as a participant-observer, and interviewed leaders of these organizations. The
study presented here attempts to bring the work of these organizations into focus, in order to
illustrate how the actions of a small group of actors can better our understanding of how political
identities are formed, and how a broad concept such as citizenship is reflected in the day-to-day
experiences of this particular group of migrants.

Justification for Research
My dissertation aims to address three major issues that emerge from the recent research
on migrant transnationalism. First is the role that organizations play in migrant‘ transnational
political engagement. While the spread of dual citizenship and external voting for migrants living
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abroad has been emphasized in more recent studies on political transnationalism (Escobar 2004;
Waldinger 2009; Itzighsohn and Villacrés 2008), these studies tend to emphasize voting behavior.
Their studies ultimately offer a limited perspective on political participation. These scholars also
do not take into consideration how civic organizations shape migrants‘ political engagement,
These studies show how migrants‘ social ties to their local communities provide opportunities to
exercise some political power. However, looking at political engagement only through these
hometown associations overlooks participation in other types of organizations, including
political parties, social movement organizations, labor unions and NGOs/non-profit
organizations, each of which likely provide a different context for migrants to become politically
engaged. These are the types of organizations that I explore with the participants in my
dissertation.
The third justification for this research concerns these scholars‘ heavy reliance on the
Mexican migration experience. There are valid reasons for this, since Mexicans not only
represent the largest immigrant population in the U.S., but also the fastest-growing. Their
geographic presence across various parts of the country also makes scholarship on Mexican
migration both accessible and relevant to many people in the U.S. Yet this also creates the
potential for a distorted understanding of the Latino American migrant experience, since it fails
to capture the diversity of the Latin American migrant population and whatever differences come
with the ethnic groups that make up this population. In this respect my research is in agreement
with G. Christina Mora‘s (2009) take on Hispanic/Latino pan-ethnicity. Mora argues that a
Hispanic/Latino collective identity is a historically contingent phenomenon driven by strategic
decisions by leading Chicano organizations to expand their profile; by the U.S. Census‘s policy
to create a distinct Latino data category, and by marketing strategies employed by Spanish
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language media to target the various Spanish-speaking population groups in the U.S. Mora‘s
findings support the idea that a Hispanic collective identity, while relevant to many Latinos‘
experiences, is not a natural or static form that renders national identity moot. Similarly, my
findings show that while Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations identify with a
Hispanic pan-ethnicity to contextualize their political goals in the U.S., their national identities
and the opportunities afforded to them within their home countries are equally important in
shaping their political identities and in formulating political strategies to address their dual
marginalization.
This dissertation seeks to address all three of these issues in an attempt to re-shape our
thinking about migrant transnationalism. Examining newer immigrant groups, such as
Ecuadorians, not only brings attention to a rapidly growing yet understudied segment of the
Latino immigrant population, but also identifies differences and similarities that may exist with
regard, for example, to Mexicans. In addition, studying Dominican migrants provides a point of
comparison. While there is some scholarship on Dominican migration and transnational practices
(Levitt 2001; Aparicio 2006; González-Acosta 2008; Itzighsohn and Villacrés 2008), there are
also opportunities to learn more about their experiences as it pertains to transnational political
practices. Finally, I chose to examine different types of organizations who are involved in some
sort of political activity, whether in electoral politics or other forms of political engagement. I
thus hope to bring into focus how the organizations that migrants belong to directly impact their
political participation in both home and host countries. Looking at different organizations also
allows me to explore how migrants stay politically active in both home and host countries, since
each organization has different goals, objectives and networks that may allow them to participate
in U.S. politics and the politics in their home countries.
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Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation is divided into six chapters. The first chapter includes a statement of the
research problem, the justification for the research, and a discussion of the literature on Latin
American transnational politics and on the two populations studied. The first chapter also
discusses the research goals and the expected contributions.
Chapter Two provides a detailed discussion of the population sample and methodology
used to conduct the research. In this chapter I present different approaches to studying migrant
transnational political participation, including both quantitative and qualitative approaches and
the population groups that have been studied in the existing body of research on transnational
politics among Latin American migrants. I highlight the strengths and limitations of these
approaches and provide a justification for my own methodological approach. I follow with a
discussion on the two population groups studied, including an explanation of specific factors
taken into consideration in my decision to conduct a comparative analysis of these two
population groups. I then discuss my sampling procedures and data collection methods, including
the steps taken to ensure informed consent and subject confidentiality. I end the chapter by
addressing the limitations of my research methodology, and how those limitations are reflected
in my findings.
Chapter Three presents the first set of findings, focusing on the factors that lead the
migrant activists in my study to become engaged in the transnational politics that inform the
notion of strategic citizenship presented in this study. Based on my research, I argue that for this
particular set of actors, their political participation is driven by perceived marginalization they
have witnessed and/or personally experienced in both the U.S. and their respective countries of
origin, which I refer to as ―dual marginalization.‖ This dual marginalization is used by migrant
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organization leaders to articulate a discourse or narrative in which migrants view themselves as a
minority or vulnerable population group in both countries by virtue of their condition as migrants,
and create a political identity around the idea of being a migrant minority. This migrant minority
political identity is used by migrant civic organizations to mobilize support to make claims for
full citizenship rights in the U.S. and their home countries, though organization leaders also
mobilize in this fashion based on their perception of how viable it is for migrants to successfully
assert their demands and empower themselves as a minority group.
Chapter Four discusses the role that government elites in Ecuador and the Dominican
Republic, play not only in creating opportunities for migrants‘ participation and full inclusion
into the state, but also in shaping the kinds of demands migrants make. In addition to enacting
laws and policies that dictate migrants‘ political participation, governments also use particular
types of rhetoric that both outline the way migrants fit into the national polity and inform the
way in which migrants formulate their demands for rights. This chapter also notes how
government actors establish relationships with particular organizations in order to generate
support among migrants, which in turn influences the way in which different organizations
interact with government actors.
In Chapter Five I examine the role that different civic and political organizations play in
shaping transnational political engagement among the Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in
my study. I follow migrants‘ political participation in a variety of different organizations,
including two major political parties from each country, two left-oriented movement
organizations, two non-profit organizations, two community based organizations and a
government-sponsored organization. In this chapter, I find that the structure of these
organizations, including leadership, material and human resources provide opportunities and
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place limits on how and where migrants make their claims. Some organizations, like electoral
movements, have access to material resources, larger numbers of supporters and networks with
ruling elites that help establish their presence, but at the same time are held back by national
party leaders as well as isomorphic forms that make it harder to adapt to migrant-specific issues.
Conversely, non-electoral organizations such as civic and social movement organizations have
greater room to adopt new tactics and are less constrained by hierarchies, but cope with
limitations that stem from limited human and material resources, which lead to difficult decisions
on how to ensure their survival without compromising their mission and/or objectives.
Chapter Six offers a number of concluding thoughts. I summarize the major findings
from each of the chapters and bring these findings together to discuss how strategic citizenship
works for both Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in New York City. I also discuss the larger
implications of my study, including how fostering civic participation can ensure incorporation
into U.S. society, but also how these organized actors can play an important foreign policy role
by helping to foster more democratic governance in their respective countries. I end this chapter
with a discussion of how my findings point to future areas of research and new approaches to
studying migrant transnational politics.
Expected Contributions
Even though a dissertation focusing on a small sample of two large populations may not
be representative of the experiences of all Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants, it nevertheless
provides some insight into the civic and political participation of a fast-growing Latino
immigrant population, which has now become the second-largest minority group in the U.S. This
study seeks to evaluate arguments and concepts that have emerged in previous literature on
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migrant transnational politics, or to identify new patterns or dimensions of migrant transnational
practices that have yet to be addressed in existing scholarship.
While all of the actors in this study share the common trait of being immigrants and being
involved in transnational practices, the dissertation seeks to show that not all migrant political
activities are the same; rather, their scope, intensity and impact are conditioned by a variety of
structural and ideological factors. Given that migration is a defining feature of contemporary
global capitalism, by exploring how different organizations and governments influence migrants‘
transnational political practices I seek to provide a better understanding of how migrants seek to
empower themselves in a situation where both migrant-sending and receiving countries rely on
human mobility to as sources of external revenue and lower cost labor power, respectively. . For
the migrant activists and organizations in this study transnational political engagement is an
attempt to empower themselves in the polities that have a direct impact on their social condition
as migrants, which for them means demanding citizenship rights in two countries from their
specific context as a minority group.
This dissertation also hopes to contribute to our understanding of how citizenship and the
nation-state are affected by these practices. Contrary to some prominent commentators (Soysal
1995 and Jacobson 1997), I do not argue that migrant transnationalism is the harbinger of a postnational system, since nation-states still ultimately retain both the power to decide membership
and the power to shape international law. If anything, the discourses, goals and tactics employed
by the actors in this study suggest that there are a significant number of migrants who engage in
transnational practices not to avoid discipline or control by the state, but to assert their right to be
included within the states of which they understand themselves to be subjects, particularly as the
U.S. and migrant-receiving countries in Europe have responded to the current wave of migration
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from the Global South by either liberalizing their citizenship policies or widening the gap in
rights between citizens and non-citizens. These responses by migrant-receiving countries have
actually prompted many migrants to intensify their efforts to obtain citizenship, which
effectively dispels the idea that migration is leading the world down the path to a post-national,
transnational or other form of de-territorialized set of rights, (Joppke and Morawska 2003). In
this respect I share the same view that more recent scholars (Joppke 1998; Bauböck 2003; Smith
2003; Waldinger 2009) have on migrant transnationalism‘s impact on the nation-state.
My dissertation therefore aims to contribute to discussions on citizenship and the
contemporary nation-state by arguing that migrant transnational political actors are seeking to
redefine the terms of social inclusion within states by pointing to the fact that political subjects
are no longer exclusive to one country. Both home and host country elites seek to exercise
control over migrants, since migrants play an important economic role in both sending and
receiving countries through their economic contributions as laborers and /or remitters. Migrants,
particularly those in this study, recognize that despite their economic, cultural and political
relevance for sending and receiving countries they often remain relegated as contributing
members of each society. Thus, for international migrants citizenship cannot, by virtue of their
lived experiences, be exclusive in character. Citizenship thus embodies a social conflict that is
more a political relationship than a territorial one, and is a site of contestation mediated by
multiple governments and civil society organizations, which is an essential feature of political
engagement in democratic political systems.
This dissertation also seeks to expand our understanding about the diversity of the Latino
immigrant population in the U.S. by comparing the political engagement of two newer Latino
populations. The Mexican population in the U.S. is often used as a point of reference for
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understanding the Latino immigrant experience. This is reflected in much of the scholarship on
migrant transnationalism in the U.S. (Goldring 1998; Fitzgerald 2003; Rivera-Salgado 2002;
Smith 2006). Scholarship on Mexican migration is timely and relevant given that they are the
single largest Latino national group in the U.S. and continue to grow in numbers. By comparing
Ecuadorians and Dominicans, however, I hope to show the variation that exists within the Latino
immigrant population in terms of their incorporation as well as how they become politically
engaged. Ecuadorians in particular are a population group that has received limited attention
from scholars, and given the rapid growth of this immigrant group over the last 15 years it is
important to bring attention to their experiences in the U.S.
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CHAPTER 2: SAMPLE POPULATION AND METHODOLOGY
The primary objective of this study is to understand how participation in civil society
organizations empowers Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants to become politically engaged in
the United States and in their countries of origin. My interest is in exploring political
participation through these migrants‘ lived experiences. To understand that experience, I use a
qualitative methodological approach, which is based on participant observation and in-depth
interviews with leaders of various civic and political organizations in the Ecuadorian and
Dominican migrant communities in New York City.
This chapter begins with an overview of the comparative and ethnographic approaches
used. I then focus on three key works on transnationalism and political organization that inform
this study. I follow with a discussion of the two sample populations and the sampling procedures
used to obtain the participants for my study. I then provide a detailed description of the
qualitative methods I utilized for data collection: participant observation, in-depth interviews and
content analysis. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of limitations to these
methodological approaches.
Approaches to Investigating Transnational Political Engagement
There is a growing body of both quantitative and qualitative scholarship on this subject.
Quantitative studies in this field have concentrated mainly on individual voting behavior by
Latin American migrants (DeSipio, Pachón and Lee 2003; Suro and Escobar 2006; Itzigsohn and
Villacrés 2008). These studies provide a more generalized account of migrants‘ voting behavior
in both the U.S. and their countries of origin, and factors that influence their voting behavior
such as access to information and time available for political engagement. Voting data analysis
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also provide valuable insight into how different demographic and attitudinal variables contribute
to individual voting tendencies, thereby showing the role that larger structural factors play in the
decision to vote. By focusing only on voting behavior, however, these studies overlook less
conventional forms of political engagement that do not include voting or do not deal with
electoral politics directly, such as collaborations with governments, lobbying and social
movement activism. By focusing only on voting data we also lose sight of how these other forms
of political participation, which may not be reflected in voting figures, but which nevertheless
play an important role in mobilizing migrants to address issues of a political nature. Examples of
this include such migrants negotiating with government officials to establish community or
economic development projects, or mobilizing to press for democratic reforms. More important
to this study though, voting-focused studies are also unable to account for the way in which
organizations mobilize migrants to become politically active, whether through the articulation of
discourses which resonate with migrant constituents, or through the dynamics within different
organizations that make it possible to mobilize migrants for different forms of political activity.
A significant amount of the scholarship on Latin American migrant transnational politics
has been qualitative and/or ethnographic in nature (Goldring 1998, Landolt et al. 1999, Levitt
2001, Fitzgerald 2002, Escobar 2004, Smith 2006, Landolt 2008.) These works have been
effective in illustrating how migrants‘ lived experiences inform the manner in which their
transnational political activities take place. They are also helpful in demonstrating how politics
can take various forms besides voting, including through community development projects by
migrant associations, labor activism and lobbying. However, most of the qualitative research on
this subject is based on single case studies, which often makes them idiosyncratic and non-
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generalizable. Particular migrants‘ experiences are documented and examined, but seldom placed
side by side with those of different sets of actors within the same study.
This study primarily follows a qualitative methodological approach because this is the
most effective way to capture the diverse forms of political engagement observed among migrant,
as well as how actors‘ lived experiences influence their political participation. It also takes a
comparative approach that is often missing within qualitative research on migrant
transnationalism. It does so by comparing not only the process of transnational political
engagement among two different Latino immigrant populations in the same place, but also how
different types of organizations shape transnational political participation by migrant activists.
Comparative Frameworks in the study of Transnationalism
Though Glick-Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc‘s (1996) seminal work on migrant
transnationalism compared the experience of Haitian and Filipino migrants, since then much of
the work in the field of transnationalism has moved away from comparative approaches. It has
only been in recent years where that scholarship on migrant transnational politics has one again
turned to comparative approaches to different aspects of how transnational political engagement
occurs. DeSipio, Lee and Pachon (2003)‘s survey study on transnational engagement examined
responses from both Mexican and Dominican migrants. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003; 2009)
examined Turkish migrant communities in Germany and the Netherlands to compare
transnational responses to their incorporation in each country. Landolt (2008) recently studied
multiple Salvadorian migrant community-based organizations in Toronto to study how linkages
to larger organized actors influenced transnational activities. These studies highlight the
importance of comparing experiences between migrant populations, in order to both identify
trends and differences in migrant transnational practices.
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My dissertation is based on a two-way comparative analysis, where I not only examined
two different migrant populations- Ecuadorians and Dominicans in New York City- but I also
studied different types of migrant organizations in each community. By taking this approach I
aim to identify both similarities and differences both between migrant populations as well as
among different actors within each population in terms of how migrants‘ transnational political
mobilization occurs.
Populations Sampled
The study focuses on political organizations among Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants
in the U.S. and more specifically, those who reside in the New York City metropolitan area. I
focus on these two groups for several reasons. First, I hope to address a trend observed in
previous studies on Latin American migrant transnationalism. Much of the existing scholarship
on the subject has been focused mostly on the transnational practices of Mexican migrants
(Goldring 1998; De La Garza and Lowell 2000; Fitzgerald 2002; Rivera-Saldago 2002; Smith
2006 and 2008; Waldinger 2008 and 2009; Orozco and García-Zanello 2009; Moctezuma 2005;
Bakker and Fox 2006). These works have yielded critical findings that have enhanced our basic
understanding of how these two groups engage in transnational practices, including bi-national
political engagement. Yet these works also tend to be idiosyncratic, in that they focus on one
very small segment of these populations, or on one specific form of political engagement. This
study seeks to fill the gap in the existing body of literature on migrant transnational politics not
only by focusing on a newer, less studied Latino immigrant population group, but also by
comparing experiences both between different ethnic groups and between different types of
actors within each of these two ethnic groups. This makes it possible both to observe the
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diversity of actors involved in transnational politics and to identify possible trends between
different ethnic groups in terms of how transnational political engagement unfolds.
Despite the presence of significant concentrations of Ecuadorians in Florida and Illinois,
and of Dominicans in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, I focus on these populations in the New
York City metropolitan area because the greater New York City area has become a central
settlement hub for both Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants. Both groups now have a significant
presence within the New York City metropolitan area, as they represent the second and fourth
largest Latino population groups, respectively, in the city. Furthermore, both groups have
continued to experience significant population growth in New York City over the last two
decades (See Table 1).
Table 1: Population Trends for Largest Latino Nationalities in New York City, 1990-2008
1990

2000

2008

Change
since
1990

Total
Population

% of Latino
Population

Total
Population

% of Latino
Population

Total
Population

% of Latino
Population

Dominicans

338,961

20.0%

547,379

24.6%

585,429

25.1%

72.8%

Puerto Ricans

848,374

50.0%

816,827

36.7%

783,911

33.6%

-7.5%

Mexicans

55,587

3.3%

187,259

8.4%

294,238

12.6%

429%

Ecuadorians

80,862

4.8%

149,897

6.7%

202,591

8.7%

150.5%

Colombians

88,259

5.2%

109,710

4.9%

98,558

4.2%

11.7%

Total Latino
Population

1,697,379

2,226,907

2,335,341

37.6%

(Source: Caro-López and Limonic 2010)

I elected to study Ecuadorians because they represent a newer Latin American immigrant
population in the United States. They are also a fast growing population, particularly in the New
York City metropolitan area. Furthermore, Ecuadorian migration to the U.S. has been largely
overlooked by social science scholarship, with only a few studies that have examined the
Ecuadorian migrant experience (Jones-Correa 1998; Pribilsky 2002). The growth of this
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population abroad, and in particular in New York provides an opportunity to add to scholarship
on how this new wave of migrants integrate into U.S. society and change the social, economic
and political landscape of New York City as well as Ecuador, which has undergone significant
political transformations since 2006.
Examining Ecuadorians also provides access to a population group that serves as a point of
comparison with other Latin American migrant groups in the U.S. that have already been
examined by other scholars in greater detail, which includes Dominicans. While Dominican
migrant political transnationalism has been studied by a small group of scholars (Levitt 2001;
Itzighsohn et al. 1999; Aparicio 2006; González-Acosta 2008; Itzighson and Villacrés 2009), I
selected Dominicans as one of the groups for my comparative study in order to compare the
more recently arrived Ecuadorians with one of the Latin American migrant groups whose
transnational practices have been studied by scholars to some extent. At the same time, because
they have not received the same level of attention by scholars as Mexican migrants in the U.S.,
there remains an opportunity to expand our understanding of how organizations in the
Dominican community contribute to shaping transnational political practices among first
generation migrants and in particular comparing how different organizations influence the
process of transnational political engagement.
In the pages that follow I discuss the most important aspects of each of the two groups from
which I have selected my sample. I focus on five factors that were important in drawing
similarities as well as differences that allow for a comparative analysis of political engagement in
each group:


Growth and Geographic Concentration: The growth and geographic concentration of
these two populations in New York City plays an important role not just in creating a
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critical mass of migrants to mobilize, but also in fostering civic engagement and social
networks that are preconditions to political mobilization. It also provided access to a
considerable number of different organized actors


Foreign-born majorities: The fact that both populations are majority foreign-born
increases the likelihood that these groups take part in transnational practices, including
transnational politics. This is often due to structural barriers including lack of U.S.
citizenship and language barriers that limit their capacity to integrate into U.S. political
activities. Jones-Correa (1998), for instance, found that Colombians and Ecuadorians in
New York, which at the time of his study were mostly foreign-born, frequently turned
their attention to political activities in their respective home countries because of their
disenfranchisement due to low U.S. citizenship rates. Furthermore, a number of studies
(DeSipio, Lee and Pachon 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2009) have noted a substantial
generational decline in transnational political participation, where second generation
immigrants are significantly less likely to take part in home country issues. Hence, by
focusing on these two population groups, I am more likely to obtain a critical mass of
individuals and groups who are committed to transnational political issues.



Dual citizenship: Dual citizenship is important because, as Bauböck (2003) has argued,
it represents the process by which migrant political transnationalism is formalized, as it
grants migrants the capacity to carry out political engagement across overlapping
governments. Furthermore, it provided an opportunity to examine how being a dual
citizen affects the way in which migrants make demands for rights to governments.
While a large number of Dominican and Ecuadorian migrants are not yet citizens,
citizenship rates are increasing in both populations. This represents a dynamic in which
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members of both ethnic groups will potentially be able to formally participate in both
home and host country politics, or at a minimum make claims for membership in both
countries.


History and context of migration: The different migration histories and trajectories
between Ecuadorians and Dominicans provided the opportunity to explore how
differences in the history of migration and the ―push factors‖ behind that migration
influence political participation. In particular, I attempted to apply these differences to
examine how migrants frame their political relationship to the home country, their level
of social and political incorporation into the U.S. political process, and the types of
networks and/or linkages that migrant political activists create for political engagement
in both the U.S. and their countries of origin.



Home state regime context: The differences in home country regimes allowed me to
explore not only how Ecuadorian and Dominican activists respond to the political
context in their respective home countries, but also to explore differences in how the
governments in each country currently opt to engage with their migrant populations in
light of their overall national policy objectives.

Ecuadorians
(1) Growth and Geographic Concentration
Despite having a presence as a migrant population in the U.S. since the 1950s, Ecuadorians
are largely a newer Latin American immigrant group in this country. Over the last 30 years the
Ecuadorian population in the U.S. has increased substantially, with the majority of this
population growth the product of migration from Ecuador. The Ecuadorian population in the U.S.

31
grew from around 110,000 in 1980 to about 610,000 by 2008, according to American
Community Survey (ACS) data (Bergad 2010). As such, they represent one of the faster-growing
Latin American migrant groups in the U.S.
Ecuadorians have been one of the fastest growing Latino ethnic groups in New York City
for approximately the last 20 years, being surpassed only by the city‘s Mexican population.
Ecuadorians have more than doubled in population since 1990, and have increased by over onethird in the last decade (Caro-López 2011). Census figures also note significant Ecuadorian
population growth in the city‘s suburbs. As of 2008, there are approximately 76,000 Ecuadorians
residing in New Jersey‘s Essex, Bergen and Hudson counties, and an estimated 29,000 more in
New York‘s Nassau and Suffolk counties (Caicedo 2011.) The New York City metro area has
the greatest concentration of Ecuadorians in the U.S. In 1980, 43 percent of the total Ecuadorian
population lived in New York City alone, and although this fell to 33 percent in 2008, New York
City was still a place of heavy Ecuadorian population concentration. Furthermore, Ecuadorians
living in the states of New York and New Jersey accounted for approximately 60 percent of the
total Ecuadorian population in the U.S., 55 percent of whom lived in New York City or the
nearby suburban counties in New York and New Jersey (Bergad 2010). Meanwhile, Dominicans
are even more concentrated in New York City proper than Ecuadorians; approximately 53
percent of all Dominicans in the U.S reside in the city, based on 2007 ACS figures (Marceli,
Holmes et al. 2009).
(2) Foreign-born majority
Ecuadorians in the U.S. and New York are mostly first generation immigrants. Foreignborn residents make up 68 percent of the total Ecuadorian population in the U.S. (Bergad 2010).
Ecuadorians in New York mirror the national population in that nearly seven in ten Ecuadorians
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are foreign-born (See Figure 1, Caro-López 2011)

Figure 1: Ecuadorian Population by Nativity in
New York City, 1990-2008
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These figures do not necessarily account for persons who arrived as undocumented or
unauthorized migrants to the U.S. Census figures also do not include persons who have
overstayed temporary visas and now live as unauthorized or undocumented migrants in the U.S.
While exact figures on the number of Ecuadorian and Dominican unauthorized migrants are not
currently available, Hall (2005) provides information that allows us to draw an estimate of the
number of unauthorized Ecuadorians arriving in the U.S. Hall states that according to estimates
provided by Ecuadorian authorities, coyoteros earn approximately $60 million through human
trafficking from Ecuador to the US, as a single passage from Ecuador to the United States may
cost as much as $15,000 per person. At the aforementioned per person cost, one can
conservatively estimate that at a minimum, some 4,000 Ecuadorians arrive in the U.S. with
unauthorized or undocumented status annually.
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Table 2: Estimated Number of Unauthorized
Immigrants from Ecuador 2008
Total Ecuadorian
609,762
Population
Foreign Born
418,117
Domestic Born
191,645
Undocumented from
170,000
Ecuador
Undocumented as a %
27.9%
of total population
Undocumented as a %
40.7%
of foreign-born
(Sources: Bergad 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, February 2011)

(3) Dual Citizenship
Ecuadorians are currently able to exercise dual citizenship, meaning that migrants who move
abroad and opt to become citizens in migrant-receiving countries can retain their citizenship in
Ecuador. Ecuadorians were granted dual citizenship in 1995, which has since allowed them to
vote in presidential elections despite living abroad permanently. More recently, Ecuadorian dual
citizens are now able to directly elect representatives to the Ecuadorian National Assembly, since
migrants abroad have been organized into legislative constituencies under the 2008 Constitution.
(4) History and Context of Migration
While Ecuadorians have been migrating to the U.S. in observable numbers since the midtwentieth century, significant emigration from Ecuador to the U.S. is largely a recent
phenomenon. The relatively new character of Ecuadorian migration also leads to most migrants
arriving under the same set of circumstances, which in this instance was economic migration.
Ecuadorian immigration to the U.S. can be broken down into two waves. The first wave occurred
during the 1950s. Ecuadorian emigration abroad at the time was prompted by an economic crisis
due to the decline in Panama hat exports, which were the lifeline of the Azuay and Cañar
Provinces in Ecuador. Many of these migrants settled in Chicago, which still retains a sizeable
Ecuadorian enclave (IOM 2008).
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The second wave of Ecuadorian migration has been driven in large measure by political
and economic instability in Ecuador that took place from the mid-1990s until the middle part of
the past decade. Shrinking economic opportunities and growing income inequality sent many
Ecuadorians overseas to seek work in the mid-1990s. Then, from 1999 to 2001, a national
banking crisis, the freezing of consumer bank accounts (also referred to as the Feriado Bancario
or Bank Holiday) and the dollarization of the economy aggravated economic conditions, driving
the country‘s poverty rate to 45 percent and pushing many middle income groups into poverty
for the first time. This was further exacerbated by major political instability, as the country went
through six different presidential administrations between 1992 and 2006, and had a national
congress fragmented along nine different political parties (Jokisch and Pribilsky 2002; Hall
2005). The resulting instability led to a huge exodus of Ecuadorians abroad, such that by 2004
almost two and a half million Ecuadorians lived and worked overseas, with approximately
550,000 Ecuadorians migrating to the U.S. since 1999 (Acosta, Olivares and Villamar 2006).

(5) Home State Regime
After nearly a decade of political instability, Ecuador has recently undergone a major
political transition under the leadership of President Rafael Correa, who is linked with the new
wave of left populist leaders in South America such as Luis Ignacio ―Lula‖ Da Silva, of Brazil,
Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Fernando Lugo of Paraguay. Under Correa‘s leadership Ecuador has
embarked on a populist political program that includes redistributive policies and expanded civil
rights for racial and gender minorities, as well as migrants. In contrast to the Dominican
Republic, which has experienced a pattern of relative stability in its electoral system, Ecuador‘s
political system is largely transitioning out of a period of severe instability, as noted earlier.
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Dominicans
(1) Growth and Geographic Concentration
Between 1990 and 2008, Dominicans increased their demographic presence in New York
City and have become the second largest Latino national sub-group behind Puerto Ricans.
According to Census ACS3 data, the Dominican population in the city grew by nearly 73 percent
between 1990 and 2008 and about 7 percent from 2000 to 2008. The city‘s Dominicans increased
at approximately twice the rate of the city‘s overall Latino population, but have been
substantially outpaced by Mexican and Ecuadorian population growth rates during this period
(Caro-López and Limonic 2010). Thus, while the Dominican population growth rate has ebbed
in the past decade, there is still steady growth, some of which is still fueled by migration from
the Dominican Republic.
(2) Foreign-born population prevalence
Like Ecuadorians, Dominicans in the U.S. and in New York are mostly foreign-born and
largely non-citizens. According to the Pew Hispanic Center‘s research (2008), 57 percent of the
U.S. Dominican population was born outside the U.S. In New York City, nearly two thirds of
Dominicans were born outside of the United States.

3

American Community Survey figures based on a 5 percent sample of the actual population count derived from the
Census Bureau‘s Public Use Microdata Area (PUMA). These population figures do not necessarily account for total
population counts for either Dominican or Ecuadorians, due to the presence of undocumented migrants who opt to
not participate in Census surveys. For additional information on the American Community Survey methodology
and data collection methods visit http://www.census.gov/acs
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Undocumented migration is also observed among Dominicans, though again exact figures are
difficult to discern. In 1996 the then Immigration and Naturalization Service (now Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement) estimated that there were approximately 75,000 undocumented
Dominican migrants residing in the entire U.S. (Duany 2005). A 2000 report from the Migration
Policy Institute, as indicated in the following table, calculates that approximately one out of
every seven foreign-born Dominicans in the U.S. are unauthorized immigrants.
Table 3: Estimated Number of
Unauthorized Immigrants from the
Dominican Republic: 2004
Total Dominican Population 1,111,142
Foreign Born
710,921
Domestic Born
400,221
Unauthorized from
100,000
Dominican Republic
Unauthorized as a % of total 8.9%
population
Unauthorized as a % of
14.1%
foreign-born population
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(Source: Migration Policy Institute 2004)

(3) Dual Citizenship
Like Ecuadorians, Dominicans are also able to hold dual citizenship. Dominican migrants
received dual citizenship from the Dominican government in 2000. As dual citizens they are
eligible to vote in Dominican Presidential elections while living abroad. They do not, however,
have direct representation in the Dominican legislature, though dual citizens are allowed to run
for public office in the Dominican Republic, provided they establish residency in the country.
Chapter Four discusses in detail both Ecuadorian and Dominican government migrant policy,
including a discussion on the factors that account for the difference in policies between the two
countries.
(4) History and Context of migration
Dominican migration to the U.S., in contrast to that of the Ecuadorian population, has a
longer and more varied historical trajectory. Not only have Dominicans had a major presence in
the U.S. and in particular New York City for nearly a half a century, but the factors that have
prompted people to depart the Dominican Republic for the U.S. have been more complex.
Currently, there are slightly more than 1.3 million Dominicans living in the U.S (Pew Hispanic
Center 2008). Significant Dominican immigration to the U.S. dates back as early as the 1940s,
but grew exponentially during the 1960s and 1970s, and has continually grown since the 1980s.
The first major wave of Dominican migration consisted of refugees fleeing political repression
and violence. This began with political dissidents fleeing repression from then-dictator Rafael
Trujillo until his death in 1961. After a brief period of political stability under the socialdemocratic government of Juan Bosch, Dominicans began to flee the country en masse after the
bloody 1965 Civil War that was precipitated by Bosch‘s ouster by the Dominican military. This
first wave of Dominican immigration culminated with a period of harsh political repression
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under President Joaquin Balaguer that ran from the late 1960s until 1978, when Balaguer
negotiated a partial democratic transition with the rival Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
(PRD) that put an end to major violence in the Dominican Republic (González-Acosta 2009).
The second wave of Dominican immigration began in the late 1980s that has largely continued
up until the present. In this wave Dominicans have come to the U.S. mainly as economic
migrants, due to a series of economic crises that emerged in the 1980s and the economic
dislocation of many working class Dominicans due to trade liberalization policies in the 1990s.
(5) Home Country Political Regime/Context:
The Dominican Republic is currently governed by the Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana
(PLD), under the leadership of President Leonel Fernández. The PLD has established itself as
one of the two dominant political parties in the country, and is largely committed to a more
center-right, neoliberal social and economic political model. The Dominican political system has
also been characterized by scholars as intensely clientelistic, where politicians rely on political
patronage in the form of direct material benefits to garner electoral support (González-Acosta,
2009.) Furthermore, the Dominican political process in its current manifestation, while
clientelistic and criticized as corrupt, has remained stable for the past 20 plus years.
Selecting my Sample
In addition to comparing across different ethnic groups, one of my main objectives for this
study was to compare different types of organizations that migrants join to become politically
active. It is important to acknowledge that the term politics is a term with a broad understanding
within the social sciences. Marable and Mullings (2000), for instance, have argued that politics is
the process where any group recognizes its own objective interests and seeks agency to secure
their interests. This view of politics focuses on the political nature of everyday life, where
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individuals mobilize to gain greater control over their lives. This conception of politics h is also
present in some scholarship on migrant transnational practices (Appadurai 1996; Ong 1999). For
purposes of this study, however, I rely on Weber‘s (1958) definition of politics in my analysis of
Ecuadorian and Dominican political participation. Politics, according to Weber, is best
understood as the exercise of leadership, or influencing of the leadership of the state or entities
that precede or operate as a state. While I acknowledge the relevance of Marable and Mulling‘s
notion of politics, my study is more interested in the practical matter of how migrants can or
cannot mobilize in order to make demands upon nation-states for recognition as legitimate
members of the state, and the rights and/or protections that come with being a citizen of said
state. States play a fundamental role in migrants‘ experiences, since as the source of legitimate
domination, states remain the final arbiter of membership in a political community that offer
enforceable rights and protections.
Opting for a broader scope of organizations also allowed my research to consider how civic
participation more generally influenced political engagement among Ecuadorian and Dominican
migrants, following the work of previous qualitative studies that examine the relationship
between civic participation and political engagement (Susser 1981, Putnam 1996, Aparicio 2006.)
I therefore purposely attempted to include representatives from a political party, a social
movement organization, a civic or community-based organization, a labor organization and a
non-profit or non-governmental organization from each group, in order to include different types
of organizations that become involved in politics.
To obtain participants from different organizations for my study I relied on a combination of
non-random convenience sampling and random snowball sampling. This permitted me to focus
on accessible research participants, which was necessary due to both financial and time
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constraints. It also proved to be a helpful approach in that it enriched my study by permitting me
to observe the networks that influence the manner in which the various migrant organizations
mobilize migrant supporters and/or successfully engage with other actors to become engaged in
both U.S. and home country politics. It is important to note, however, that this approach presents
a limitation in terms of the generalizability of this study‘s findings. Convenience samples must
also contend with the possibility of systematic bias.
I make no attempt to argue that the experiences of these organizations are necessarily
reflective of all migrant organizations, or for that matter all of the organizations within the
respective migrant communities of which they are part. As respondents in my student themselves
have indicated, there are a wide range of civil society organizations in both the Ecuadorian and
Dominican communities that vary in size, scope and organizational capacity, which makes a
proper mapping of all possible organizations time consuming and difficult. The goal of this
approach is to document and analyze how a small segment of the larger population of migrant
civil society organizations mobilizes transnationally and the factors that shape their mobilization.
I employed two approaches to recruit organizational representatives to participate in my
study. The first involved soliciting different civic and political organizations through a flier,
which was distributed through electronic mailing lists, to professional contacts that work with
migrants in each community, and through Ecuadorian and Dominican government officials. This
approach yielded modest results, with only five Ecuadorian organizations responding to the
solicitation, and only one that ultimately qualified for my study based on their active
involvement in civic and political activities.
The remaining participants that comprise my sample were obtained through snowballing
procedures. After I made initial contacts with representatives of both a major Ecuadorian and
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Dominican political party I was referred to representatives of other organizations. I also directly
solicited participants from other organizations that participated in public events that I attended as
part of my research, which helped to ensure that I had a more random sample. As a result my
final sample is based on data collected from 20 participants from nine different organizations.
This included two major political parties, two social movement organizations, two non-profit
organizations, and two community-based organizations. Five of the eight organizations are from
the Ecuadorian migrant community, and the remaining three are Dominican-based migrant
organizations. The two major political parties have a broad presence across all the entire
Ecuadorian and Dominican populations. Two of the social movement organizations- the FUIE
and Alianza País from the Dominican Republic, also have an organizational presence that
extends beyond New York. The remaining community and civic organizations are all located in
New York City or in northern New Jersey, which I will refer to as the New York Metropolitan
area. I attempt to compensate for the uneven representation in my sample at various points
during the dissertation. I include other primary source data (such as news articles), about other
Dominican organizations that take part in transnational activities, such as the Committee for
Ecuadorians Abroad (CONDEX) Furthermore, Chapter Five provides an in-depth analysis of
organizational dynamics, in which I compare three Ecuadorian organizations and three
Dominican organizations. In this way I offer a more balanced analysis of how organizational
processes influence transnational political engagement for both Ecuadorian and Dominican
migrants who lead these organizations.
Data Collection Procedures
Participant Observation
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I gathered qualitative data in three ways. The first was ethnographic, based on participant
observation of organizational activities conducted over the course of approximately 18 months.
This method was used to document Ecuadorian and Dominican‘s experiences in political
engagement. Participant observation provided the opportunity to examine important aspects of
political organization that quantitative research and even interviews may overlook, including
organizational dynamics, the strategies and tactics used by organizations to meet their objectives,
and their interactions with other political actors. Finally, participant observation research also
permitted me to evaluate statements made by organizational leaders whom I interviewed, in
order to see if their claims were contradicted by facts, or if they neglected to address other
aspects of their political engagement that were central to understanding that engagement for
activists in each community.
Participant observation work included attending political rallies, election campaign events,
public meetings with elected officials, and social events that took place in the Ecuadorian and
Dominican communities of New York City and northern New Jersey. I also attended exclusive
organization events such as planning meetings and private social functions for organization
members at the invitation of some organizational leaders in both communities. I also went to
events and activities organized by the Ecuadorian government, generally at the invitation of
representatives of the Casa Ecuatoriana, a migrant outreach and service office operated by
Ecuador‘s National Migrant Secretariat; or the Ecuadorian Consulate, some of which included
other Ecuadorian civic and political organizations that became part of the study. I was invited to
similar events by representatives of the Dominican government, but which were less frequent
and sometimes cancelled for reasons beyond my control.
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I limited my role at private Ecuadorian and Dominican organizational events to that of an
impartial observer, and informed my contacts and other people in attendance that I was not a part
of the organization whose event I was attending. In these private activities I was often introduced
to other organizational members by the person who had invited me to attend as a sociologist
conducting a study on Ecuadorian or Dominican political organizations. These introductions
often permitted me to speak with other members about their experiences and their attitudes on
the organization and/or relevant policy issues. As I attended multiple events for a number of the
Ecuadorian organizations, my presence created a familiarity with members that made them more
willing to discuss different aspects of the organization, though I constantly asserted my impartial
observer status when pressed for opinions on what I had observed. As such, comments provided
by research subjects in the course of the participant observation work are presented as
anonymous responses, in order to protect the identity of these individuals and in accordance with
human subject research protocols.
In-depth Interviews
My research is also based on in-depth, semi-structured interviews with representatives of the
organizations that agreed to take part in my study. In total I interviewed approximately 20
individuals (14 Ecuadorian, 6 Dominican), most of whom held leadership positions in each
organization. In some cases I interviewed multiple individuals in larger organizations, while
smaller organizations only required interviewing one or two members. Interviews were
approximately an hour in duration on average, with a few interviews being slightly shorter at
around 45 minutes, and a number of interviews were about one and one half hours. I utilized an
interview protocol that asked basic questions about each organization‘s structure, resources and
objectives, as well as the respondent‘s history in the organization, their motivations for becoming
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part of the organization and their assessment of the organization‘s ability to meet its stated goals
or to address the concerns of constituents4. However interviews also took on a dynamic character
in that I would explore themes that emerged from my initial questions that were not initially
included in the interview protocol, or that were specific to the respondent‘s experiences. As my
field work progressed I often addressed other specific issues that emerged during my field work
that related to either the respondent‘s organization or to general policy issues affecting the
migrant community that the organization was working on at the time.
Once interviewees agreed to meet for an interview they were informed of their rights as a
research participant5, including the right to confidentiality, anonymity, the right to audio record
their responses, and to provide responses when they felt comfortable to do so. Informed consent
documents were provided to respondents in Spanish and English based on which language they
were most comfortable conducting the interview. In most cases interview subjects consented to
being identified in the study, even after being informed that they had the right to be cited
anonymously. All but one of my interview respondents granted permission to record their
responses. Interviews were for the most part conducted in Spanish, since most of the
interviewees were either not fully proficient in English or were more comfortable articulating
their ideas in their native language. I personally conducted all of the interviews, which I was able
to do as a native Spanish speaker. Interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber. All
of the direct quotes from respondents that appear in throughout the dissertation study were
translated from Spanish to English by me verbatim, in order to present respondents‘ own ideas
and opinions as accurately as possible. My interest was to ensure that the voices of the

4
5

See Appendix A for sample interview protocol
See Appendix B for sample consent form
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participants in my study would be highlighted, since my goal is to examine the phenomenon of
political engagement through the lived experiences of the actors whom I met and studied.
Content Analysis
Another qualitative method employed in this study includes content analysis. This
entailed analyzing fliers, informational pamphlets, email messages and newsletters provided by
organizations that discuss their mission, goals and activities to members and to the general public.
I analyzed organization documents that were publicly disseminated materials. I also examined
Ecuadorian and Dominican government propaganda used to appeal to migrant constituencies, in
order to compare the government‘s discourse with the experiences migrant activists had with
their home country governments. Finally, I examined articles from local community press and
national newspapers in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic. In particular I focused on news
articles that reported on the activities carried out by the organizations in my study, and actions
carried out by Ecuadorian and Dominican government officials that affected migrant
constituencies in New York and/or the U.S. Examining organizational documents and
propaganda provided the opportunity to see how organization leaders reach out to members and
other constituents, as well as to compare the discourse used to appeal to potential support with
the actual manner in which they interact with constituents.
Post-Collection Analysis
Coding
Once interviews were transcribed and field notes were written out, I relied on line-by-line
coding to develop my code lists. I found that using a traditional line-by-line approach provided
the best opportunity for identify themes and note similarities and differences among
organizations and ethnic groups. I relied on codes that came from hi-frequency words, from
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commonly described processes or from the meaning that respondents placed on particular
experiences, based on my own understanding of the conversations. The codes that I used were
helpful in documenting how my participants mobilize bi-nationally to challenge the
marginalization migrants in both home and host countries. It is important to note that when
discussing the notion of marginalization is based on what the subjects in this study describe
experiencing through their own personal experiences, which includes issues such as xenophobic
discrimination and violence, denial of rights as non-citizens and challenges to normalizing their
legal status in the U.S on the one hand; and prejudice towards migrants by non-migrants in their
home countries, as well as denial of full citizenship rights and/or protections by home country
governments despite their contributions from abroad. Furthermore, not all Ecuadorian or
Dominican migrants necessarily identify with the idea of marginalization, nor may have
experiences that could be properly considered marginalizing: by virtue of their socio-economic
position, citizenship status or access to political power, they may occupy positions of relative
privilege in both home and host countries. The fact that many organization leaders repeatedly
raised this topic, however, became an important focal point for understanding the process of
political engagement and mobilization by the subjects in this study.
Themes
Once I developed the code list, I identified themes from the list. Using this approach I
was able to develop the framework for my discussion on strategic citizenship. I had, for instance,
a code on ―ideological framing‖ which permitted me to consider how migrants frame their binational political participation, which in turn helped me to consider the relationship between
experiences and ideological framing. This, in turn, allowed me to review some of the collective
action/contentious politics literature to better understand the relationship between experiences,
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discourses and political engagement. As a result, I was able to gear a research project that was
initially prompted by my interest in transnationalism into a study that examines political
mobilization/collective action in light of how migrants live their lives transnationally. In addition,
codes such as ―state migrant relations‖ and ―state-organization relations‖ allowed me to develop
a separate chapter on how government entities, particularly those from migrant-sending states,
elaborate discourses, policies, laws and relationship with migrants and migrant political
organizations to both create and limit opportunities for migrant activists to engage in strategic
citizenship. My codes also allowed me to see how the participants in my study interpret the
relationship that state representatives make towards migrants and how they evaluate policies
enacted by the state with respect to migrants and alter their expectations based on how relations
between migrants and the state unfold. In short, by coding I was able to carry out a systematic
analysis of both my field notes and my interview transcripts to identify themes or issues that
were observable both in my participant observation work as well as when I spoke directly with
participants.
Limitations
Non-Generalizability
As with any qualitative research approach, one of the major limitations that emerged
from my study is the generalizability of my research. While the goal of my dissertation is to
understand how organizations, discourses, state policies and structural conditions shape migrant
political transnationalism, the final study is specifically about how the experiences of my
participants inform the manner in which they see themselves as political actors and in turn, how
they opt to organize and make demands for rights as marginalized actors. These findings are
therefore useful in understanding how a specific group of migrants engage in strategic
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citizenship and thus cannot be used as a model or framework to understand how all migrants
become involved in transnational politics. Still, I believe that the concept of strategic citizenship
has much wider applicability to migrants elsewhere who also find themselves living in two
different worlds, politically speaking. This study was also carried out with the hope of providing
a starting point for designing macro-level studies that attempt to identify whether the
observations regarding political engagement by these organizations is reflective of larger trends
among a large number of migrant organizations, both within the two populations studied as well
as among other migrant populations in the U.S. and in other migrant-receiving countries.

Time-Sensitivity
The time-sensitive nature of qualitative research is another limitation of the methodology
used for this study. This project can only make assessments of these migrants‘ experiences based
on the circumstances that existed during the time of my fieldwork, which was from early 2009 to
the fall of 2010. During that time the subjects in my study were responding to a particular set of
events that unfolded during that period. As is often the case with politics, issues and policies can
change quickly, as can the actors involved. For example, at the time of concluding my fieldwork,
a once popular elected official from the Ecuadorian migrant community was now facing the
threat of a recall election after only one year in office. Similarly, a Dominican political party that
was part of my research is now in facing internal divisions after a contentious primary election in
February, 2011. While these developments will certainly affect what many of the organizations
in my study may do moving forward, my research cannot possibly keep pace with the ever
changing nature of politics. As a result it is important to acknowledge future circumstances that
may lead to different outcomes than those emerging from my research project.
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Accessibility Issues
Despite my intent to have a balanced representation of organizations and actors from each
community, I was unable to obtain the level of access to Dominican political organizations and
activists that I initially sought. The exact reasons for these access issues are difficult to discern.
In some instances, potential contacts to which I was referred to by professional networks simply
failed to respond to multiple requests for participation. In other instances, I was informed by
participants in my study that it was possible I would be met with disinterest, suspicion or
resistance by some Dominican political activists by virtue of being an outsider to the Dominican
social and political milieu, as I am neither Dominican nor have worked in any extensive manner
with Dominican community or political leaders in New York. Such was the case when I was
introduced to a prominent New York State Assemblyman of Dominican descent, whom I was
told would be an asset in reaching out to other political organizations in the Dominican
community; in that instance, my efforts to make contact with this elected official were met with
disinterest.
I also experienced overt hostility and suspicion first-hand during an attempt to network with
other leaders of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano6 (PRD) in New York City at a party
event during the Dominican municipal and legislative election in May, 2010. Despite having
received an invitation to this event and being referred to a particular individual by one of the
local party leaders who participated as an interviewee in my dissertation, I was largely made to
feel unwelcome at the event. When I arrived I was immediately singled out by a PRD militant
who instantly knew that I was an outsider to this event. While I was able to justify my presence
at the event by referencing the leader whom I had previously interviewed, I was told in no
uncertain terms that PRD activists go to great lengths to ensure that only individuals authorized
6

Translation: Dominican Revolutionary Party.
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by the PRD leadership are allowed to attend official party functions. When I attempted to speak
with the contact person to whom I was referred, I was rebuffed. The leader, who I was told
would be willing to participate in my project, gave me little more than a passing look and walked
away, after having introduced myself and explaining my research agenda to him. While it may
very well be that my initial contact lacked the clout to validate my presence among other party
leaders, it is equally possible that the response I received indicated that even those leaders who
initially accepted my invitation to participate in the study remained suspicious of my presence
and made limited efforts to facilitate my ethnographic research. To be sure, the activists and
organizations with whom I ultimately was able to collaborate were quite receptive to my research
and open in our interviews, these proved to be in the minority during my field work in the
Dominican political community and largely represented voices that rejected the political status
quo within the Dominican diaspora. These experiences of rejection by Dominican political
activists validated points made by various other Dominican contacts and scholars such as
Gonzalez-Acosta (2009), that the Dominican political landscape is characterized by high levels
of distrust and suspicion, largely because of the contentious and often violent history of
Dominican politics.
I did not, however, observe these sorts of barriers to access in my research with Ecuadorian
civic and political leaders, though of course some actors were initially reluctant to discuss their
political activities to a third party. Most Ecuadorian organizations were open to allowing me to
observe their activities and/or to participate in interviews for my research. Some activists even
expressed their gratitude that they had met a scholar who was interested in providing greater
exposure and understanding to the Ecuadorian experience in the U.S. In the Ecuadorian political
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community my status as a non-Ecuadorian arguably aided me with Ecuadorian organizations and
activists, because I was regarded as an impartial observer.
Ultimately, because of the access issues I faced while seeking out Dominican participants for
my research, the study places greater emphasis on how Ecuadorian migrants mobilize around
their personal and collective experiences. Dominican organizations I studied and activists with
whom I spoke are still featured, and their activities are compared to their Ecuadorian
counterparts. In some instances, however, I rely on existing scholarship on Dominican political
transnationalism to supplement my own research as well as to draw comparisons with
Ecuadorians on different aspects of political organization. As a result, the Dominican experience
serves as more of a point of comparison for Ecuadorian migrant political engagement, as the
Ecuadorian experience is not only a more recent process, but also one that has received
considerably less attention from social scientists.
The decision to use qualitative methods ultimately allowed me to explore various facets of
how political organization and participation takes place in the Ecuadorian and Dominican
communities in New York. Participant observation work allowed me to study the dynamics of
the organizations that my participants belonged to, and how these organizations shaped
participants‘ political engagement. Interviews in turn allowed participants themselves to discuss
their reasons for becoming politically active, and to provide their own perspective on how they
and other migrants are affected by being involved in transnational politics.
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CHAPTER 3: DUAL MARGINALIZATION AND STRATEGIC CITIZENSHIP AMONG
ECUADORIAN AND DOMINICAN MIGRANTS IN NEW YORK CITY
The spring of 2009 was something of a political turning point for the people of Ecuador.
Less than six months earlier, in a national referendum, the people of Ecuador ratified a new
Constitution. The new constitution provides for a wide range of guarantee rights for
disadvantaged groups including Afro Ecuadorians, indigenous nations, women, LGBT and
Ecuadorian migrants living abroad. Among the rights extended to migrants is direct
representation in the Ecuadorian National Assembly.
That April, a volunteer from Alianza PAIS7, the governing political movement in
Ecuador, invited me to attend a debate in Brooklyn for candidates seeking to be the first migrant
representatives to Ecuadorian National Assembly from the U.S. I expected the debate to focus on
policy issues back in Ecuador, including policies towards migrants. As expected, each of the nine
candidates discussed issues such as remittance fees, consular services and domestic policy issues
in Ecuador. However, as the debate progressed candidates began to discuss issues I did not
expect to be addressed in that forum. Marcel Feraud, a candidate for the Partido Sociedad
Patriótica8, began his opening speech with a revealing comment, stating that:
Migrants have been forced to live clandestinely and in fear, and slapped with the
stigma of being labeled ―illegals‖…Migrants cannot continue to live with less
rights than others; our goal is, through the national assembly, to secure greater
rights for immigrants in the United States, by negotiating with representatives of
the U.S. government.
Assembly candidate Antonio Arízaga of the Frente Unido de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos (FUIE)9,
a migrant-based social movement organization, echoed similar sentiments during the debate
about what the Ecuadorian government needed to address:

7

PAIS is an acronym for Patria Altiva y Soberana, which translates to High and Sovereign Country Alliance.
Translation: Patriotic Society Party
9
Translation: United Ecuadorian Immigrants Front
8
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We have been advocating for immigrants‘ rights for many years, and this
past January worked with Rep. Luis Gutierrez 10 to introduce immigration
reform legislation. The deaths of Marcelo Lucero and Jose Sucuzanhay11
reflect the lack of commitment the Ecuadorian government has towards
defending immigrants‘ rights in the U.S.
The issues raised by these and other candidates appear to reflect Ecuadorians‘ aspirations for
greater integration into U.S. society. Yet if they are committed to U.S. citizenship, why do
Ecuadorian migrants participate in their home country‘s political process to seek representation
in Ecuador? Arízaga explained why many Ecuadorian migrants sought greater dual citizenship
and greater rights in their homeland:
There are so many Ecuadorians living abroad that we account for
approximately half of the economic resources through remittances we
send. So there has to be some sort of recognition for these communities
abroad through university opportunities, recognizing their rights,
providing legal aid for human rights violations when people are assaulted
here…We‘re not asking for money or public assistance. We‘re asking that
Ecuadorians living abroad be given proper respect and above all attention
to our demands.
To be certain, there are a number of immigrant populations across the world that has
organized to demand citizenship rights in both home and host countries. Extensive research
(Goldring 1998; Fitzgerald 2003; Smith 2006; Waldinger 2009) has documented this
phenomenon among Mexican migrants in the U.S. Furthermore, Ecuadorians the only migrant
population in New York where activists have organized to demand greater citizenship rights in
both the United States and their country of origin. Dominican migrants in New York City, for
example, also see political engagement in both home and host countries as an important and
necessary step that they must take in order to fully advocate for their needs as a community.
Marino Mejía, a lead organizer for Alianza País- a newly created political movement, noted as
much:
10

Democratic Congress member from Illinois
Two Ecuadorian immigrants murdered in Suffolk County, NY in separate incidents later prosecuted by local
authorities as bias crimes.
11
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One thinks about things over there [in the Dominican Republic] when there are
natural disasters. One always makes the effort to collect money…to send it over
there with the frustration that sometimes you send it and it never gets to where it
has to go. So it‘s important for us to think about our political organization to deal
with problems over there, as well as the community organizations we‘re involved
with here [in the U.S.], so that when we rise up as a community the things we
propose and do for over there fall into the hands of those who will do what‘s
needed for the benefit of people over there. It‘s two paths, from the point of view
of helping our community here in order to help a community over there, and
that‘s the essence of the effort we make.
Yet despite being part of a political movement based in the Dominican Republic, Alianza País
New York Section activists devote much of their collective efforts to promoting greater
Dominican political representation in various U.S. elected offices. New York Section Director
Radhamés Pérez, for instance, has publicly spoken on the need for Dominicans political
representation as a means to demand greater rights in the U.S. on issues such as immigration
reform, deportation raids, and the discrimination towards Dominican migrants (En Movimiento
23:6).

While transnationalism has often been discussed by many scholars as a series of social
processes that link migrants to their countries origin, the preceding comments reveal that the
transnationalization of migrants‘ political activities is largely a contextual matter. Thus, in this
chapter I contend that Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant activists in New York are driven to
political engagement in both the U.S. and their home countries based on a dual marginalization
they experience in both countries. Migrant organization leaders and supporters alike in this study
connect their marginalization with experiences of exploitation, prejudice and discrimination they
associate with being migrants, which occur both in the U.S. as well as back in their respective
home countries. .
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The chapter further argues that Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organization leaders
in New York respond to this dual marginalization by articulating a discourse or narrative in
which they identify themselves as a minority or vulnerable population in both the U.S. and their
home countries. This marginalized political identity allows Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant
organizations in this study to mobilize in order to demand citizenship rights in both the U.S. and
their respective countries or origin. Lastly the chapter contends that while these groups of
migrants demand full citizenship rights in each country, the extent to which organization leaders
commit organization resources to press claims for greater migrants‘ rights is predicated by how
these groups identify opportunities to not only make such demands, but also how each nationstate can protect migrants‘ rights and interests as a constituency.
Ultimately the goal of this chapter is to show that by articulating a political discourse
rooted in dual marginalization and using this as a framework by which to demand citizenship
rights in both the U.S. and their home country, the migrant organizations are part of a
phenomenon that I refer to as strategic citizenship. As migrants, these organizations not only
recognize that they are political subjects in multiple nation-states, but also that their status as
migrants has engendered a particular of social, economic and political inequality specific to their
experience. This inequality leads migrant organizations to develop strategies to obtain full
inclusion in both states, which in this instance includes employing the dual marginalization
discourse to frame their demands; identifying opportunities provided by each nation-state to
make demands; and harnessing resources available to each organization to become politically
engaged to make these demands. All of these elements, which occur across multiple nation-state
boundaries, are what constitute strategic citizenship. In proposing the concept of strategic
citizenship I draw on the contentious politics theoretical model presented by Tarrow (1998), in
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which political actors rely on the structure of opportunities, mobilizing resources, identity
framing and networks to make claims upon the state, which are also dictated by structural,
historical and ideological factors.
The concept of strategic citizenship is partially influenced by the idea of flexible
citizenship as articulated by Ong (1999), in which she contends that the logics of accumulation,
movement and displacement associated with global capitalism induces subjects to respond
fluidly and opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. According to Ong, in
their quest to accumulate capital and prestige in global arena, subjects emphasize and are
regulated by practices favoring flexibility, mobility and repositioning in relation to markets,
governments and cultural regimes. For Ong, flexible citizenship strategies, such as multiple
passport holdings and multi-national family enterprises reflect actions by subjects to circumvent
different forms of disciplining by governments and other power regimes. Such strategies have as
a goal to maximize opportunities for upward mobility within contemporary capitalism, which
relies on mobility of commodities and labor for accumulation.
The notion of strategic citizenship articulated here shares with Ong‘s theory that human
subjects actively adapt and exploit opportunities in response to the logics of contemporary
capitalism. Where strategic citizenship differs from flexible citizenship is that transnational
political engagement, while adaptive and responsive to opportunities, operates within a
structured field of activities shaped by the organizations in which migrant activists operate. Most
political activities (with the exception of voting) occur and are shaped by organized actors.
Organizations are what permit social actors to draw upon collective resources and networks, and
employ discursive tactics to mobilize individuals to exert political power and challenge the state,
to which the state must respond. The migrant activists in my study have adapted to the changing
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social, economic and political landscape by seeking dual engagement in home and host countries.
However because these activists necessarily rely on organizations to be able to confront
governments, this forces migrant actors to act within a setting defined in large part by
organizational dynamics. Migrant transnational action thus requires actors to consider strategies
for mobilization based on the constraints created by the organizational nature of politics. This
has led to the actors in this study to develop mobilization strategies for their organizations
around the notion of citizenship rights, which includes not only exploiting the resources and
opportunities available to their organizations, but also the narrative or discourse of dual
marginalization that gives direction to political engagement.
Strategic citizenship also differs from flexible citizenship in terms of its direct
engagement with the political concept of citizenship. Ong‘s work views citizenship in cultural
terms, focusing on daily practices that reinforce belonging-ness across various nation-states.
Strategic citizenship, however, addresses the more traditional notion of citizenship as formal
membership in a nation-state, and how migrant actors organize to make demands for greater
political, civil and social rights. Seen from this perspective, strategic citizenship focuses on how
migrant activists mobilize in such a way as to maximize their opportunities to obtain citizenship
rights that will end their marginalization. Finally, strategic citizenship differs from flexible
citizenship in its view of how subjects relate to states. While Ong employs the concept to explain
how subjects subvert and avoid controls by states; strategic citizenship specifically looks at how
migrants actually seek to become legitimate subjects of states, in a bi-national context.
By examining strategic citizenship practices, this study aims to show that Ecuadorian and
Dominican migrant activists seek to challenge what Jones-Correa (1998) has referred to as a
―liminal‖ political space, where Latino immigrants they lack full membership in the U.S as well
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as in their countries of origin. The actions by migrant actors in this study challenges the idea that
Latin American migrants live in a political limbo, since they use their participation in homecountry politics to challenge the marginalization to which they believe they are subjected to as a
consequence of migration.
Existing Scholarship on Political Transnationalism
As migration from low-income economies to advanced capitalist countries such as U.S
and European Union countries has increased in recent decades, there has been a concurrent
growth in social scientific research that has focused on migrant transnationalism. Broadly
speaking, this term has been used to refer to processes that deal with migrants‘ social, economic
and political engagement in both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (GlickSchiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc. 1994; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Portes, Guarnizo and
Landolt 1999). These same scholars who pioneered theoretical discussions of transnationalism
generally describe it as the process by which migrants create social fields that link sending and
receiving countries, in response to the economic dislocations associated with globalization.
These dislocations include market liberalization and privatization policies that have driven wages
downward for working class persons in developing countries, which make international
migration a survival strategy for working class and poor individuals in these countries.
While the study of transnationalism has focused largely on how cross-border economic
and cultural practices, such as trade (Landolt 2001) and religion (Levitt 2001), help foster
transnational spaces, there has also been increasing emphasis on the emergence of political
transnationalism by migrants. Early transnational scholarship focuses on the capacity for migrant
transnationalism to become a space for migrants to contest and fundamentally transform the
nation-state. Vertovec (1999), for instance, argues that migrant transnationalism also can be a
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consciousness, a site of cultural reproduction, a site of political engagement or a reconstruction
of a space or locality. Other scholars (Glick-Schiller, et al 1994; Smith 1994; Goldring 1999;
Rivera-Salgado 2002) contend that migrant transnational political activity is about migrants
constructing discourses that challenge established power hierarchies in home countries, which
often lack democratic transparency, making claims for legitimate recognition by the home state.
Other early scholars (Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1996) have argued that migrants‘ cross-border
political participation is paving the way towards a post-national form of citizenship where state
control over subjects will wane. Transnationalism thus represents a new phenomenon that will
alter the nation-state system in favor of deteritorrialized political communities (Glick-Schiller et
al 1994).
Yet more recent scholarship on transnationalism, and in particular transnational political
engagement by migrants, has cast doubt on the novelty and/or the transformative significance of
migrant transnationalism. Foner (2000) notes that historically, migrants have kept strong political
ties with their home countries as far back as the early 20th century, and failed to fundamentally
alter the nation-state system. Robert Smith (2003) also expresses skepticism about the ―strong‖
transnationalist perspective, which views migrants‘ transnational practices as undermining
nation-state sovereignty or creating deterritorialized communities. Bauböck (2003) argues that
the strong transnationalist view overstates the scope of transnational political practices as well as
clouds our understanding of what migrants actually do when they engage in cross-border or binational political practices. Various scholars (Landolt, Aulter and Baires, 1999; Faist 2002;
Smith 2003; Bauböck 2005; Gamlen 2008) have noted that nation-states, particularly those in
migrant-sending countries, play an important role in shaping transnational practices by
attempting to maintain relations with migrants living abroad, and/or by controlling their
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transnational political practices, such as shaping the conditions for dual citizenship and providing
varying levels of voting rights and/or political representation. Baübock (2003) suggests that
political transnationalism should be viewed in narrow terms, as political practices that deal with
overlapping memberships in two independent states. Thus newer scholarship sees migrants‘
transnational practices as rooted within and, indeed, a product of the nation-state system.
There is a fundamental issue related to transnationalism that emerges from existing
scholarship (and in particular the work on Latin American political transnationalism), that this
chapter seeks to address. Roger Waldinger (2009) has noted that research on migrant political
transnationalism has sought to shift the focus of migration from political incorporation in
receiving states to participation in home states, as a result of which less attention has been paid to
how both conditions in sending and receiving states shape migrant political participation.
Waldinger examines the development of expatriate voting in Mexico to argue that migrants‘
political participation is limited by the bureaucratic hurdles faced by the Mexican government in
its attempts to create a voting system, as well as by the social processes associated with
migration that limit migrants‘ political engagement. Itzigsohn and Villacrés (2009) note that the
social and political contexts of both migrant-sending and -receiving countries place limits upon
migrant political participation for Dominican and Salvadoran migrants. Similarly, Aparicio
(2006) and Escobar (2004) have sought to focus more attention on how migrants negotiate their
political engagement between the U.S. (and local level) political process and political processes
back in Latin American countries. However there remains a need to elaborate a more
comprehensive framework for understanding how structural conditions, migrants‘ personal
experiences and state policies converge to create opportunities for engagement in both polities,
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particularly if the goal of understanding transnationalism is to determine how migrants
simultaneously engage politically in both home and host countries.
In this chapter I seek to build on the work of recent scholars examining Latin American
political transnationalism by adopting Tarrow‘s (1998) contentious politics model in order to
understand how Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants participate in both the U.S. political
process as well as those in their home countries. In this way I identify how geographic and
structural factors that shape migrants‘ experiences converge not only to provide an ideological
framework for migrant leaders‘ political engagement, but also to create opportunities for these
migrant actors to make claims for rights in each state based on their specific interests as migrants.
While the emphasis is on the experiences of Ecuadorian migrants, I also discuss the experiences
of Dominican migrants in order to compare differences between a more established and wellstudied population with a newer and less well-understood set of experiences.
I begin the rest of this chapter by identifying the structural factors that facilitate
organization among Dominican and Ecuadorian migrants in the New York City metropolitan
area. I then address how two key issues -- remittances to the home country and victimization and
exploitation in the U.S. -- create incentives for Dominican and Ecuadorian migrants to mobilize.
I continue with a discussion on how these issues have led to the emergence of a political
discourse where both groups label themselves as minority or marginalized groups in both home
and host countries, which I refer to as dual marginalization. Leaders of the Ecuadorian and
Dominican organization in my study employ this dual marginalization to justify their
participation in both U.S. and home countries, in order to make claims for citizenship rights in
both countries that have thus far been denied to those who migrated abroad. The last portion of
this chapter provides examples of how different the Dominican and Ecuadorian organizations

62
examined in New York City attempt to mobilize migrants to make claims in each state, and how
the decision to participate in U.S. and/or home-country political affairs is driven by perceived
opportunities to successfully address their claims.
Geography and Political Engagement by Ecuadorian and Dominican Migrants
The geographic growth and concentration of both populations plays a critical role in
allowing Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants to mobilize for political action. The high
geographic concentration has, for example, prompted major political parties from both countries
to establish local chapters in the New York City metropolitan area. Ecuador‘s governing Alianza
PAIS party has also established its U.S. political bureau in New York City, while the Ecuadorian
government under Alianza PAIS has opened three consular locations in the New York City
metropolitan area (Queens, Manhattan and Newark, New Jersey), where in addition to providing
various government services, migrants can also register to vote in Ecuadorian elections. The
Ecuadorian government also opened its first Casa Ecuatoriana, which acts as the public outreach
arm of the government‘s National Migrant Secretariat (SENAMI, Spanish abbreviation), in
Queens. New York Meanwhile the The Partido de la Liberacion Dominicana (PLD) and the
Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the two largest political parties in the Dominican
Republic, have established not only a regional office in Manhattan, but also various precinct
offices throughout the city to recruit and mobilize potential voters. Other smaller incipient
Dominican political movements, such as Alianza País12 which participated in my study, have
followed suit.
The geographic concentration of both populations is also an important catalyst for civic
engagement in both communities. For example, according to informational data provided by
12

Not to be confused with Alianza PAIS, the current ruling party in Ecuador. For clarification purposes, Alianza
PAIS (Patria Altiva y Soberana) from Ecuador will be in all caps, while Alianza Pais () will be in lowercase letters
and referred to as A.P. throughout the study.
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Ecuador‘s SENAMI representatives in the U.S., out of approximately 200 Ecuadorian
organizations or groups in the U.S., approximately 45 are based in the New York City tri-state
area or approximately one-quarter of all known organizations Within the Dominican community,
the exact number of organizations is not exactly known, but by way of the example the Latino
Institute, a Dominican non-profit organization in New Jersey, lists 40 different active Dominican
organizations in northern New Jersey alone13.
The presence of such a substantial number of civic organizations has impacted political
participation as well, mainly through the growth of social networks between community
members and organizations that allow politically active groups to recruit potential members and
supporters. While observing Aliaza PAIS activists conducting voter outreach during the 2009
Ecuadorian election, I spoke with Henry, a 30-year-old Ecuadorian musical promoter who was
volunteering with Francisco Hagó‘s campaign for the U.S-Canada seat in the Ecuadorian
National Assembly. I asked Henry what prompted him to become involved with PAIS. He
replied that he was always active in community service work since he was a youth in Ecuador,
mainly through his local Catholic congregation. After arriving in New York, Henry said he was
put in touch with a group called Juventud Ecuatoriana14, which helped organize cultural events
and support efforts for Ecuadorians in the tri-state area. It was through Juventud Ecuatoriana that
he met Luis Ortiz-PAIS‘s main campaign coordinator in the U.S. - who convinced him to
volunteer for the PAIS campaign. Similarly, Alex15, now one of the main PAIS coordinators in
New York City, explained in our interview how arriving in New York City provided him access
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Source: http://thelatinoinstitute.org/about/affiliates/
Translation: Ecuadorian Youth. Throughout the rest of this chapter and proceeding chapters I will refer to the
organization by its Spanish name or by the initials J.E.
15
Alex is a pseudonym used at the request of this participant to maintain anonymity. Unless specified, all named
persons have consented to being identified in this study, per CUNY Graduate Center IRB-approved protocols for
research with human subjects.
14
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to a network of organizations that ultimately led to his political engagement
In December of 2007 and early 2008 I started trying to get involved with
community organizations. Before this I was helping out a Colombian friend who
was organizing an annual event every December to support the immigrant
cause. .. Once I moved to the city I began to get more involved… in the process I
meet another person who collaborated with my friend… who invited me to a party
o festival at the consulate in New York. As it turns out, it was a meeting for an
organization called Juventud Ecuatoriana…where the Minister of Migrant Affairs
was also present.
Alex went on to explain how the meeting led to an opportunity to become politically involved in
Ecuadorian migrant politics:
After a few days I received an email from Juventud Ecuatoriana, inviting me to
one of their meetings…I got this email and said let me see what this is all about.‘
There were about 20 to 25 people there, and everyone, including me, introduced
themselves and talked about their story in the U.S. At the end of the meeting a
person named Walter Sinche congratulated me for not hesitating to publicly
discuss my experiences. He invited me to a meeting the next day for his
organization, called Alianza Ecuatoriana Internacional.
Alex and Henry‘s trajectories to political engagement are not unique within the
Ecuadorian community. Former FUIE President Vicente Mayorga explained how the presence of
organizations in and outside of the Ecuadorian community allowed him to eventually become
part of the FUIE:
I started here by creating a club called Libertad with my friends, play sports and
to maintain ties to Ecuador, and with the city I‘m from, Ambato. At the time the
immigration issue made it necessary for us to speak out. We joined forces with
some other organizations and presented this law [to protect undocumented
migrants]. From there we created the Frente Unido de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos.
During that time I…had a workplace accident that confined me to a wheelchair. I
couldn‘t walk, was undocumented and didn‘t know how the law worked
here…It‘s a desperate situation but I asked around until I met some community
organizations that showed me that we all had rights… That led me to become
even more involved. I was an organizer for the New York Civic Participation
Project and an organizer of the Freedom Caravan in 2003 for immigration reform.
These narratives indicate that migrant hubs like New York City play a central role in
civic and political engagement for the migrants with whom I interviewed. As migrants continued
to arrived, civic organization emerged in relatively short order, often driven initially by a desire
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to foster community. Once linked up to the various civic organizations and other civic-minded
migrants operating in New York City, political activity becomes a logical next step for those
migrants who are committed to the betterment of their communities or to address the issues that
affect them both individually and as a community. This sort of political participation is done with
a clear understanding that as migrants, they have vested interests in becoming politically engaged
in the U.S. as well as in Ecuador.
Current and former Dominican activists in New York also emphasized the existence of
civic organizations in galvanizing transnational political engagement. Esteban, a former
Dominican political activist turned historian, explained that when he arrived in New York City in
the 1980s, he quickly connected with community leaders who took part in both various
organizations within the Dominican community. Esteban said that while staying active in a
number political organizations politically engaged in the Dominican Republic, he frequently
interacted with individuals who participated in both Dominican political parties and advocacy
groups in New York City, such as the National Dominican Congress, the ACDP (Asociacion
Comunal de Dominicanos16 ) and Alianza Dominicana 17 . Similarly, Manuel Félix, a citywide
coordinator for the Dominican Revolutionary Party‘s (PRD) New York Section, said that the
party has community leaders from local civic organizations such as the Audobon Partnership and
the Washington-Inwood Coalition among its members. Radhamés Pérez, New York Director of
Alianza País18, recalled how his experiences over the years exposed him to a rich history of
Dominican diasporic civic and political engagement in New York
The thing is that you will find the following phenomenon… the political parties
that existed over there [in the D.R.] were created here. And as a result, you
already had the PRD, the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, you had the
16

Dominican Community Association
Dominican Alliance
18
Country Alliance
17
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Partido Reformista19, and afterwards the Partido Quisqueyano Democrata20. You
also had representation from the Movimiento14 de Junio21, which was the main
left revolutionary organization in the country at that time… everyone in their own
little church. You also saw Dominicans start to create cultural organizations,
which were clubes culturales y deportivos22.
Pérez also noted how the network of Dominican organizations offered him the opportunity to
work with a variety of civic and political organizations since coming to New York, both within
and outside of the Dominican community:
I was mainly part of the Dominican Worker‘s Party (PTD)... Aside from my
representation in that party I always had an inclination towards social work,
community work. And in some way I had the chance to be a part of many
community institutions, , a sort of coalition that worked on issues that were not
exclusive to the Dominican community or with issues that were tied to minority
communities...
The experiences here illustrate that the presence of a large community brought about
opportunities for the respondents in my study to become civically engaged through social
networks established among migrant community leaders and activists. Furthermore, Dominicans
respondents‘ civic and political engagement took on a dual character. The civic organizations
that emerged out of these two communities allowed migrants to adjust to their new context in
New York while stating tied to affairs in their home countries, according to my respondents.
These forms of organization discussed by participants highlight the duality of the migrant
experiences: the social ties to their home countries, and their collective struggle to adapt and
incorporate into U.S. society. This duality becomes the starting point for a number of migrant
groups to search for forms of political engagement in both home and host countries.
Framing Migrant Political Participation
While the presence of a large community stimulated civic organization permitted many of
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Translation: Reformist Party
Translation: Quisqueyan Democratic Party; Quisqueya refers to the original indigenous name given to the island
of Hispaniola
21
Translation: June 14th Movement
22
Translation: Sports and cultural clubs
20
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the migrant activists in my study to take part in civic and political activities, their decision to join
transnational political organizations was shaped by larger structural factors specific to their
experience as migrants. Migrants in my study generally emphasized two issues justified their
need to become politically active in both U.S. and home country politics. One was the
remittances, or the economic resources that migrants send back to their home countries, and the
impact these have on sustaining local and national economies. The second was the immigrant
discrimination and disenfranchisement in the U.S. These two issues were central not only in
shaping participants‘ political consciousness, but also helped forge a distinct political identity
that is rooted in migrants‘ experiences marginalization in both home and host country by virtue
of being migrants.
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in my study frequently evoked the issue of
remittances when asked what prompted them to participate in home country politics. From their
perspective, their capacity and willingness to send remittances back to the Dominican Republic
and Ecuador constitutes a major contribution they make as nationals living abroad. These
migrant organization leaders view the act of sending remittances not just as a means by which to
address the economic needs of their families and kin, but as a political act that represents
migrants‘ commitment to the strengthening of their home countries. This is reflected in the
following comment made by Ecuadorian National Assembly23 candidate Elsa Santos during a
public debate held in Brooklyn for the U.S.-Canada seat in the Assembly :
Ecuador is in social, political and economic crisis, and yet we are here because we
left our country to help our homeland, separating ourselves from our loved ones.
We are the silent patriots. Our hearts and minds are still tied to Ecuador, and as
such we need to make our presence felt in Ecuador

23

The Ecuadorian National Assembly
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I also observed Ecuadorian migrant constituents raise this issue. During a voter outreach effort
carried out by National Assembly candidate Francisco Hagó in April, 2009, a small group of
older Ecuadorian men openly expressed skepticism about President Correa and his Alianza PAIS
movement, and dismissed the current administration as just another member of the partidocracia,
or partyocracy 24 . However, Hagó‘s commitment to easing restrictions and fees for remitted
goods seemed to resonate with these potential voters, who expressed concerns to about how their
remittances and their assets in Ecuador would be protected. At a another meeting with
constituents later that year to discuss a proposed sports and recreation law, many of those in
attendance vehemently rejected a proposal to levy a tax on remittances to fund an athletic
commission office for Ecuadorian sports clubs in the U.S., arguing that migrants already
contribute more than enough in remittances to have to be taxed on top of that.
The centrality of remittances also justified the need to mobilize migrants to take part in
home country politics, according to many organizational leaders with whom I spoke. FUIE
President Antonio Arízaga promptly raised the topic of remittances when asked why the FUIE
and many other Ecuadorians migrant leaders continued to press the Ecuadorian government for a
migrant policy agenda:
We have so many Ecuadorians living abroad that we‘re the ones who provide
almost 50 percent of the economic resources through the remittances we send. So
there needs to be some sort of recognition for communities living abroad in terms
of providing opportunities, such as the issue of [Ecuadorian] universities abroad,
recognizing their rights, providing legal aid for human rights violations for people
who are attacked here. They definitely must provide the necessary protections,
which is the state‘s obligation. To have transparent institutions, clean ones, to
provide security to Ecuadorians living abroad. That‘s what we demand. We‘re not
demanding money; we‘re demanding the respect due to Ecuadorians living abroad.
The FUIE also emphasizes remittances in its criticism of the current Ecuadorian government. At
one of their general body meetings in 2009, then President Vicente Mayorga denounced the lack
24

The Translation of this term was taken from Escobar (2007). Partyocracy is a shorthand term used for political
corruption and refers to a form of patronage politics for official party members.
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of oversight and transparency for consular services in the U.S. Among the complaints the FUIE
had of consular services were the high cost of sending goods home, which are subject to high
customs fees. Mayorga added that the Alianza PAIS leaders in the U.S. were unresponsive to
growing concerns from the community on this and other issues affecting the migrant community.
Yet even for Alianza PAIS leaders in the tri-state area remittances were still a point of
contention between migrants and the Ecuadorian government. New York Alianza PAIS
coordinator Ximena Peña said as much when asked what she hoped to accomplish by
participating in Ecuadorian politics:
If we can get cooperation from our government here in a foreign country, if there
is that opening from the government, we have to take advantage of it, because as
migrants we are still collaborating with the country‘s economic activity. We are
sending remittances. Therefore, I think it‘s only fair that the government over
there, even if they can‘t address all our needs, should at least remember that
there‘s a group of people over here and acknowledge us in some way.
Dominican political organization leaders in New York also discussed the importance or
remittances as a rationale for taking part in home country politics. PRD-New York Section
coordinator Manuel Félix discussed remittances as a key factor for the party‘s continued
presence in New York:
We Dominicans …contribute with our remittances. We are the primary real
estate investors in the country. The Dominican community living abroad, and
specifically New York, makes large contributions to the national economy. There
are Dominicans here that help sustain households in the Dominican Republic,
finance children‘s, brother‘s and families‘ education. So the PRD pays a lot of
attention to this community, because we are an essential part of the country‘s
development.
Marino Mejía of A.P. in New York also discussed remittances when asked why he and other
migrants joined Alianza País:
The Dominican community abroad, and in particular those who live in the U.S., is
reflected in all aspects of Dominicans‘ lives here and there Especially there, since
in terms of sending remittances, we‘re close to 20 percent of the country‘s gross
domestic product and approximately 30 percent of the national budget. So when a
person who lives here calls the Dominican Republic and that person is the one
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who sends money to pay for school, to pay rent, etc., and says to them ‗look mom,
dad or brother, vote for Alianza País, which is a serious organization‘, mom or
dad will think thrice about it.
Radhamés Pérez, for his part, discussed the potential remittances have for improving Dominican
society, and how that can be used as a way for Dominicans living abroad to advance their
collective interests as a constituency:
I think that Dominican political parties need to legislate to make remittances more
productive. We have to see how these remittances can do more than just serve to
help people that are waiting for it at the end of each month to eat. It‘s about
combining remittances with the power, with the state, to turn it into something
much more productive… Why don‘t we say, for example, for each dollar that you
send back to the people of San Francisco de Macorís, the state puts up three. And
then we can start …community projects.
Remittances were even brought up as an issue relevant to Dominicans‘ political aspirations in the
United States. Zenaida Méndez of the National Dominican Women‘s Caucus explained how
access to political power and representation in the U.S can potentially help Dominicans to lobby
the Dominican government on remittance issue:
It helps. Every time we take a step further also helps Dominicans in the
Dominican Republic. It‘s open in remittances; because there‘s a lot of regulation
in remittances. We understand the needs for our community.
The emphasis that Ecuadorian and Dominican organization leaders placed on remittances
as a political issue is based on factual evidence that notes the importance of remittances in low
income countries. World Bank estimates indicate that migrants living abroad send approximately
$440 billion in remittances to their home countries annually (World Bank 2010). Economist
Dilip Ratha (2005) found that remittances account for 3.3 percent of GDP and over 18 percent of
imports in low income countries. Ratha also notes that remittances on the whole more than offset
the loss of labor and taxable income from migration. Remittances are particularly important for
immigrants from Latin America. A recent Pew Hispanic Center Report (López, Livingston and
Kochhar 2009) found that approximately 54 percent of all foreign-born Latinos in the U.S. sent
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remittances abroad, even in spite of the recent economic downturn. Adams, Jr. and Page‘s (2005)
research suggests that remittances have a noticeable, albeit modest, impact on poverty reduction
in migrant sending countries in Latin America.
Remittances are a vital economic resource in Ecuador. The World Bank (2010) indicates
that by 2010, $2.5 million in remittances went to Ecuador. Nieto-Cuevas (2005) conducted a
random-sample survey of 200 Ecuadorian migrants in the New York City area, and found that 74
percent of migrants reported sending remittances to Ecuador. Most respondents sent money to
family in Ecuador on a bi-weekly or monthly bases, with nearly half the respondents saying they
sent anywhere from $100 to $1,000 each time, depending on financial circumstances and need.
While most remittances are devoted to family consumption as opposed to wealth building, the
volume of remittances is high and has outpaced both total banana exports (Ecuador‘s second
largest export market) and total direct foreign investment when remittances are excluded.
Remittances are also critical to the Dominican Republic‘s economy. According to the
World Bank (2010) total remittances to the Dominican Republic reached an estimated $3.3
billion by 2010, which ranked third among all remittance receiving countries. Dominicans in
New York account for 85 percent of all remittances to the Dominican Republic. As in Ecuador,
most remittances are used for family consumption, though as Levitt (2002) has noted, some
Dominican hometown associations (HTAs) have take part in collective remittances to fund
small-scale community infrastructure projects, much in the same way that a number of Mexican
HTAs have done so (Goldring 2003, De La Garza and Lowell 2000, Orozco and García-Zanello
2009).
Remittances were not the only aspect of their experience that migrants in my study
identified as a catalyst for political mobilization. The hardships associated with irregular
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immigration status and anti-immigrant discrimination also fostered transnational political
engagement by migrant organization leaders in my study.

Former Ecuadorian National

Assembly candidate for the Pachakutik Indigenous Movement and Ecuadorian International
Alliance Director Walter Sinche stressed the importance of immigrant rights as the impetus for
his and other migrants‘ participation in both U.S. and Ecuadorian politics:
If you don‘t take part in causes, for rights, how can you serve the individual, or a
community? In this country… if you don‘t vote you don‘t count. And that‘s why
this government is afraid of giving 12 million papers to people who they know
won‘t vote for them afterwards, right? If Congress gives papers to Perez,
Gonzalez and Sinche, migrants won‘t vote for Schumer or won‘t vote for anyone
without a Hispanic surname. That is the fear that current politicians, Republicans
and Democrats have, because legalization doesn‘t benefit them; Immigration
reform doesn‘t benefit them. They would rather deal with health care reform or
financial reform- there has to be a major event for them to do something major.
The experience of arriving as an undocumented migrant was a reality that a number of the
participants in my study had and in some case, still confront. Consider Alex from Alianza PAIS,
who unexpectedly wound up living as an undocumented migrant, which fueled his political
consciousness:
I arrived in February of 2000. And for A or B reasons I ended up undocumented. I
graduated as a computer engineer in Ecuador and like everyone else came to try
and find a job in my field. I was unable to do so and as a result wound up
undocumented. And once I ended up in this situation I noticed, during all those
years, all of the injustices that affected our people. Not just Ecuadorians, but
people of other nationalities who come with the goal of improving their living
conditions. But once they arrive here, they are subjected to this system. I have no
hesitation in saying it, a system of exploitation. I was part of that experience for
nearly seven years.
Alex added that his situation was exacerbated by the fact that he worked in upstate New York as
an ironmonger for less than minimum wage, under the threat of being reported to I.C.E. officials.
Similarly, Vicente Mayorga described the hardship he faced when he decided to come in the U.S.
as an undocumented migrant:
[Political] persecution, not finding a job, and even attempts against my life in
Ecuador, led me to come to the U.S. When my sons were growing up, there were
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no resources for their education… And that‘s when we decided to come to the
U.S., initially undocumented. It was then that I had the chance to discover up
close the drama of living undocumented. I lived undocumented in the U.S. for 13
years, separated from my family. My two sons stayed in Ecuador. I came with my
wife. I came to know discrimination, exploitation and everything else that comes
with being Hispanic, with being a migrant, with not having papers. It‘s a life that
fills you with persecution madness. You can‘t have a peaceful life.
Vicente explained how undocumented migrants‘ experiences required migrants to become
politically active, explaining to me that ―the undocumented are being criminalized more and
more and do not have access to any sort of benefits, yet they work, pay their taxes and all the rest.
These politics of fear affects all workers, regardless of their immigration status.
FUIE President Antonio Arízaga also noted how discrimination was a key motivating factor
towards his political participation in the U.S.:
I think what gave me the greatest incentive to engage these issues were the racial
attacks that took place at that time. I remember there was a man, Auca Pishter, an
Ecuadorian who at the time was beaten to death with a bat. That seemed to
awaken people‘s outrage a bit more, and also the solidarity of some people who
have remained in solidarity with these issues, and who have been against these
injustices and all of those sorts of incidents.
Jorge Vivanco, founder and President of Nuevas Raices 25 , an Ecuadorian community-based
organization in Newark, New Jersey, stated how the problems and hardships faced by
undocumented migrants in his community and in the U.S. motivated him and other members of
Nuevas Raices to advocate for Ecuadorian migrants, who are a critical resource for the U.S
moving forward:
We‘re talking about serious, serious issues... An immigrant who doesn‘t have a
steady job, has no papers, is marginalized when it comes to health care services.
We live in the most developed country in the world, but that person has no health
care… Another serious problem that‘s affecting the immigrant community in
general is when kids get to college and have no papers. Then they are shut out of
the educational system. What is the U.S., going to do if all of these children end
up on the margins of college? If they can‘t rejuvenate the population with these
youth… we‘ll be lacking professionals on all levels. That will create a serious
25

Translation: New Roots. Through the remainder of the study I will refer to the organization by its Spanish name
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social chaos in the U.S. Local and national politicians need to prevent that now,
because rejuvenating the population is necessary… If those youths aren‘t in the
university and starting new careers to promote national development, the question
becomes, what will the U.S. do then? And far from expelling us from the country,
they should instead be opening the gates to the universities…
For the migrant leaders in my study, the hardships associated with being an immigrant in
the U.S. are important catalysts for political engagement. The FUIE, example, boldly advocates
for Immigration reform now on the cover of its organizational brochure. The brochure also notes
the FUIE was founded ―to work for rights of all Ecuadorians abroad.‖ They add that their work
―centers on the struggle for civil human and labor rights; against discrimination, racism
xenophobia, raids and deportations; against anti-immigrant laws; against racial hate crimes; and
in defense of life.‖ During FUIE meetings leaders and rank and file members alike noted that the
rise of racist and xenophobic mobilizations against immigrants, including incident against
Ecuadorians in New Haven, CT, made FUIE‘s efforts to push for immigration reform all the
more crucial.
The FUIE also frequently mobilized its supporters to rallies and protests for immigration
reform. In October, 2009 the FUIE took part with a coalition of organizations in a lobbying
session and rally in Washington, D.C. for immigration reform.. Throughout the march and the
rally The FUIE made patriotic gestures, presumably as a means by which to legitimize their
cause. This included displaying U.S. flags, emphasizing their commitment to serving in the
military and paying their taxes, and proclaiming their support for President Obama.
Immigrant discrimination is also an important call to action to groups in my study that
are not explicitly seen as political organizations. Edward Miranda and Ronald Bautista, President
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and Vice-President of Juventud Ecuatoriana26 respectively, explained how as an organization
they strive to mobilize Ecuadorians around issues of discrimination and immigrant rights, despite
being a non-profit civic organization:
(Edward): Bottom line, what do we seek? To create individual leaders, [to be] an
incubator, as they say, so that in the future through their ideals they give and
receive, become part of an integrated community and be a leader, and why not
also, a political leader?
(Ronald): To contribute to public policy
(Edward): And also to contribute to areas outside of public policy, by creating
policies towards everyone…that are just. To do things without discriminating,
without being racist, to not segregate, right?
Dominican organizations in New York also viewed immigrant discrimination and undocumented
migration as a reason for political engagement. Radhamés Pérez explained how he made the
decision to advocate for Dominican migrants‘ rights in the U.S. both with his former
organization, the Dominican Worker‘s Party, which he has carried over to his current
organization, Alianza País:
We have to mobilize around Dominican issues here, because the Dominican is
subjected to exploitation and marginalization, because he is excluded, because he
lives in rat and roach-infested dwelling, because he‘s repressed by the police,
because he‘s chased by immigration. So we had to find that balance. And we
found that balance through a more generic definition [of the mission]…which we
perceived as being more in line… with reality. From that point forward that
group… began to intervene in the political debate and struggle on both sides.
Radhamés‘s current organization, Alianza País, also works to advocate for Dominican migrants‘
rights and improve Dominican migrants‘ quality of life in the U.S. Alianza País also stresses the
need for increased Dominican representation in U.S. elected office, as a means to improve
community organization in the U.S. (En Movimiento, 28:4).
Manuel Félix of the PRD also noted Dominican migrant‘s experiences in the U.S. as

26
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cause for mobilization in talking about the party‘s objectives with the New York City Dominican
community during our interview:
And every Dominican, every PRD-ista participates in city affairs. [The party]
worries about agency, worries about Dominicans on immigration issues. We
participate in the North American internal political process. We have a course, as
you already know, for Dominicans, elected officials who are close friends of the
PRD. And we help organized election campaigns for these candidates.

A Minority Here and There: the Dual Marginalization Discourse
The contributions made through remittances and immigrant discrimination are issues that
loom large in individual and collective experiences of the in my study. These two issues
converge and lead migrants to frame their political participation in a particular way. For the
migrant organization leaders in this study the combination of these two sets of experiences
represent a migrant-specific political reality where the common denominator is their
marginalization. This has led these migrant organizations to articulate a political discourse in
which they view themselves as marginalized political subjects in both the U.S and their
respective home countries. This discourse is rooted in the idea that as marginalized subjects of
the state, migrants occupy a status as second class citizens or a minority group in each country.
As such, both the U.S. and their respective home countries are obligated to provide full
citizenship rights, in order to meet their responsibility to protect their subjects. By adopting this
discourse or narrative, the organizations in this study are able to frame their political activities
in both the U.S. and their respective home countries as a campaign to end migrant
marginalization. The decision to demand rights in each country is driven not just by their
personal ties to each country, but also on the fact that they make substantive contributions as
subjects of both states, and as such meet the obligations required of for full membership in each
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state where they are subjects.
Furthermore, by viewing their political engagement as a response to dual marginalization,
migrant organizations in this study give themselves the opportunity to pursue full citizenship
rights based on where they are more likely to be able to make effective claims to the state for
greater migrant rights. The dual marginalization discourse and the collective action carried out
by organizations based on this discourse thus becomes the basis for strategic citizenship. This is
because these social actors recognize their ability to make legitimate demands for inclusion in
two nation-states and look to exploit these opportunities by linking these two sites of collective
action through the dual marginalization narrative. This strategic citizenship exercise also
represents a challenge to the idea that contemporary migrants are political subjects that are
mutually excluded from home and host country political processes, that Jones-Correa (1998)
argues hinders immigrant political engagement. Rather than having limited opportunities for
political participation, or living in a state of what Jones-Correa calls liminality, migrants in this
study are not only cognizant of their capacity to become legitimate political actors in both the
U.S. and their home countries, but also attempt to make their presence felt in both states as a way
to empower.
Many of the Ecuadorian organization leaders in this study, for example, often referred to
dual marginalization in order to rationalize their political engagement. Respondents generally
expressed the opinion that migrants live as a minority group both in the U.S. and Ecuador. While
they understood that their minority status in each country was dictated by specific factors in the
U.S. and Ecuador, the common denominator was their marginalized status as migrants, which
was central their belief that transnational political engagement was a necessity.
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As previously noted, the migrant respondents discussed at different points how the
discrimination and exploitation they faced in the U.S., based on their background as non-English
speaking and often undocumented migrants, informed their views that migrants were
marginalized subjects. These same respondents also spoke of being discriminated or
marginalized in their home countries, both by the government and by home country society in
general. They discussed how migrants are underrepresented in Ecuadorian government policies,
and are often seen as second class citizens by non-migrants in Ecuador. These views were
sometimes expressed in very direct language, and respondents appeared to accept this
identification as minority. Ximena Pena, an Alianza PAIS coordinator in New York, explained
the quandary Ecuadorian that she believes migrants face by being a minority back Ecuador:
It‘s sad because you‘re a minority in your own country, but sadly it‘s true. I will
tell you migrants, it‘s generally the poor who migrate. So that in itself, makes
people say that migrants ‗ah, those are the ones that aren‘t very educated, they
went to work over there, to serve the gringos.‘ That‘s it. So yes, there is a certain
amount of discrimination by people back there towards those who are here; ‗ah
the ones who working over there washing dishes, over there cleaning.‘ There is a
certain kind of discrimination towards migrants. Furthermore, I‘m not sure how
true this is, but [Assemblywoman] Linda Machuca… said that some Catholic
schools refused to accept migrants‘ children in their schools because they were
children with family problems; that they were complicated and caused trouble in
school. So that is the perception… It‘s sad, because no one really knows what one
goes through as a migrant over here. There is a lack of empathy because we have
contributed to the country‘s economy. After oil, we are the most important good.
We help maintain the economy, according the President himself. But that really
doesn‘t matter to people over there. Politicians are indifferent to that.. If you as a
migrant- in my mind as a minority- after you have worked here and go through a
lot here, on top of being discriminated, you go back and find yourself at a
complete disadvantage, because you‘re a foreigner twice over.…you live like a
foreigner here and when you go to your homeland, after a few years, you also feel
like a foreigner, because everything has changed.. So then that should motivate
people. I want to find a country with open doors; that will receive you and support
you and help you incorporate.
Vicente Mayorga, in turn, described his group‘s work as reflective of a migrant-specific political
identity and agenda, rooted in a politics of restitution:
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I personally delivered a letter to the President of Ecuador at the U.N… in which
we summarized all of the aspirations the Ecuadorian community abroad has.
There‘s the need for a civil registry abroad. There‘s the issue of the university
[abroad]. There‘s the [government] accountability issue. There‘s the issue of
establishing bilateral treaties with different countries to normalize Ecuadorians‘
legal status abroad. A series of issues, from migrants‘ perspective. That‘s our
platform. That‘s not to say that we don‘t have other things to say. We have
already addressed the issue of national sovereignty, the issue of paying foreign
debt, and other things as well. But those issues don‘t really address migrants‘
demands, but rather come from a migrant perspective, that of restitution.
It was not simply the activists I interviewed who spoke of migrants as a minority in
Ecuador. Some constituents also began to define themselves as a minority group when discussing
how government policies would impact Ecuadorians living abroad. During a public meeting with
constituents in October, 2009, Assemblyman Francisco Hagó discussed the Citizen‘s
Participation Committee (CPC), a new entity created by the Ecuadorian government to act as an
oversight body run by independent citizens. A number of constituents in attendance asked Hagó
if migrants would be guaranteed a spot in the CPC, to which he replied that he suggested to
government officials that the CPC should be required to have at least one migrant representative,
since migrants are a vulnerable population within the Ecuadorian state and need to have a voice
in government decision making. However, Hagó said he was told by government officials that
that the government couldn't impose that sort of mandate, since it would violate the spirit of
completely open participation. Constituents expressed resentment toward the government‘s
position. One individual bitterly argued that migrants are absolutely a vulnerable group and must
have guaranteed representation the CPC in the way that indigenous groups do, especially since
the appointments to the CPC are for six year terms. This individual‘s comments were met with
wide agreement by all in attendance. Another person said that it was time for the community to
demand more from its elected officials in Ecuador, arguing that migrants not only needed
guaranteed representation on the CPC, but on other government bodies such as the Central Bank
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so that migrants are more fully incorporated, which the crowd enthusiastically endorsed.
Dominican participants also spoke about feeling marginalized in their home country.
Marino Mejía described the marginalization of Dominicans living abroad back in their home
country in a rather pointed criticism of Dominican politicians:
The traditional partyocracy has always opposed voting abroad. Migrants were just
a source of income with noting given in return. It was a long-lasting process in
which many politicians made it a political platform of sorts, a conceptual platform
where we were seen as lowly piggy banks that would send money. With time
we‘ve started to break with that view, and the fact that we send remittances, has
provided the government motivation to make the concessions that have been
made, which by the way, are relatively minimal because in the Dominican
environment there‘s this whole neoliberal perspective that sets limits on those of
us Dominicans on this side to invest and become part of the productive apparatus
in the Dominican Republic.
Mejía also described the prejudice and marginalization migrants face from people back in the
Dominican Republic:
There‘s no doubting it [the prejudice]. And that prejudice is manifested through
euphemisms. There are some people who talk about ―Dominican Yorks‖ and they
see it from a pejorative perspective. When a Dominican goes back there
politicians close all the avenues to prevent that person from being a political
candidate, because they view us as someone who supposedly abandoned them;
that we came here, enjoyed all the benefits and left them behind. But they don‘t
realize that we‘re the ones who send money over there… We are looked at with
disdain, they look at us from over their shoulders, but we are also seen as a
dangerous entity. We really have to keep fighting that.
Migrant organization leaders and even constituents ultimately associate these feelings of
marginalization with their experiences as migrants. For these actors, being a migrant in the U.S.
often means confronting anti-immigrant discrimination, xenophobia and racism, which leads
them to view themselves in the same situation as other racial minorities struggling for equal
protection. Marginalization and minority status back in their home countries is, in turn, more
rooted in class or status differences vis-à-vis non-migrants. The common denominator between
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these two forms of marginalization is that migration becomes a marker for ―other-ization‖ by
non-migrants in each country, which migrants perceive and ultimately use to justify their binational claims for rights.
Strategic Citizenship: A response to dual marginalization
Transnational political engagement, in the form of strategic citizenship, is the solution the
actors in this study have found to negotiate the marginalization they experience as migrants.
Migrant organizations attempt to press claims for full and equal membership in both the U.S. and
their home countries, since they view their marginalization as the product of social and political
conditions in both home and host countries. Employing the dual marginalization discourse is the
first step in strategic citizenship, in that migrant organization leaders rely on this to frame their
involvement in both countries. Beyond this however, strategic citizenship is also driven by how
actors themselves view the opportunities within each nation-state to be recognized as legitimate
actors and to make claims for rights and resources as citizens of the state. While all of the
organizations in this study had some level of political engagement in both the U.S. and their
home countries, organization leaders tended to lean towards greater political participation in one
country versus another. Ecuadorian and Dominican political organizations in my study favored
made specific decisions on whether to pursue political engagement in their home countries or in
the U.S. based not only on how receptive governments were to their claims of marginalization,
and where they could most effectively gain access to political power. While there is some
variance in terms of specific policy items that migrants address in each country, by and large the
claims these organizations make all revolve around the central issue of marginalization.
Furthermore, in many instances these organizations make the same demands to both home and
host countries on issues such as legal protection for undocumented migrants, immigration reform
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legislation and access to education.
Ecuadorian migrant organizations in this study appeared to have greater engagement with
the Ecuadorian government to make demands as marginalized migrants. For the respondents in
my study, the political reforms brought about by President Rafael Correa, coupled with the legal
hurdles faced by undocumented migrants (a status many Ecuadorians face), made home country
political involvement a more viable option to exercise real political power and make claims on
the state to address migrant marginalization. Dominican organization leaders, however, were
more inclined to take part in U.S. politics, since they perceived that many hurdles still existed for
migrants to have a presence as full-fledged members of the Dominican polity, despite recent
measures taken by the Dominican government to facilitate migrants‘ political incorporation,
including dual citizenship, external voting and the possibility of migrant legislative district in the
Dominican Congress Skepticism among many Dominican migrant leaders about the Dominican
political process, along with the gains Dominicans have made in U.S. elected offices have led
migrant organizations, including those that originated in the Dominican Republic, to invest more
in expanding Dominican political power in the U.S. These leaders believe that greater political
power in the U.S. will also make it easier for migrants to make claims to the Dominican
government to end their marginalization in the Dominican Republic. Thus as these organizations
look towards transnational political engagement as a response to dual marginalization, the scope
and direction of their political activities in each country are based on the extent to which
organization leaders see possibilities for their groups to become effective advocates for migrants
in either home or host country, which constitutes the next part of strategic citizenship.
Much of the political debate in the New York Ecuadorian community focused on the
Ecuadorian government‘s role in addressing migrant marginalization both in Ecuador and the
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U.S. During the 2009 candidate debate for the Ecuadorian National Assembly, migrants
representing various political parties all articulated a migrant-specific to address migrant issues
both in the U.S. and Ecuador. Alianza PAIS candidate Francisco Hagó proposed creating an
Immigrant Protection Law in Ecuador, guaranteeing migrant eligibility voluntary enrollment in
Ecuadorian Social Security, expanding funding credits for migrants to establish their own small
businesses, and more efficient consular services. These same issues were endorsed by candidates
from the PRIAN, a conservative political party, the Social-Christian Reformist Party (PRSC) and
the Democratic Left Party (ID). The FUIE, for its part, mobilizes migrants around issues such
voluntary social security for migrants, the creation of a Migrant Savings and Loan Bank to
facilitate transactions in the U.S. and Ecuador, affordable distance education in Ecuadorian for
migrants abroad, and guaranteed migrant representation throughout government agencies and
branches, including the Supreme Court, Consulates and the Casa Ecuatoriana (Ecuamigrante,
August 2008).
Meanwhile Ecuadorian migrant community and non-profit organizations also seek to
press claims in both countries for issues affecting migrants in the both the U.S. and Ecuador.
Nuevas Raices, informs community members through a monthly newsletter about their
constitutional rights in Ecuador, as well as Ecuadorian policy issues that affect migrants,
including the new social security reforms (Manuelita Sáenz, July 2010), and civil service reforms
that permit migrants to apply for Ecuadorian public sector jobs (Manuelita Sáenz, June 2010).
Juventud Ecuatoriana (JE), a non-profit organization has worked with Ecuadorian government
and officials in Azuay Province to promote local economic development and education program,
as a way to reduce economic and social pressures for Azuayans to migrate. JE also works with
the Casa Ecuatoriana and other non-profit organizations to provide pro bono legal services for
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migrants both in the U.S. and Ecuador. Other Ecuadorian migrant leaders made similar claims in
their discourse. Ecuadorian Assembly hopeful Francisco Dillon explained to reporters during the
2009 Ecuadorian election that he was committed to working on issues that Ecuadorians in the
U.S. contend with on a regular basis, including jobs, college credential recognition by U.S.
universities and employers, lobbying for comprehensive immigration reform, and collaborations
with both the White House and the U.S. Congress on issues directly affect Ecuador.
On another occasion, during a public meeting between Assemblyman Hagó and his
constituents, Alianza Ecuatoriana27 Director Walter Sinche publicly asked what Mr. Hagó and/or
the Ecuadorian government was doing on behalf of undocumented migrants in U.S. immigration
detention centers, and whether the current administration was doing anything to lobby for either
comprehensive immigration reform. The Ecuadorian Consul, who was also in attendance, replied
that the Ecuadorian government has tried to take steps to provide some sort of aid to migrants in
detention, including opening a consular office in Texas, where many Ecuadorians are being
detained. He and the Ambassador to the U.S. also had discussions with U.S. government on
immigration reform but said they face an uphill battle, because this is a very tough issue in the
US.
At the same time however, Ecuadorian migrant activists whom I observed and spoke with
were less engaged with the U.S. political system than with the Ecuadorian government. This is
not to say, however, that they have completed opted out of U.S. politics. I learned from both
FUIE leaders whom I interviewed as well as from email bulletins I received from the
organization that the organization frequently mobilized Ecuadorian migrants against antiimmigrant discrimination, as well as for marches and lobbying sessions with members of
27
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Congress such as Luis Gutierrez (D-Illinois) on behalf of pro-immigrant legislation. Leaders of
Juventud Ecuatoriana informed me during our interview that the organization runs a scholarship
program as part of their effort to create new civic and political leaders in the Ecuadorian
community to run for office in the U.S. During that interview J.E. President Eduard Miranda and
others in the organization openly supported Francisco Moya in his campaign to become the first
Ecuadorian-American to be elected to public office in New York State, in 2010. Nuevas Raices
President Jorge Vivanco noted in our interview that the group has started to work closely with
Newark Mayor Corey Booker to create a local community center for the Ecuadorian community,
and to create opportunities for undocumented Ecuadorian workers to legally work as street
vendors in the city. However most of the activities I observed among Ecuadorian organizations
involved dealings with the Ecuadorian government. Even organizations like J.E. and Nuevas
Raíces, which are more attuned to enhancing Ecuadorian political engagement in the U.S., often
worked with Ecuadorian government officials in collaborative projects such as the capacity
building program sponsored by the Casa Ecuatoriana and in the case of J.E., local development
projects in Ecuador. Furthermore J.E. and Nuevas Raíces seemed to be in the minority, with
other groups either foregoing political engagement altogether- such as the Ecuadorian Civic
Committees in New York and New Jersey- or else working directly with Ecuadorian government
entities. For example, approximately 40 groups were taking part in the SENAMI-sponsored
organizational capacity-building workshops that I was invited to attend by the Casa Ecuatoriana
as an observer. During my interview with Alternate Assemblywoman Blanca Ortiz, she noted
that many of the Ecuadorian community groups would report to her to address issues affecting
the migrant community both back in Ecuador as well as locally in northern New Jersey, where
she resided.

86
This dynamic seems largely due to new avenues for migrants to claim substantive
citizenship rights in Ecuador. In addition to dual citizenship and voting rights from abroad 28,
Ecuadorians living abroad have been granted the opportunity to elect and recall representatives
to the National Assembly, the right to directly introduce legislation to the Assembly, and the
right to participate in the country‘s Citizen‘s Participation Council- a body of seven elected
citizens charged with fostering civic participation and oversight of government entities
(Constitución de la Republica del Ecuador, 2008). Ecuadorian migrants also have access to the
Casa Ecuatoriana, which acts as the public liaison for the National Migrant Secretariat, the
equivalent of a Ministry of Migrant Affairs. The Casa Ecuatoriana provides migrants with a
wide range of resources and services for migrants, including legal assistance, capacity building
programs for civic organizations, and videoconferencing services to allow migrants to
communicate with their families in Ecuador. The Casa Ecuatoriana also plays an active role in
promoting various civic, cultural and educational events carried out by community organizations.
The emphasis on engagement with the Ecuadorian government may also be driven
largely by the high number of non-citizens. The high rate of non-citizenship among Ecuadorians
limits their access to political power in the U.S. at this point. Many are not eligible to vote in the
U.S., and as a result Ecuadorians have limited representation in state and local public office in
either New York or New Jersey. In 2010, State Assemblyman Francisco Moya was the first
Ecuadorian elected to a statewide office. While some Ecuadorian organizations, including the
FUIE, Alianza Ecuatoriana Internacional, Juventud Ecuatoriana and even Alianza PAIS, have
made efforts to engage the American political process through community organizing and
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the voting country. Here migrants are eligible to vote in Ecuadorian elections even when they no longer maintain
permanent residence in Ecuador.
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lobbying/pressure politics, political engagement in the U.S. has been a more elusive target for
these organizations around which to mobilize. Hence, many organizations place significant
emphasis on demanding greater rights within the framework of Ecuadorian politics, since these
avenues are much more accessible at the present time.
The high number of undocumented migrants also limits U.S political engagement to
some degree. Some respondents said that migrants are reluctant to do anything to put them at risk
for deportation. This point was expressed by Vicente Mayorga, who said that organizational
attendance fluctuated because many migrants felt pressured to work and keep a low profile on
account of their legal status. I also observed this at a FUIE meeting in the summer of 2010, when
the organization discouraged undocumented members from participating in a civil disobedience
action for immigration reform to ensure no one would risk being deported if convicted. Alex of
Alianza PAIS says that he was also unable to do much of anything politically while he was
looking to resolve his undocumented status. Between this dynamic and the avenues now
available for migrants in Ecuadorian politics, the focus thus far for migrants has been more
towards home country political empowerment.
It should be noted though that while Ecuadorian migrant leaders appear more engaged
with home country politics, there are leaders within the community that look at involvement in
Ecuadorian politics with skepticism. While observing Alianza PAIS volunteers on the campaign
trail in 2009, I saw Francisco Hagó struggle to convince some older Ecuadorian migrants to vote
in the April election, as they openly expressed skepticism that the current government would be
less corrupt or actually do something on behalf of those living abroad. During our interview,
Jorge Vivanco of Nuevas Raíces noted that many Ecuadorian migrant he works with in his
Newark neighborhood have expressed resentment over the failures of past governments in

88
Ecuador to address the economic problems that led to so many people leaving the country.
However Vivanco added that: ―there‘s resentment, but the damage isn‘t permanent. The
community isn‘t permanently damaged. It‘s a circumstantial damage.‖ He has also found that
people in his community have come to Nuevas Raíces for help on issues, and want to have an
active voice despite their disillusion with past governments.
Dominicans meanwhile, are almost in the opposite situation. There are in fact a good
number of migrants engaged in Dominican politics. The phenomenon of Dominican hometown
associations and religious groups playing an active role in local community development projects
in the Dominican Republic has been well documented (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Levitt 2001 and
2002). My own research also discovered other forms of home country political participation by
Dominican migrants. For example, Máximo Padilla, President of the Comite de Dominicanos del
Exterior, (CODEX; Committee for Dominicans Living Abroad) recently meet with government
officials in the Dominican Republic to denounce legislation that bans imports of appliances and
used vehicles into the country, without making distinctions between goods remitted by migrants
for personal consumption and goods imported for secondary market sales (NotiPress, 9/23/10).
Radhamés Pérez noted in our interview that the political discourse in the Dominican community
here and in the Dominican Republic has changed with respect to migrant issues, as politicians
have started to articulate policies that speak to migrants‘ marginalization, which creates
incentives for migrants to become active in Dominican politics:
―This has really been changing, and now they [elected officials] try, in their discourse as
well, to articulate some sort of proposal that… helps Dominicans. For example, with the
return policy, what have we been saying? ‗Listen here, if I‘m returning to my country,
why do you have to tax me like a foreigner just because I‘m living abroad? If I live in
Santiago and I‘m going to move to San Francisco de Macorís, you don‘t tax me.‘ So
things like that, basic things like these, are now a real part of the political discourse.‖
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Alianza País (D.R.) has also been active in mobilizing voters in New York for 2012 Dominican
Presidential hopeful Miguel Moreno, as I saw not when I was invited to observe the organization
participate the 2010 Bronx Dominican Day Parade, where they handed out information about
Moreno to potential voters. The PRD events I was invited to observe in 2010, which included a
training session and a congressional election rally, were well attended by Dominicans in New
York. Even the National Dominican Women‘s Caucus lobbies around some issues in the
Dominican Republic, including deportation of Dominican migrants who have spent their entire
lives in the U.S. and have few or no relatives in the D.R. to care for them after they arrive in the
country, as Zenaida Méndez noted during our interview.
Most Dominican organizations, however, have increasingly focused on expanding their
political engagement at the local and national level in the U.S., particularly as a greater number
of first and second generation Dominicans have obtained elected office in New York and New
Jersey. As Radhamés Pérez previously noted during our interview, a number of the organizations
from the Dominican Republic that set up shop in New York to recruit migrants into Dominican
politics, such as the political parties, have over time started to work more closely with
Dominican elected officials in the U.S. to focus on migrant-related issues in the U.S. Radhamés
also that as an activist with the Dominican Workers Party (PTD) his group took an active role in
supporting Guillermo Linares‘s New York City Council campaign in the 1980s, and the recently
mobilized voters in support of newly elected Dominican councilmember Ydanis Rodríguez, a
former PTD member himself. Manuel Félix also noted during our interview that that the PRD
takes an active role in mobilizing voters to support Dominican candidates for elected office in
the U.S. Other organizations, such as ACDP and Alianza Dominicana, which originally took a
more active role on issues in the Dominican Republic, have over time shifted away from

90
Dominican politics to focus on U.S.-centric issues affecting the migrant community (Aparicio
2006).
This lean towards U.S. political engagement appears to be driven by the perception, at
least among some leaders, that Dominicans can have more successful political engagement
through the U.S. political system, and face more obstacles in making claims with the Dominican
government. This point is best illustrated by Zenaida Méndez of the National Dominican
Women‘s Caucus (NWDC), when she discussed her organization‘s focus on U.S political
engagement, and why she encourage Dominicans to focus less on Dominican politics:
Here it is easy for you to go to your person and your assemblyman or
representative, because you‘re not going to go to Washington to see the President
all the time. So the one serving you is your local official. In our country, the
President, everybody is talking to the President, the President you know, it‘s like,
if the President goes ‗you‘re not welcome to the President‘ it doesn‘t matter. You
don‘t talk to your senator, anybody. So in the case of the Dominican Republic, I
was very troubled when they revised the constitution in the Dominican Republic
and they had like a big celebration, all the Dominicans in the U.S. or extranjeros,
and whatever. I was like, ‗oh, my god‘, because to have people who represent
them here or vice versa, I don‘t see what the Dominican government can do for us.
Zenaida‘s comments reflect a profound skepticism about what opportunities might exist for
Dominicans abroad for effective political engagement in the Dominican Republic, and
consequently, the capacity to make greater claims for substantive rights, despite efforts by the
Dominican government granting migrants abroad (at least the possibility of such.) Former PRD
leader David Williams, who now works with a smaller Dominican political party in New York,
while less skeptical about what migrants can get from their political participation, shared during
an interview what he has heard from Dominicans in New York about the possibility of having
representation:
It [congressional representation from abroad] could help us and it could hurt us…
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If we simply go to occupy a space, people will not value- in fact, I have been in
debates-and the constitutional reform has not even been approved yet- where
there have been a large number of people who have been opposed to having
representatives for Dominicans abroad, because they said that all they‘ll do is go
collect [a paycheck]. That they are not going to solve any of the problems that
afflict us over here, because we live here, not there.
The division that seems to be expressed within the Dominican migrant community over
whether or not to strive for greater political rights and representation seems to be influenced by
the perception that migrant‘s interests will not be adequately represented by anyone in the
Dominican government, if at all. This may very well be due to the prevalence of clientelism and
corruption in the Dominican Republic, which as González-Acosta (2009) notes, is prevalent in
Dominican electoral politics. This would partially explain why Dominican organizations, such as
the aforementioned, as well as activists from Dominican political parties, have over time turned
their attention towards claiming rights from local and national politicians in the U.S. The option
for organizations such as the NWDC and Alianza Dominicana to focus less on rights in the
Dominican politics is also easier to make given that Dominicans now control four seats in on the
New York City council and have three state legislators.
Thus transnational or cross-border political engagement among Ecuadorian and
Dominican migrant activists emerges from a confluence of structural and political conditions that
compel migrants to elaborate strategies to claim rights in overlapping polities. The social and
economic issues associated with migrants‘ experiences create the opportunity to forge a political
identity that defines their political engagement. Once this new political identity, which is rooted
in a sense of dual marginalization based on their migrant status, takes hold, migrant actors in
these two populations make demands on both states. However the levels and direction of binational political engagement varies based on the avenues available to migrants in both countries,
which means these actors make deliberate choices on where to direct their demands for greater
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inclusion and/or rights. Thus as vested members of two states, yet living at the margins of both
polities, the migrant actors in my study must ultimately negotiate between these two contexts to
empower themselves sufficiently to escape a marginalization that is specific to their lived
experience as migrants.
By relying on a contentious politics/collective action framework, it is possible to see the
factors that characterize strategic citizenship by Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organization
leaders in New York City. Strategic citizenship finds its genesis in the discourse of dual
marginalization employed by the migrant organization leaders featured in this study. This dual
marginalization discourse stems from the organization leaders personal experiences as well as
the collective experiences of their countrymen who have migrated abroad. Marginalization in the
U.S. stems from overt forms of discrimination and xenophobia, as well as the precarious lifestyle
that comes with undocumented or irregular status that many Dominicans and Ecuadorians have.
At the same time, marginalization in their home countries is rooted in resentment over limited
citizenship rights despite the personal sacrifice and economic contribution migrants make to their
home countries, along with social stigma and discrimination directed towards migrants by those
who opted not to migrate. These experiences of dual marginalization are employed by
organization leaders as a discourse to justify transnational political engagement in order to
demand rights that will end this marginalization, which constitutes the first part of strategic
action by migrants. Strategic citizenship is further defined by calculated decisions made on the
part of organized migrant actors to make demands for rights in either home or host country,
based on where migrant actors believe they are most capable of obtaining citizenship rights that
will put begin to put an end to their marginalization. Thus discourse helps to both frame actions
and mobilize supporters, while actors adopt particular strategies to make claims for citizenship
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based on the opportunities available for them to act.
Yet as subsequent chapters will demonstrate, strategic citizenship by Ecuadorian and
Dominican migrant organizations is not only defined by the discourse and actions of migrant
organizations. Rather, these organization leaders must navigate through various structural factors
that either constrain or enable them to effectively claim rights in both countries to end migrants‘
dual marginalization. Chapter Four, for instance, will illustrate how existing laws and
government policies in both Ecuador and the Dominican Republic shape the public discourse and
opportunities for migrants‘ political participation; and whether the migrant organizations in my
study ultimately opt to aggressively seek greater rights in their home countries or instead direct
their efforts towards U.S. political engagement. Following this, Chapter Five provides an indepth examination of a number of select Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations to
argue that the structure and membership composition of each organization also play an important
role in not only creating opportunities for transnational engagement, but also their effectiveness
in advocating for citizenship rights to end dual marginalization.
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CHAPTER 4: CREATING STRATEGIC CITIZENS: SENDING-STATE POLICIES
AND DUAL MARGINALIZATION
This chapter focuses on home country government influence on migrant transnational
political mobilization. Specifically, it examines the various approaches used by the Ecuadorian
and Dominican governments to engage with and integrate their migrant populations living
abroad. The chapter explores how history of migration in each country influences the way in
which each government engages with its migrant population, and in turn how the policies that
emerge from these attempts at engagement affect migrants‘ political engagement in these
countries and the U.S. Both Ecuador and Dominican Republic, similar to many other migrantsending countries in Latin America and other parts of the world, have, to varying degrees and
through a variety of approaches, embarked on policy programs designed integrate their migrant
populations into their polity (Gamlen 2008). In most cases, including the two countries that are
examined here, migrant policies are driven largely in response to migrants‘ economic
contributions through remittances, philanthropy and/or community development programs in
their home countries. It is the substance of these policies that ultimately determines how
migrants participate in home country politics.
I argue that while the Ecuadorian and Dominican governments have expanded its efforts
to court migrants as a constituency and integrate them economically and politically, the extent of
migrant policies shape the scope and depth of migrants‘ transnational political engagement in
both the U.S. and their home countries. Furthermore, despite differences in official government
discourse and citizenship rights offered to migrants abroad, Ecuadorian and Dominican
government policies, ultimately reinforce dual marginalization for migrant organization leaders,
as rights are either denied or framed as rights given to groups who are seen as visible minorities
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by the home country government. Thus these policies not only influence how organizations in
my study seek political inclusion, but do so by reinforcing minority group identity that these
migrants use to frame their transnational political participation.
Studies of home country efforts to politically incorporate migrants have focused on dual
citizenship and external voting rights; often focusing on the effect of these two measures on
migrant external voting turnout. (DeSipio, Pachon and Lee 2003; Escobar 2004; Gamlen 2008;
Itzighsohn and Villacrés 2009, Waldinger 2009). Assessing the overall impact of policy changes
on migrants‘ engagement, however, is a rather complex endeavor for a number of reasons. These
aforementioned studies, while insightful in highlighting electoral participation by the general
citizenry in response to enfranchisement, only present one form of engagement, and a very
specific one at that. It does not tell us, for instance, how migrant organizations lobby with home
country elected officials around policy matters that impact migrants directly. These studies also
fail to account for how constituents mobilize in ways other than voting, such as rallies, protests,
lobbying or town hall meetings. Furthermore, quantitative studies of external voting cannot, in
and of themselves, capture the extent to which home country government rhetoric compels
migrants to seek home country engagement. Additionally, these studies often overlook the
degree to which migrant organizations interact with home country governments, and how these
interactions- whether collaborative or contentious in nature- lead organizations to mobilize
migrants
A smaller number of studies have examined political engagement from a different
perspective. Some have examined how dual citizenship policies have allowed migrant
entrepreneurs to run for elected office in their home countries (Bakker and Fox 2005). Other
studies have examined how state and local governments in Mexico have become responsive to
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lobbying efforts by migrant hometown associations (Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Smith 2006).
These studies are important qualitative analyses of the interplay between home country
governments and migrant political actors that demonstrate how migration has impacted
governance in migrant-sending countries. Yet these studies often provide a singular perspective
on a particular policy initiative or of a single country, leaving only an idiosyncratic analysis for
understanding how governments shape migrant political engagement.
The consequences or outcomes of discourse and/or interactions between the state and
actors are difficult to quantify. Furthermore, this chapter attempts to provide a comparative
analysis of how different migrant sending countries approach the question of migrant political
incorporations, and respond to migrants‘ demands for greater political rights. As such, the
findings in this chapter are based on combination of qualitative methods to analyze these aspects
of state-migrant relations, including content analysis, participant observation and interviews with
government representatives and migrant leaders. While it is important to acknowledge that the
data presented in this chapter does not constitute an exhaustive examination of the impact
sending-state policies have on migrant participation, it nevertheless provides greater detail on the
varied and complex ways in which different home country governments take deliberate steps to
foster or to restrict migrants‘ participation.
Ecuadorian migrant policy
In the last five years the Ecuadorian government has dramatically expanded its
involvement in migrant affairs, to the point where Ecuador now has perhaps one of the most
comprehensive migrant policy programs of any Latin American country. Where many national
governments in Latin America have reluctantly extended limited political rights to migrants
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abroad, the Ecuadorian government plays an increasingly visible role in the daily lives of many
Ecuadorians living abroad, including those living in the New York City Metropolitan area.
The government‘s expanded role in migrant affairs is driven largely by ideological
orientation and policy objectives of President Rafael Correa‘s government, which markets itself
as the advocate of a ―citizen‘s revolution29‖ in Ecuador. The five part ―revolutionary program‖
that the Correa government has pledged to carrying out is designed to create a more inclusive
state. These include a political revolution (expanded electoral representation), an economic
revolution (based on domestic production, nationalized natural resources and promoting
domestic entrepreneurship); an ethical revolution (based on greater government transparency and
accountability); a socio-cultural revolution (based on promoting cultural pluralism; universal
education, a larger welfare state and expanded rights for racial, ethnic and gender minorities);
and a revolution for regional integration in South America30. Migrants are an important part of
Correa‘s political program, given that over the past 15 years nearly 3 million Ecuadorians have
migrated abroad, largely because of the economic and political turmoil that emerged from the
mid-1990s until Correa‘s election in 2006. Thus, the government‘s appeal to migrants also
represents a strategy by the Correa administration to distinguish itself from the host of unpopular
governments that are often blamed for the current exodus from the country- a point raised by a
number of the participants in this study.
The expanded role of the Ecuadorian government in migrant affairs has a significant
impact on migrants in New York. There are five specific aspects of Ecuadorian government
policy that directly influence migrants‘ transnational political engagement, both by individual
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See Appendix C:1 for an example of how this motto is used in government propaganda
See Appendix C:2 for pamphlet highlighting these ―revolutions‖
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constituents as well as by organized actors. These include: (1) the state‘s rhetoric regarding
migrants; (2) legal changes that ensure migrants‘ ability to claim rights from the state; (3)
Expanded electoral rights; (4) Government programs and policies targeted at or inclusive of
migrants concerns; and (5) direct participation by government actors in the migrant community
in New York. Beyond the immediate rights and benefits granted to migrants, these policies also
influence political engagement among the migrant organizations I studied in New York, in both
direct as well as in more subtle ways. The changes in rhetoric, policies and rule of law create
opportunities at the national level for migrants to demand rights and protections, even on issues
specific to the U.S. These policies have also allowed the government to cultivate support among
a population that is shielded from many domestic-level policies inside Ecuador, and build
alliances with particular migrant organizations. At the same time, however, these policies have
also reinforced dual marginalization for migrant organization leaders by casting migrants as a
vulnerable population, which encourages migrant organizations to adopt a minority group
identity to make claims.
State Rhetoric
Like other countries in Latin America with large migrant populations, Ecuadorian
government leaders have increasingly incorporated migrant-specific issues into the national
political discourse. Migration is not new to Ecuador‘s national political discourse- migrant issues
have been debated since the late 1990s on issues such as dual citizenship and external voting
rights for Ecuadorian migrants (Jones-Correa 1998), but have gained importance under the
Correa government as migration abroad has peaked. President Correa has repeated stated that an
estimated three million Ecuadorians now live abroad, which means that migration directly affects
a larger number of households in Ecuador (Ecuador News, 10/1/2009). The economic impact of
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remittances also drives Ecuadorian migrant policy, as migrants collectively sent back over $USD
2 billion in cash to Ecuador from 2008 to 2009, According to Ecuadorian Central Bank data that
is published online (Banco Central del Ecuador, 2009). These realities have compelled
politicians and government officials to develop a political discourse that addresses migrantrelated issues.
Migration is now framed as a critical part of Correa‘s ―citizens‘ revolution‖, which
rhetorically speaking, makes migration major policy subject in Ecuador. However the content
and the tone of government rhetoric have a significant impact on the way in which Ecuadorian
migrant organizations in New York City engage in transnational political practices. Through its
rhetoric, the government looks to portray migrants as full members of Ecuadorian society to
whom the state has an obligation to serve and protect. At the same time, however, government
discourse also characterizes migrants as a disadvantaged and victimized group, which reinforces
feelings of marginalization among migrant organizations in New York, which they use to
mobilize the community and make demands on the Ecuadorian state.
The Correa administration‘s claims its migrant policy is part of a broader goal of
fostering El Buen Vivir, or Good Life for all Ecuadorians. Buen Vivir is an ideology that seeks to
create a more sustainable, culturally diverse and socially equal Ecuadorian society. The state
aims to accomplish through redistributive policies, reforming the country‘s social welfare system,
and by expanding civil and political rights to different racial, ethnic and gender minorities. The
government also identifies eight major principles that define Ecuador‘s migrant policy. These
include: (1) creating an integral policy that respects human mobility on all levels of government;
(2) non-discrimination towards migrants; (3) recognition of the principle of universal citizenship;
(4) defending migrants rights in home and host countries; (5) political representation; (6)
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recognition of the rights of transnational families; (7) reciprocity in its migratory policy; and (8)
state support for migrants (SENAMI, 2009).
Reinforcing patriotic sentiments among migrants is also central to the government‘s
ideological campaign to incorporate migrants. Ecuadorian government officials help to organize
events celebrating Ecuadorian independence and other important national holidays in New York
(Noticiero Universo, 6/1/2009). Consular offices make pocket-sized copies of the new
constitution publicly available to help migrants understand their rights along with illustrated
pamphlets on the history of progressive politics in Ecuador. This includes accounts about former
President Eloy Alfaro (who is described as the architect of the first progressive constitution in
Latin America), and the place that migrants have in Correa‘s citizen‘s revolution.
Government officials also stage various public events around the world to reach out
directly to migrants. President Correa has met with migrant constituents in Belgium to
emphasized the state‘s obligation to defend migrants rights in their current countries of residence,
as well as ensuring their right to democratic participation in Ecuador (El Migrante Ecuatoriano¸
12/3/2009: 2). A similar event was held in Queens in 2009, where President Correa personally
met with the New York migrant community and affirmed his administration's commitment to
advocating on behalf of Ecuadorians living abroad for greater protections as immigrants. This
included addressing issues such as discrimination and comprehensive immigration reform in the
U.S. Correa also discussed the numerous policy achievements to help migrants such as the
drafting of a new constitution, external voting representation for migrants, improved consular
services, and economic reforms facilitating the remittance process.
Alex of Alianza PAIS discussed the government‘s efforts to demonstrate their
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commitment to migrants in New York:
It‘s our obligation, our responsibility to let people know what the government is
doing for them, whether in Ecuador or here in the U.S …Several figures from the
Ecuadorian government have been brought here. The Director of the Internal
Revenue Service, Carlos Marx Carrasco came a few months ago.… Just a few
weeks ago the director of the Ecuadorian Customs Corporation, Santiago León,
was also invited to give a talk on what the procedures are for people who want to
return to Ecuador… This is the work that we‘ve done so far, to invite figures in
the Ecuadorian government, to come and explain to the community and see the
work that‘s being done and how that affects the immigrant community.
Finally, representatives of Ecuador‘s National Migrant Secretariat (SENAMI) frequently publish
statements condemning bias crimes committed against Ecuadorian ―compatriots‖ in the New
York area, as well as anti-immigrant legislation adopted by state and local governments in the
U.S. (―SENAMI Por el Respeto a los Derechos de los Compatriotas‖, Noticiero Universo,
5/16/2010: 9; ―Pronunciamiento de la Secretaria Nacional del Migrante Sobre la Aprobación de
la Ley S.B. 1070 en El Estado de Arizona, Estados Unidos‖, Noticiero Universo, 5/16/2010: 9;
―Secretaria Nacional del Migrante a la Comunidad‖, Noticiero Universo, 11/16/2009: 18;
Comunicado de Prensa, Secretaría Nacional del Migrante, 6/1/2009).
Ecuador has also made migration a central foreign policy issue, seeking to position itself
as an advocate of migrant rights and a supporter of universal citizenship. Ecuadorian Migrant
Affairs Minister Lorena Escudero recently stated at international forums that Ecuador views
migration as a human right which states must work to guarantee to all persons (―La SENAMI
Promueve la Integración Regional, El Migrante Ecuatoriano, 10/15/2009: 5). The Migrant
Affairs Sub-Secretary echoed these views at an OAS meeting in Mexico, where he defended
dual-citizenship, and stressed that migration had to be seen in a positive light. The Sub-Secretary
also characterized migration as a process of ―growth, breaking down walls and learning about
new places‖, and added that the world is moving towards ―universal citizenship‖, given that the
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current global economy is centered on human mobility. (―Ecuador Plantea ante la OEA Retorno
Voluntario de Inmigrantes‖, Notimex, 4/12/2010)
The central component of Ecuador‘s migrant discourse, however, is a campaign called
Todos Somos Migrantes¸ or We Are All Migrants. According to Casa Ecuatoriana Director
Pablo Calle, The purpose of the campaign is to educate the public both here as well as in
Ecuador about the reality of migration and the reasons why people emigrate, as well as to
highlight the discrimination and prejudice that migrants face both in the U.S. and Ecuador
The Todos Somos Migrantes campaign explains that the Ecuadorian government‘s
migrant policy is part of its larger goal of fostering el Buen Vivir. Consequently migration needs
to be seen as a policy issue that affects all sectors of Ecuadorian society. The campaign adds that
its goals are to (1) recognize and vindicate the work that migrants carry out across the world for
both home and host countries; (2) Fight against any form of discrimination towards migrants and
the denial of humane human mobility; and (3) To show solidarity with migrants who are victims
of restrictive or punitive measures taken against them (SENAMI 2009).
The Todos Somos Migrantes campaign also directly engages with the public to reinforce
the Ecuadorian government‘s commitment to fostering greater inclusion of migrants. The
campaign frequently recruits people to act as goodwill ambassadors to represent the ideas and the
image of the campaign. This often includes famous sports and musical celebrities from Ecuador,
as well as well-known celebrities from the countries where Ecuadorians migrate to. The
campaign also uses direct outreach. At a SENAMI-sponsored street festival in Queens in the
summer of 2010, Todos Somos Migrantes representatives introduced various popular Ecuadorian
musicians as goodwill ambassadors and discussed the various efforts the Ecuadorian government
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was carrying out on behalf of migrants in the U.S. and across the world to those in attendance.
SENAMI officials also set up a kiosk to provide information on various government services
available to all Ecuadorian citizens. TheTodos Somos Migrantes campaign also took part in an
immigration-rights rally in March, 2010, in which they not only marched alongside other
immigration-reform and supporters, but also distributed information to educate people in
attendance about the right to human mobility in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(http://www.todossomosmigrantes.orgMultitudinaria_Marcha_en_Washington_Por_Reforma_Migratoria, 3/22/10)
Ecuadorian government discourse therefore attempts to reframe migration in a positive
light to secure migrant support. Yet in doing so the government‘s discourse also reinforces
notions of victimization and marginalization victimization. President Correa has stated that the
three million Ecuadorians who have left the country to seek better opportunities as ―one of the
greatest failures in social and economic policies in recent decades‖ (―Correa Quiere Que
Regresen los Emigrantes‖, Ecuador News, 4/8/2009:6). Furthermore, both government and
Alianza PAIS representatives in New York often evoked the term tragedy to refer to the
migration process, which was first articulated by President Correa himself. At the first Alianza
PAIS event I attended, Alex explained that migrants were now being given an opportunity to
have direct representation in the country‘s National Assembly because they are the victims of a
―national tragedy‖, and President Correa has pledged to give migrants their proper place in
Ecuadorian society. The two main Alianza PAIS candidates vying for the U.S. seats to the
Ecuadorian National Assembly echoed Alex‘s earlier comment that night. They pledged to
support the Correa administration‘s efforts to support migrants, including advocating for
migration as a human right, universal citizenship for all Ecuadorians, non-discrimination for all
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Ecuadorians, and extending social security to migrants. The two candidates also stated that
migrants are ultimately victims of social inequality, corruption and failed economic policies and
deserve a voice in the Ecuadorian congress. I also observed the same discourse of victimization
with New York‘s Casa Ecuatoriana Director, who said the Casa Ecuatoriana was created to
address the needs of Ecuadorians living abroad, given that President Correa has qualified
Ecuadorian migration as a national tragedy, due to the high levels of migration after the 2000
bank holiday.
Official government propaganda also fosters promotes the victimization discourse. The
SENAMI‘s official program for migration policy states that the SENAMI‘s primary obligation is
to uphold the principles laid out in the 2008 Constitution which explicitly notes that that state is
obligated to (1) Ensure non-discrimination against people based on their migratory condition; (2)
recognize the principle of universal citizenship which includes protecting the rights of all Latin
American peoples living abroad, and (3) Protect the rights of all Ecuadorian migrants living
abroad (Politica Migratoria Para el Buen Vivir: 5)
These various examples of the type of rhetoric used by government officials and ruling
party leaders are indicative of the effort on the part of the Ecuadorian state to depict migrants as
a marginalized segment of the population in the context of Ecuadorian politics. Migrants are not
only victims of deliberate actions of past governments, but also are victims of various forms of
discrimination based on their identity as migrants. This victimization discourse allows the
government to frame its actions as a restitution policy towards their migrant population.
Rule of Law Changes
The current Ecuadorian government made changes to the country‘s rule of law to further
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incorporate migrants. One of the major accomplishments of the Correa administration was to
successfully create a constituent assembly to draft a new national constitution that would reflect
the principles of equality and diversity that the Citizens‘ Revolution proposes to create in
Ecuador.
The new Ecuadorian Constitution includes a number of provisions pertaining to migrants‘
rights, or what the document itself refers to as human mobility rights. Title I of the new
constitution describes the state as a territory with a geography that is defined by ―natural, social
and cultural dimensions.‖ (Constitución Política del Ecuador, Article 4, No. 2, 2008). Title I also
defines the terms of formal citizenship, which now includes second and third-generation
Ecuadorian descendants (Ibid, Article 7, No. 2). The constitution now establishes dual
citizenship as a right for all persons born in Ecuador, (Ibid, Article 8, No. 3), rather than just as a
product of legislative fiat. Finally, Title I establishes that non-citizens residing in Ecuador have
the same rights and obligations as citizens (Ibid, Article 9).
In Title II of the Constitution establishes equal protection rights for migrants, by
providing that no person will be discriminated based on their migratory condition. This article
also requires the state to enact affirmative action policies to promote equality for groups living in
unequal condition, which includes migrants (Ibid, Article 11. No.2). Title II also establishes the
right of universal education, which Ecuadorians enjoy regardless of their migratory status (Ibid,
Article 28). Finally, Title II outlines ―human mobility rights‖, which include the right to migrate,
and the state‘s obligation to consider all migration legal. This article also requires the state to
ensure migrants‘ capacity to exercise their constitutional rights by (1) providing assistance to
migrants and families wherever they reside; (2) Providing protection and counsel to migrants; (3)
safeguard migrants who are deprived of their rights abroad; (4) foster migrants ties to Ecuador
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through family reunification and return migration; and (5) protect the rights of all transnational
family members (Ibid, Article 40). Human mobility rights also include the rights of asylum and
refugees and protects their right to remain in the country legally (Ibid, Article 41), as well as the
right to leave and re-enter the country in accordance with government regulations (Ibid, Article
66).
The 2008 Constitution also requires the country‘s executive branch to account for
migrant populations living abroad. For example, the executive is now required to create National
Equality Councils, to ensure that the state develops effective policies to ensure the protection of
rights for different groups, including migrants (Ibid, Article 156). The Attorney General‘s Office
is also required under the Constitution to protect the rights of migrants living abroad (Ibid,
Article 214.)
The new Constitution also includes a section that outlines the state‘s obligations to
promote the Buen Vivir, which also applies to migrants. This includes an obligation to provide
access to social security to Ecuadorians living abroad (Ibid, Articles 371 and 374) as well as to
create a comprehensive migration policy that ensure unrestricted human mobility at both the
national and international level (Ibid, Article 392). The last part of the Constitution requires the
state to pursue a foreign policy that prioritizes regional integration with other Latin American
countries, which includes free movement of persons throughout the region (Ibid, Article 423).
The rule of law established by the 2008 Constitution, thus firmly secures migrants‘ status
as full members of the Ecuadorian state. Yet the way that migrants‘ rights are expressed in the
Constitution impose a minority group status onto migrants within Ecuador. The obligations the
constitution places on the state to protect the welfare of migrants and their families (including
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those still living in Ecuador given the specific use of the term ―transnational families‖) represent
a mandate to rectify migrants‘ social and political marginalization, as they were previously
deprived of rights and protections by the state. The emphasis on protections and restitutions
reinforce migrants‘ marginalization and victimization within the Ecuadorian nation-state.
Political Representation
Perhaps the most significant change in Ecuador‘s migrant policy under Correa‘s
government has been to expand political rights for migrants living abroad. Ecuadorians living
abroad have had limited political rights since 1995, when the Ecuadorian Congress passed
legislation granting migrants external voting rights for Presidential elections (Jones-Correa 1998).
The 2008 Constitution outlines specific political rights for migrants, including (1) the right to
elect and to be elected to public office; (2) Take part in public interest issues; (3) Present
legislation and ballot measures; (4) Consultation; (5) Participate in government oversight; (6)
Recall their elected officials; (7) Work in the public sector and (8) create, join and fully
participate in political parties or movements (Ibid, Article 61). Article 63 guarantees that
migrants can vote in Presidential elections, and grants migrants the right to run for elected office
in Ecuador.
The Constitution also grants migrants direct participation in the Ecuadorian National
Assembly and calls for the creation of legislative constituencies abroad. Each external legislative
constituency can elect two Assembly members, though the Constitution does not specify how
these constituencies are to be organized (Ibid, Article 118). The Ecuadorian government
approved the creation of three migrant constituencies: One for the United States and Canada; one
for the European Union countries; and one for South America (Consejo Nacional Electoral,
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http://www.cne.gov.ec.)
Finally, the new constitution establishes the right for all Ecuadorians, including migrants
living abroad, to present legislation to all levels of government in Ecuador Specifically, it allows
any constituent to draft and submit a bill for consideration by the National Assembly (Ibid,
Article 102). Some migrants invoked this right during an open meeting sponsored by
Assemblyman Francisco Hagó‘s office in late 2009. At this meeting, leaders of a federation of
local Ecuadorian sports clubs in the U.S. discussed legislation to be submitted to the National
Assembly to create a government-sponsored sports federation for migrants living abroad.
The Ecuadorian government has also worked to encourage migrant electoral participation
in New York. This includes voter registration drives at all area consular offices, creating three
polling places in the Greater New York-New Jersey-Southern Connecticut area (Queens, NY,
Newark, NJ and New Haven, CT) for elections and providing transportation for voters living in
suburban areas such as Suffolk and Putnam Counties, NY, during the 2009 general election. The
government also circulates information in New York community newspapers such as Ecuador
News and El Universo to notify voters about election-related events31.
Government Policy and Programs
The fourth significant change in Ecuador‘s official migrant policy has been the creation
of an extensive bureaucracy to work exclusively on migrant affairs. While other Latin American
countries with large migrant populations such as Mexico and El Salvador have created
bureaucracies to work on migrant-relate issues, these are limited to lower-level departments or
bureaus within larger ministries, usually within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ecuadorian
31
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government however, created the Secretaría Nacional del Migrante, or National Migrant
Secretariat (SENAMI), an executive-level ministry specifically devoted to developing and
enacting all migrant-related government policies. The SENAMI is described as ―an active part of
a global movement dedicated to promote universal citizenship‖ with the goal of ―encouraging
migrants to exercise their full rights and enable their capacity for take part in ‗good life‘.‖ This,
according to their mission, includes ―planning and executing Ecuadorian migrant policy,
fostering dialogue with migrant actors as well as articulating a clear public policy agenda that is
consistent with the demands of citizens who are living abroad‖ (SENAMI, ―Nuestra Vision,
http://www.senami.gov.ec).
The SENAMI has developed a series of policy programs specifically designed to address
key aspects of Ecuadorian migrants‘ collective experiences.

Specifically, the ministry has

outlined six programs and initiatives that are part of its effort to meet the state‘s constitutional
obligations as outlined in Article 40 of the Constitution. These include:
Links Program: Under this program, the SENAMI is responsible for providing opportunities for
migrants to communicate and interact with their relatives and communities back in Ecuador. This
includes video conferencing for migrants to communicate with people in major urban centers in
Ecuador including Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca, as well as long distance telephone service..
This program also includes sponsoring cultural events in migrant communities that reinforce
Ecuadorian culture and identities.
Welcome Home Program: The goal of this program is to provide resources and assistance for
those migrants who intend to permanently return to Ecuador, as a way to stimulate return
migration. There are two specific initiatives that make up this program: the Menaje de Casa and
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the Cucayo Fund. The Menaje de Casa, or Household Goods Program, aims to reduce the
financial burden that migrants seeking to return to Ecuador often endure by eliminating all
import taxes on household and small business goods for return migrants (Bienvenid@s a Casa
pamphlet, SENAMI). The Cucayo 32 Fund, in turn, is a government funded competitive grant
program designed to award up to $USD 25,000 in seed money to migrants who plan to set up a
small business in Ecuador, as well as financial advisement and technical assistance to help these
aspiring small entrepreneurs (Bienvenid@s a Casa: Programa Fondo Concursable “El Cucayo”,
SENAMI brochure).
Integrative Migration Policy Program: This program seeks employ a ―humanistic and rightsdriven‖ migration policy (Nuestra Visión, http://www.senami.gov.ec). The SENAMI‘s official
documentation does not offer more specific details on how this initiative works in practice,
though the idea of a humanistic and rights-based migration policy was often echoed by
government officials with whom I spoke or who I saw speak at public events in New York City.
New Casa Ecuatoriana Director Pablo Calle told me that one of the organization‘s goals was to
support migrants in the free exercise of their rights. (In another instance, during an open meeting
with the Ecuadorian community at the Queens Consular Office, the Consul General explained
what steps the Ecuadorian government has taken to provide some sort of aid to migrants in
detention, including opening a consular office in Texas, where many Ecuadorians are being
detained awaiting deportation hearings. Ecuadorian officials also engaged in public lobbying to
the U.S. and governments of various EU nations to adopt less restrictive immigration policies.
Migrant Bank Program: The SENAMI is actively working to create a financial institution to

32

Name is derived from the Quichua language, which refers a custom in which food provisions are taken to the
minga or communal work site (Source: SENAMI)
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provide free or low-cost services to migrants living abroad, as well their families and/or
businesses in Ecuador. Services would include personal and commercial bank accounts that
migrants and their family and counterparts in Ecuador can jointly access as well as low interest
personal and commercial loans for migrants. Facilitating migrants‘ access to financial services
and capital will ensure that migrants‘ investments effectively contribute to the country‘s overall
economic development, according to the SENAMI (Nuestra Visión, http://www.senami.gov.ec)
Transnational Family Support Program: This program is designed to provide a variety of
informational and support services to migrants and their families through a newtork of ―Casas”
or ―Houses‖ across the Ecuadorian Diaspora. This is the basis for the Casa Ecuatoriana33, or
Ecuador House, system that the SENAMI has implemented in New York, Milan, Madrid and
Caracas, as well as throughout various parts of Ecuador, to provide an institutional resource that
fosters transnational ties. The Casa Ecuatoriana, acts as the main point of contact between
Ecuadorian migrants and the government. At the same time, however, as discussed later in this
chapter, it also plays an important role in migrant political engagement by directly participating
in civic life.
The Ecuadorian government has also developed a number of new entitlement and service
provision programs that extend benefits to Ecuadorian migrants living abroad. One is national
Social Security program (IESS), which allows migrants to voluntarily enroll in the program. The
second is the new Higher Education Law, which requires Ecuadorian universities to provide
distance education programs for migrants to pursue higher education while living abroad
(República de Ecuador Asamblea Nacional, 2010).

33
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The Ecuadorian government and the SENAMI‘s migrant outreach programs reflect a
concerted effort by the state to enact policies that address many of the issues most relevant to
Ecuadorian migrants abroad, including their financial security, their social and cultural ties their
rights and security in the countries of destination. At the same time, these policies and programs,
such as voluntary social security, distance education and the Welcome Home Program, also meet
address one of the state‘s major objectives in its migrant policy, which is to foster the growth of
financial and human capital in Ecuador through return migration and continued investment.
Perhaps most importantly, however, is that the SENAMI‘s mission and programs contribute to
the institutionalization of the transnationalization of migrants‘ lives.
Direct engagement in community life
In addition to reforming its constitutions and laws, the Ecuadorian state also seeks to
influence migrant political participation by directly inserting itself into the civic life of the New
York migrant community. There are two government institutions which, during the course of my
dissertation research, had a strong presence in migrants social, economic, and political lives,
which are the Casa Ecuatoriana and the Consulate.
Consulate
The Ecuadorian Consulate in New York carries out all of basic tasks normally carried out
by other consulates. They provide travel visas, passports and official identity documents for
migrants, as well as bureaucratic procedures that Ecuadorian citizens require for affairs in
Ecuador including as death certificates, marriage certificates, divorce filings and fiduciary
powers for legal matters. In and of themselves these bureaucratic procedures are an important
part of migrants‘ lives. As Saddiq (2008) notes, migrants security and well being in both home
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and destination country is increasingly predicated on access to legitimate documentation. Hence,
these also become important political matters, especially for the participants in my study. For
example, Alianza PAIS devoted part of its campaign efforts in 2009 to pledge to pass a new
Information Law, which would reduce the cost of important identity documents, including birth
certificates and identity cards. The issue was also raised by migrant leaders and constituents
during an October 2009 public meeting with Assemblyman Hagó, as well as by FUIE leaders
during one of their meetings. In both cases migrant activists criticized the Ecuadorian
government for how financially burdensome it was for most migrants to obtain identity
documents.
The consulate‘s impact on the Ecuadorian community, however, is not limited to these
bureaucratic matters. Much of the consulate‘s activities often walk the line between service
provision and politics. Many of the public events organized by the government to promote
Ecuadorian national identity, such as Ecuadorian Independence Day celebrations and the
country‘s bicentennial anniversary, were coordinated by the consulate (―Se Cumplio el Tercer
Desfile

Internacional

por
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24

de

Mayo

Noticiero

Universo,

6/1/2009;

www.consuladoecuadornewyork.com). Similarly, Alianza PAIS‘s U.S. politburo co-chair Luis
Ortiz noted that the government was opening a consular affairs office in Arizona in late 2010 in
response to the S.B. 1070 passed by the Arizona legislature, adding that he thought ―the
consulate will have a lot of clients.‖ The implication of Luis‘s comments are that the consulate is
very much invested in carrying out the government‘s political mandate to the extent that it is able
to do so through the services it is designed to provide for migrants.
The extent to which the consulate is involved in Ecuadorian politics in New York is
perhaps a more important aspect of its role in the migrant community. The Queens consular
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services office essentially serves as a de facto headquarters for Assemblyman Francisco Hagó,
who held his all of his meetings with constituents and other public events he sponsored at the
Queens consular office. I attended approximately a half a dozen events sponsored by the
Assemblyman after his election in 2009. Not only were all of these events held at the Queens
consular office, but the Consul General was also present at each of these. Furthermore, the
consul himself often interjected in debates or was the focus of comments and criticisms by
migrant community leaders in attendance. Such was the case at the second meeting between Mr.
Hagó, where the leader of Alianza Ecuatoriana directly addressed the Consul General to demand
what was being done to address the growing number of Ecuadorians in immigrant detention
centers.
The partisan political interventions by the consulate have been brought to light by
community media as well by as participants in my study, often as criticism against the
government. At a planning session for the PAIS campaign committee Alex immediately said that
everyone had to exercise discretion about this meeting after what happened with former consular
official Ruth Loyola. Alex explained that Loyola was removed from her post in the consulate due
to the publication of images by a Pachakutik Party volunteer showing her at the PAIS campaign
inauguration event two weeks ago openly campaigning. In a separate incident, the Ecuadorian
Consul General was forced to defend himself against allegations that he took part in violent
altercation with activists of Ecuadorian opposition parties, as well as calls for his resignation
(Noticiero Universo, April Special Edition 2009.) Finally, during a FUIE general body meeting
in late 2009 a member of the organization produced a picture of the U.S. Consul general at a
PAIS-sponsored event stumping for PAIS candidates during the general to denounce the
politicization of the consulate.
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Casa Ecuatoriana
The New York branch of the Casa Ecuatoriana, since its inauguration in 2009, has taken
an active role in Ecuadorian the daily life in New. The Casa Ecuatoriana was designed to act
both as a public liaison between the SENAMI and the migrant community, as well as public
service provider for the community. The SENAMI describes the Casa Ecuatoriana as a ―referent
of support and accompaniment for the Ecuadorian living abroad, and a conduit between different
aspects of the government and this population34‖ (www.migrantecuatoriano.gov.ec 2011). The
bulk of the Casa‘s work is therefore focused on providing government services for migrants.
Casa Ecuatoriana Director Pablo Calle explained the primary services that the Casa helps
administer, which include the aforementioned Cucayo Plan; the Return Plan which provides
financial incentives to encourage return migration to Ecuador for small business creation; and the
Welcome Home Plan, which provides financial assistance for return migrants to purchase a
residential dwelling. Beyond this, the Casa Ecuatoriana claims to offer other individuals
services for migrants including legal aid, language courses, libraries, videoconferencing and
internet

services,

and

a

virtual

network

for

community

organizations

(http://www.migranteecuatoriano.gov.ec, 2011).
An equally important aspect of the Casa Ecuatoriana‘s work is its role in fostering
migrant civil society growth in New York, which is done through the Casa‘s FORES 35
Workshop. The overarching goal of the FORES Workshop is to aid Ecuadorian civic
organizations in capacity building. However, Pablo Calle described FORES‘s purpose to me as
34
35

http://www.migranteecuatoriano.gov.ec/content/view/422/192/
Acronym for Migrant Organizational Structuring and Social Network Construction Project
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follows:
The FORES Workshop has various objectives, including the creation of networks
of work with Ecuadorian organizations to address the issue of migration,
improving the capacity of community organizations that work on migration
advocacy, and supporting the Todos Somos Migrantes sensibility campaign… The
workshop focuses on various themes related to organizations, including how to
structure an organization, identity issues and political engagement. It also seeks to
teach participants how to obtain the 501© (3) exemption status for non-profit
organizations …we see it as something advantageous for organizations, since
having that status helps them maintain fiscal and organizational stability. The call
to participate in FORES is open and there are many organizations that are not
501© (3), but we have three organizations that have already successfully obtained
the status, including the Ecuadorian International Center, the Ecuadorian Civic
Committee and Juventud Ecuatoriana.
The FORES workshop also allows participating organizations that successfully complete
all of the workshop sessions to apply for a government-sponsored grant program to help either
pay for the 501© (3) incorporation process or to support the organizations‘ programs.
The FORES workshop was arguably the most significant aspect of the Casa
Ecuatoriana‘s work that influenced migrant civic and political life in New York. I was invited by
the Casa Ecuatoriana Director to observe the FORES workshop sessions, to see the sort of
capacity building work that was being done with participating organizations. I attended two of
their daylong sessions, which were held at different locations throughout the New York City
metropolitan area. The first workshop walked participants through 501 © (3) non-profit
incorporation process. There were approximately 30 people in attendance, representing
approximately a dozen different organizations from throughout the New York metropolitan area.
These included a local soccer team, two arts and culture organizations, a journalists association,
representatives of the Ecuadorian Civic Committee of Danbury, Connecticut, as well as leaders
of Juventud Ecuatoriana and Nuevas Raíces (which are presented in Chapter Three). Much of the
workshop discussion revolved around how organizations could successfully incorporate their
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organizations as legal non-profit groups when their leaders and/or the majority of their members
had undocumented status.
The second session I attended dealt with political engagement, and consisted of a U.S.
politics and lobbying lesson organized by Make the Road New York, a local advocacy group that
works with various immigrant organizations. This session included many of the same groups
from the prior workshop as well as some new participants, including the Ecuadorian
International Center (a non-profit advocacy group from Queens), as well as National
Assemblywoman Blanca Ortíz. The presentation started with a lesson on basic U.S. civics,
followed by a role playing exercise where participants took on the roles of different actors in the
legislative process including public interest groups, legislators, constituents, unions and
corporate lobbyists. The session helped stir participants‘ political passions, especially around
issues of rights and the need to become politically engaged. Many of the participants also took
the opportunity, at the encouragement of SENAMI representative present, to connect the
presentation to their personal and organizational experiences. This led to an impassioned
discussion on various issues including the lack of rights for immigrants in the U.S., the need to
pressure the Obama administration and Congress for an immigration reform bill, the challenges
of organizing around local-level issues in the metropolitan area, political apathy among many
Ecuadorians in the U.S., and even the need to mobilize to address their concerns as migrants to
the Ecuadorian government.
The previous account of the illustrates how the Ecuadorian government- through the
Casa Ecuatoriana- now plays a significant role in the long-term outcomes of these migrant
organizations, many of which are incipient groups. Because FORES is one of most touted
aspects of its work, the Casa Ecuatoriana sees itself as a catalyst for migrant civic and political
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engagement in the United States. At the same time however, the FORES program also serves as
a vehicle to help the Ecuadorian government develop alliances with civic organizations that may
allow the government to garner support among migrants for the Correa administration.
The Casa Ecuatoriana‘s and Consulate‘s involvement with the migrant community thus
provides an institutional framework for Ecuadorian transnational civic and political engagement,
while simultaneously reinforcing a minority group identity among migrant organizations in New
York City. The programs and services provided by both the entities, whether it is documentation
or assistance programs, have become important political issue for a number of Ecuadorian
migrant organizations. These compel migrant organizations to adopt some sort of transnational
focus, as they respond to the Casa Ecuatoriana‘s work. Yet as Casa Ecuatoriana Director Pablo
Calle noted, the creation of initiatives like Todos Somos Migrantes, FORES and Welcome Home
Program are driven by the fact that migrants are viewed as victims of discrimination in both
countries because of their status as migrants. These programs, along with the Consulate‘s
interventions for undocumented Ecuadorian migrants are, in the government‘s view, a way to
give migrants dignity and provide a path towards greater social equality in Ecuadorian society. It
is in this way then that the government‘s actions help create a context of collective action where
marginalization and minority group identity are the focus of migrant organizations‘ transnational
political engagement.
Dominican Government Migrant Policy
In contrast to the Ecuadorian government, the Dominican Republic‘s migrant policy is far
less extensive and the Dominican government has been slower to grant full recognition to
Dominican migrants abroad. Part of this is due to the uneasy history between the Dominican
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Republic and its migrant population, largely as a consequence of the political violence that
afflicted the country for much of the 20th century. This not only led many Dominicans to flee the
country, but also saw a number of migrant organizations emerge to challenge the authoritarian
regime of President Joaquín Balaguer from the late 1960s through the 1970s. Alianza País
leader Radhamés Perez noted during our interview how Dominican migrants‘ political
engagement was in response to the turmoil that prompted many people to flee the country after
the 1965 Civil War broke out, and the subsequent U.S. military intervention to impose a
transitional military-led government to quell a leftist uprising:
After the imposition of the counterrevolution a process of persecution, of terrible
repression began in the Dominican Republic. And this facilitated a new wave of migration of
Dominicans to the U.S. And of course, remember that the U.S. was in Vietnam at the time. They
also needed cheap labor to come here, above all in the manufacturing sectors, in places like New
York. That‘s what facilitated that wave of migration….Migrants kept talking about baseball,
about other stuff, thinking about rice and beans, but at the time they also brought their own
organizational forms with them.
Radhamés added how he and other Dominican activists in New York were recruited to
play a critical support role in opposing the Balaguer government:
There was a sector, especially on the left, that understood that the work
here [in New York] was to serve in denouncing the lack of liberty, lack of
democracy, the political persecution that was prevalent in the Dominican
Republic after the installation of President Balaguer in 1966… which would last
until 1978. Of course, the demand that the political exiles be allowed to return
was part of that vision… that sector understood that above all the work in the
Dominican community in the U.S. was to be… a sort of bulwark which aside
from political denunciation, had to play an effective role in locating economic and
material support for a possible change...
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Since the 1980s, however, state-migrant relations in the Dominican Republic underwent a
slow change. For one, the Balaguer regime began a slow transition to democratic rule that largely
put an end to political violence in the country. Second, a deep recession and fiscal crisis plagued
the country through the 1980s, which led many Dominicans the country as economic migrants,
rather than to flee political violence in the country. Many migrants were now focused on
economically supporting their families and communities in the Dominican Republic, rather than
operating as a community of political exiles.
By the late 1990s the Dominican government began to seek a rapprochement with its
migrant population abroad, mainly under the leadership of President Lionel Fernández,
continued under the leadership of President Hipólito Mejía, and now again under Fernández‘s
second administration36. Two factors account for this renewed engagement with migrants by the
Dominican government. One is the economic impact of remittances, which as discussed in
Chapter Two, account for a substantial part of the country‘s economic output as direct
investment. Remittances are particularly important to the Fernández administration, whose
economic policy agenda emphasizes trade liberalization and direct investment into the local
economy. The second is due to President Fernández himself, whose personal experience living in
New York as a child likely influenced him set in motion efforts by the Dominican government to
further integrate migrants into Dominican society.
As a result, since Fernández‘s return to the Presidency in 2004 the Dominican
government has enacted a number of changes that have significantly altered the landscape for
migrants‘ political participation in the Dominican Republic. In this sense there are similarities
36

Fernandez is currently serving out his third term as President of the Dominican Republic. Originally
constitutionally limited to one term after his election in 1996, Fernandez was able to run for President again in 2004,
and Constitutional reforms approved by voters eliminated Presidential term limits.
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with the approach the Ecuadorian government has taken towards its migrant population. Yet
there are also noticeable differences between Dominican and Ecuadorian state-migrant relations
which not only affect migrants‘ outlook towards participating in Dominican politics, but also
how transnational political engagement occurs among Dominican migrants.
Rhetoric/Discourse
Political discourse from the Dominican government does address the country‘s migrant
population abroad, and makes a concerted effort to portray migrants as an important group that
makes positive contributions to the Dominican Republic. Dominican government discourse, does
not, however fully acknowledge migrants as members of Dominican society to which the state
has obligations towards, in the way that the Ecuadorian government has done. Rather, the
language and tone used by Dominican officials speaks of migrant‘s relevance to in largely
instrumental terms, and reinforces differences between migrants and non-migrants in terms of
their belonging to the nation-state.
The nature of the Dominican government‘s discourse is reflected in remarks made by
President Fernández during his annual speech to the Dominican legislature in February, 2011, in
which he noted the following about Dominican migrants:
We have the immense fortune to count on a Dominican community from abroad,
prestigious, industrious, admired and respected, which not only contributes
important resources to sustain the national economy, but which also enriches us
with its social networks and its cultural, educational and scientific exchanges‖
[Speech before the Dominican National Assembly, 2/27/11 (As reprinted in El
Nuevo Diario newspaper)]
In contrast to Correa‘s rhetoric, in which migrants are viewed as members of Ecuadorian
society who have fallen victim to tragic circumstances, Fernández opts for a discourse in which
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migrants seem to be characterized more as allies of the state, rather than members. Furthermore,
migrants are discussed in largely instrumental terms, based on their contributions to the state
rather than their ties to the state as citizens who were compelled or forced to leave.
Dominican migrants‘ contributions through remittances are heavily emphasized by
government officials. For instance, during the inauguration of the National Council for
Dominican Communities Abroad (CONDEX), a new entity created by the Dominican
government to reach out to migrants in 2009, President Fernández once again stressed
remittances as a fundamental motive behind the enactment of this new program, noting how
migrants‘ remittances, which make up 20 percent of the country‘s GDP, are an important part of
the country‘s economic development strategy, which provided the impetus for this program
(―Presidente Juramente Consejo Comunidades en el Exterior, www.presidencia.gob.do). These
same comments were echoed a year later by Dominican Secretary of State Alejandro Santos,
who emphasized the economic importance of migrants remittances as the motivation for the
efforts being made by the Dominican government to integrate migrant issues into its public
policies (El Nuevo Diario, 12/19/2010).

Other government documents emphasize the

importance of Dominicans as human capital as the motivation for migrant-integration policies
(Reglamento de Aplicación, Decreto No.674-08, 2008).
The Dominican government‘s discourse also emphasizes the importance of patriotism
and national loyalty in accepting migrants as part of the Dominican state. In the run up to
Dominican Independence Day in February, 2011, a Dominican consul in the U.S. publicly noted
that Dominicans living abroad had an obligation to celebrate Dominican Independence, stating
that ―wherever we are, we must pay tribute to the men that gave their lives in exchange for the
freedom that all Dominicans have today‖ (Primicias¸ 2/16/2011). The issue of patriotism was
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also raised by President Fernández in 2008 during a discussion about the constitutional right of
dual citizens to run for the Dominican Presidency. In an official press release, Fernández noted
that dual citizen Dominicans have shown their loyalties to both the Dominican Republic and the
countries in which they currently reside by participating in both electoral processes (Dirección
de Información, Prensa y Publicidad de la Presidencia, 2008). Migrant leaders have assimilated
this discourse as a way to legitimize their political aspirations in the Dominican Republic.
Aspiring candidates for the new legislative positions created for migrant communities have, for
example, touted the patriotism of Dominicans living abroad for their sacrifice sending
remittances (―Aspirante a Senador por el exterior destaca patriotism dominicano en envios
remesas, El Nuevo Diario, 12/19/2010).
Another aspect of the government‘s discourse is that they opt not to use the term
―migrant‖ to identify their migrant population. Instead, the government uses the term
―Dominicans from abroad‖ (see quote above) or diaspora to refer to Dominican migrants. This is
reflected not only in public discourses, but also in the new government programs that have
emerged to work with migrant populations. The CONDEX, or the National Council of
Dominicans from Abroad, which is the government entity in charge of government outreach with
Dominican migrants, does not refer to these groups as migrants at any point despite the fact that
their work is targeted mainly at Dominican citizens who have left the country. Finally
government propaganda often ignores the role of the Dominican state in migration trends. For
instance, a CONDEX executive summary from 2008 discusses the trends in the global economy
have influenced migration and made migrants situation more precarious, but fails to discuss
domestic factors that have lead to Dominican emigration (CONDEX 2009). While the state‘s
decision to not use the term migrant may possibly be driven by a desire to be inclusive of second
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plus generation Dominicans, the fact that the government‘s main interest is in working with the
remitting population and those with human capital who seek to return suggests that it is in fact
migrants whom they seek to court. The reluctance to use the term migrant may therefore reflect a
desire by government leaders to use a discourse that steps aside discussions about what role the
Dominican state has played in migration trends, and the extent to which they seek to integrate
migrants into the national polity.
Changes to Rule of Law
In 2008 the Dominican government approved legislation that led to constitutional reform.
Among the changes made were including new provisions that apply to migrants living abroad.
There are two provisions in the revised Dominican constitution that apply directly to migrants
living abroad. Article 20 of the constitution recognizes the right for Dominican citizens to
acquire a foreign citizenship without renouncing their Dominican citizenship (Constitución de la
República Dominicana, 2008.) This opened the door for expat voting to be adopted by the
Dominican government in 2000.
The second constitutional provision related to migrants is found in Article 81, which
addresses electoral constituencies for the lower chamber of the Dominican legislature.
Specifically, this article designates seven seats in the House of Representatives for the various
Dominican communities abroad, with the seats to be distributed by legislative action (Ibid,
Article 81).
Outside of these two articles, the Dominican constitution does not include any additional
language that addresses the rights of migrants or citizens permanently living abroad. The
guarantees of dual citizenship and external legislative representation under the constitution
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reflect an acknowledgement by the Dominican Republic that migration is a significant part of
Dominican society. They also grant migrants the opportunity to further develop a political
identity as migrants that can make claims on the Dominican government.
At the same time, however, the constitution does not explicitly establish migration as a
right of all citizens, or include provisions that guarantee the full equality of migrants vis-à-vis
non migrants, in matters such as representation in other areas of the government or in terms of
access to entitlements and or civil protections that may be offered to non-migrants. This aspect of
the constitutional reforms has not been lost among some leaders and political commentators
among the Dominican migrant community in New York. New York-based political commentator
Manuel Nin Matos, for instance, recently argued that the 2008 constitutional reforms keep
Dominican migrants in a second class citizenship status by not guaranteeing full equality for
Dominicans living abroad, and providing limited representation (Nin Matos 2008).
Political Rights
The Dominican government made a number of significant legal changes that grant
migrants greater political rights in back in the Dominican Republic. In 2004, the Dominican
government, after years of lobbying by a number of migrant organizations, passed legislation
granting Dominicans living abroad limited voting rights. Yet this law only permitted migrants to
vote in presidential elections, denying them legislative representation.
This form of limited suffrage was gradually been put to an end by Leonel Fernández‘s
current government. Constitutional reforms approved in 2008 authorized the creation of external
legislative constituencies for the Dominican House of Representatives. In early 2011 both
chambers of the Dominican legislature finalized the creation of these legislative constituencies
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by approving the External Representatives Voting Law. Under this law a total of seven
representatives will be elected by the various Dominican communities abroad. Three
representatives are to be elected from the Northern cities of the United States (New York, Boston
and Providence), two from the southern U.S. and South America (which includes South Florida,
Puerto Rico), and two from Europe (CONDEX 2011). Because these new legislative
constituencies will not come into effect 2012, it is difficult to forecast how these new legislative
seats will impact political engagement among Dominican migrants at this point outside of the
traditional Dominican political parties‘ efforts to mobilize voters.
As I note later in this chapter, however, a number of Dominican organizational leaders
with whom I spoke expressed various levels of skepticism as to how relevant these new elected
positions will be for the migrant community in terms of exercising political power in the
Dominican Republic. Concern and skepticism over whether these new legislative seats will be in
place by the 2012 election cycle have also been noted by a number of Dominican migrant leaders
who have already announced their candidacies for said positions. There have also been public
criticisms from Dominican migrant leaders in the U.S. over the fact that Dominicans living
abroad have been denied representation in the Dominican Senate, who have also noted that some
people have threatened to start withholding remittances in protest (―Embajador Critica Rechazo a
Senadores por Ultramar‖, Al Momentor 6/1/09).
Policies and Programs
The Dominican government recently implemented a number of policy programs designed
to expand migrants‘ involvement in the Dominican Republic. First was the creation of an office
within the country‘s Central Election Board (JCE) to work specifically with migrant voters,
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called the Junta para el Voto en el Exterior, or Voting Abroad Board. This office is responsible
for coordinating all aspects of external voting, including registration and voting procedures
(www.votoexterior.do).
Second, the Dominican government passed an executive order creating the Presidential
Consultative Councils for Dominicans Abroad (CCPDE). These were conceived by President
Fernández as a series of executive-level advisory groups across the various Dominican migrant
communities to act as an interlocutor between the Dominican government and these communities.
The CCPDE‘s role is to not only conduct outreach with the migrant community but to also
advise the President on the needs and demands that each community has for the Dominican
government (www.condex.gob.do.) (CHECK ASA CITATION FORMAT)
Finally, in 2008 the Dominican government passed a law that created the National
Council for Dominican Communities Abroad, or CONDEX. The CONDEX is a public entity run
by the President and cabinet members from the country‘s State, Tourism and Public Health
Departments, as well as the General Director of Migration. CONDEX‘s stated mission is to
integrate the various migrant communities and connect them to the Dominican polity through the
promotion of public policies that enable these communities to make meaningful social, political
and economic contributions to the Dominican Republic. CONDEX is also responsible for
working with various government and civil society organizations to foster these linkages
between migrant communities and the Dominican state (Santos 2008.) The CONDEX has a
number of specific functions it is designed to carry out, which include: (1) presenting nationallevel policies geared towards migrant communities; (2) Promoting community organization,
educational, cultural, sports and health initiatives in migrant communities as a way to improve
migrant quality of life; (3) Making policy recommendations to improve ties between migrant
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communities and both public and private institutions in the Dominican Republic; (4) Making
policy recommendations to improve communication between the Dominican Republic and its
migrant population (Ibid: 8).
The creation of the CONDEX also led to a restructuring of the CCPDEs, which
essentially operated as ad hoc executive committees. The CONDEX oversaw a restructuring of
the CCPDEs by establishing regulations for their operation and election of their members, as
making the CCPDEs formal groups that work in conjunction with the CONDEX to craft migrant
policy (CONDEX 2009.)
As part of its efforts, the CONDEX has entered a number of collaborative agreements
with a number of migrant-based organizations and other local organizations in New York City.
These include the New York Dominican Officials Association (NYDO), The Hispanic Health
Professionals Association (AHPSI), the New York Supermarket Association (which is
dominated by a large number of Dominican-owned supermarket chains) and the DominicanAmerican National Roundtable (Ibid).These alliances are meant to conduct outreach with
different sectors of the migrant population, in order to help craft policy proposals. There have
been more recent efforts to sign similar collaborative agreements with the League of United
Latin American Citizens (LULAC) (CONDEX 2009).
Based on the description of its activities, the CONDEX essentially operates as an arm of
the Dominican government to conduct outreach in migrant communities and on behalf of
migrants, and in particular serves as a vehicle for the acting Dominican Secretary of State. The
events that it has taken part in the U.S. includes co-organizing an annual health fair in New
Jersey with the Dominican-American Community Association, speaking in the Rhode Island
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Hispanic-American Chamber of Commerce‘s annual gala, and participating on a panel
discussion at the third annual CUNY Dominican Students Conference. CONDEX also organized
a summit between President Fernández and various Dominican elected officials throughout the
United States, including members of the New York City Council and New York State Assembly.
The meeting produced a number of policy proposals that have been submitted to the Dominican
executive branch for consideration including assisting Dominican elected officials in the U.S. in
future electoral efforts, providing legal assistance in the redistricting process to aid Dominican
voters in the U.S., and mechanisms to assist Dominican politicians in the U.S. to channel aid to
the Dominican Republic (CONDEX 2009.)
CONDEX has taken on the role as the main government agency/entity to focus
exclusively on migrant affairs, mainly by acting as the government representative among
different migrant constituencies abroad. Dominican government policy thus mirrors Ecuadorian
government policy in that it has acknowledged the necessity of having a dedicated program that
channels migrant concerns. Yet because the CONDEX was conceived as an advisory council, the
Dominican government is not legally bound to craft law or policy to deal directly with migrants‘
demands. Furthermore its activities, including its focus on supporting Dominican elected
officials in the U.S. may be interpreted as an effort by the government to reduce its long-term
involvement with migrant communities by bolstering Dominican political incorporation in the
U.S.
By contrast, the policy changes and migrant-oriented programs enacted by the
Ecuadorian government are not only a response to constitutional mandates to provide protections
and equal access for migrants, but also reflect an effort by the current government to create new
paradigm regarding migration. Specifically, the new paradigm that the Correa government is
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attempting to foster views migration as a social phenomenon affecting all members of
Ecuadorian society, and which creates social problems that the state has a responsibility to
address.
Direct Engagement with Migrants
With creation of the CONDEX and CCPDEs the Dominican government has extend its
engagement with its migrant population abroad, including those living in New York.
Furthermore, through CONDEXs consultation with migrant community leaders the Dominican
government has started to take a more active role in fostering transnational civic engagement.
However the fact that CONDEX is meant to be an advisory body for the Dominican government
does not ensure that Dominican migrant organizations will be capable of fully empowering
themselves in the Dominican polity, since their demands through CONDEX have no guarantee
of being acted upon by any branch of the Dominican government. Furthermore it is not yet clear
if the CONDEX will play a role similar to the Casa Ecuatoriana/SENAMI in trying to empower
migrant organizations to make demands on federal and local governments in the U.S., or whether
it will work to advocate on behalf of Dominican migrants rights as the Ecuadorian government
currently does. There is no specific evidence of this capacity building effect thus far, but given
the newness of the CONDEX there still exists an opportunity for those sorts of initiatives to
emerge.
The policies enacted by the Dominican government are, at present, considerably less
extensive than the efforts carried out by the Ecuadorian government for its migrant population
abroad. While some aspects of Dominican migrant policy are yet to be carried out and ultimately
may provide greater opportunities for migrants to seek substantive political engagement in the
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Dominican Republic, the policies currently in place are decidedly less ambitious in providing
migrants access to state resources or citizen rights and protections than what Ecuador offers its
migrants.
Historical relations between home country states and migrant populations abroad appear
to account for how each country has approached migrant incorporation, at least in some measure.
Dominican migrants‘ contentious history with the Dominican government over the last half
century seems foster nationalistic notions within the Dominican Republic that migrants have
abandoned their homeland, despite the transnationalization of Dominican migrants‘ lives. This
contributes to an opportunistic and half-hearted attempt at incorporation by the Dominican state,
adopting policies that provide limited rights and access to resources from the state to migrant
citizens. Ultimately state policies seem to provide few opportunities for migrants to make claims
on the Dominican state to address their dual marginalization, and may in fact exacerbate it.
By contrast, the Ecuadorian government under President Correa has taken a more
proactive approach to migrants‘ transnational practices, largely by expanding civil, political and
social rights for migrant citizens abroad.

Unlike the Dominican government, Ecuadorian

government officials see migrants not just as a new constituency to be courted, but also view
migration as part of a larger systemic problem that has affected much of Ecuadorian society.
Restitution policies for migrants also represent an opportunity for the Correa government to
legitimize itself as the government that successfully led the country out of nearly a decade of
economic and political instability, towards a progressive and equitable society. While
Ecuadorian migrants abroad acknowledge being stigmatized for their status as migrants, they
now have various avenues to make claims on the state to address their dual marginalization,
which is to some extent perpetuated by the government‘s discourse that reinforces migrants‘
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victimization in both the U.S. (currently) and Ecuador (by past governments). Nevertheless,
state-migrant relations, though complicated, have facilitated transnational political engagement
for migrants abroad.
Migrant Organizations Response to State Interventions
Ecuadorian migrant organizations
Changes to the rule of law and the creation of programs specifically targeting migrants
have provided significant incentives and incentives for migrant organizations to seek greater
political engagement in Ecuador. At the same time, however, these changes, along with the
government‘s rhetoric and direct involvement in the New York migrant community, have also
reinforced the idea dual marginalization among organization leaders. This, in turn has led
organizations to utilize a minority group identity as a means to engage in both Ecuadorian and
U.S. politics.
Among the migrant organizational leaders in my study there was a general recognition
that the constitutional reforms were an important change that allows migrants to make greater
demands for inclusion in Ecuadorian society as a minority or disadvantaged group, and as such
aids in migrants‘ transnational political engagement. Vicente Mayorga of the FUIE explained
how the process of drafting a new constitution in 2008 was crucial in getting the organization to
participate in the Ecuadorian political process:
In a practical manner, in the U.S. the legal framework allowed us to be part of
some coalitions that were part of changes in U.S. law. Same with Ecuador. We
made a serious presentation to the Constituent Assembly In the state‘s political
Constitution, one of our adopted proposals was to include protecting migrants
living abroad a state policy…. This means that those of us Ecuadorians who are
outside of our country are not left defenseless by the Ecuadorian state.
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Vicente added how the new constitutional reforms gave his and other migrant-based
organizations a reason to be involved in Ecuadorian politics:
I mention in some events that the Ecuadorian Constitution ensures access to free
health care for all... Here we don‘t have health insurance. Undocumented persons
don‘t quality except for emergency cases. So now in Ecuador there‘s access. All
three levels of education… free, all three levels up to university, which over here
doesn‘t exist...
Other Ecuadorian migrant organizations and/or their leaders have also emphasized the
importance of participating in Ecuadorian politics in order to defend the rights migrants have
been granted. During a FORES workshop session, the Danbury Ecuadorian Civic Committee
President emphasized the need for migrants to put an end to their political apathy and participate
in Ecuadorian politics now that migrants had a voice and rights. Similarly, Nuevas Raíces
frequently encourages its supporters to exercise their rights to government resources in Ecuador
including the right to vote and to enroll in social security.
The expanded political representation provided considerable incentives for migrant
organizations to mobilize voters, often by appealing to the idea of migrants being a minority
group with a political voice. This was one of the points used by Alianza PAIS activists to recruit
supporters. During their early campaign efforts in 2009 that I observed, Alex told me and the
PAIS volunteers that Ecuador that has dramatically changed the power structure by pushing
aside traditional elites and giving migrants and other historically marginalized sectors a voice in
governance. According to Alex, the fact that Ecuadorians abroad realize how the political
landscape has changed seems to have inspired migrants to be more politically active based on the
responses he saw from voters in the run up to the election. Alianza PAIS Coordinator Ximena
Peña made a similar point during our interview on how the new constitution encourages migrants
to advocate for minority rights:
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If you want to go back you have to participate… It also helps us… not just for
those who want to go back, but also at the level of the Ecuadorian community
here. If we can have some cooperation in our government here, in a foreign
country; if the government provides that opening, we have to take advantage of it,
because we as migrants are still contributing to the country‘s economic activity.
We send remittances. So then I think it‘s fair that the government over there, if
they can‘t address all of our needs, at least remember that there‘s a group of
people that exist over here and offer some sort of benefit. … I‘ve lived outside of
the country for 15 years…I‘m educated. If I want to go back I will have a hard
time getting work. I think there should be, affirmative action for people who meet
the requirements and are applying for government positions.
Other migrant organization leaders in New York also saw the electoral process as an
opportunity to advance their interests as community leaders and/or the interests of their
organizations. In addition to the FUIE, which ran a slate of candidates under the movement‘s
name (Ecuadorian election law permits both electoral parties and political movements to
participate in elections), another Ecuadorian migrant organization, Movimiento Inmigrantes en
Acción (MIA) also ran their slate of candidates. Ecuadorian International Alliance (a non-profit
cultural and immigrant advocacy group) Director Walter Sinche ran as a candidate for the
Pachakutik Indigenous Party. During my time observing Alianza PAIS Francisco Hagó‘s
campaign I met a number of members of Juventud Ecuatoriana who were participating as
volunteers for his campaign. Finally, an organization from Suffolk County, New York, Lucero
de América37, mobilized Ecuadorian migrants from the county to attend various campaign events
to demand greater support from the Ecuadorian government in protecting migrants from
discrimination and anti-immigrant violence.
For some migrant organizations the election opened the door to new opportunities to
articulate their demands on behalf of the migrant community. FUIE President Antonio Arízaga
explained why the electoral process was important in meeting their goals as community-based
37

The term Lucero translates to ―bright light‖ or ―radiant light‖, though the name of the organization may also refer
to Marcelo Lucero, an Ecuadorian immigrant from Suffolk County, NY, who was murdered in a bias crime in 2008.
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organization in Ecuador as well as the U.S., despite falling short of winning an Assembly seat:
Whatever the election results were or what was-the advantages or disadvantages
were, we believe the fact that we opened a path, we dared to participate in the
electoral process, was already a win, because we proved that community
organizations have the capacity to not only bring their message, but also to even
win the election…
FUIE ex-President Vicente Mayorga addressed the importance of the external voting
process in a broader context, noting how it has created a space for Ecuadorian migrant activism,
after many years of confronting migrant apoliticism
We were always told not to speak about politics. We were not allowed to talk
about. But now with the electoral situation allows us to discuss politics The
whole electoral process has allowed us to go to forums, to discuss, to go to a
sector of the community to [encourage them] to participate and think about the
different proposals from each of the parties...It‘s great that people participate in
politics. That lets them break that taboo of apoliticism. That‘s been strongly
injected into the veins of the entire community, apoliticism Human beings
essentially political; from birth until death, we‘re political…And the electoral
process grants us that, to air out the country‘s problems, society‘s problems, class
problems. It lets us talk about the economy; it lets us talk about interests. It lets us
talk about corruption
Even migrant leaders who were extremely critical of how President Correa and past
governments have dealt with migrants nevertheless saw the importance of taking advantage of
the new set of political rights, since it provided an opportunity not simply to advocate on behalf
of the particular interests of the migrant community, but also to challenge the notion that
migrants continue to be marginalized by the Ecuadorian state. I observed this in comments made
by Angel Borja, a candidate for the Immigrants in Action Party (MIA), during one of the
Ecuadorian National Assembly candidate debates:
We seek to win a seat to work on behalf of migrants, who for years have been
forced to leave Ecuador because of incompetent government; Even with the
current government we have been once again been deceived by promises of
change; Rafael Correa came to the US to get migrants support, only to forget
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about us after he was elected president; MIA was born out of the betrayal of the
Ecuadorian leaders in New York, who I advised for many years only; Migrants
are treated like cockroaches in the US while the Ecuadorian government remains
silent- the abuse must end!
State-sponsored programs that are include or target migrants have also become an
important incentive for migrant participation among the groups studied in my dissertation.
Vicente Mayorga explained how the new social security law not only gives many migrants
resources that they currently lack, but also invests them in matters of state policy:
One of the things we are promoting as change is access to voluntary affiliation to
Ecuador‘s social security, which was a proposal of ours that has now become law.
We can affiliate, and many of us have already voluntarily affiliated to the
Ecuadorian social security so that we can get medical insurance, access to housing
credits, the right to retirement pension…the majority of [migrant] community is
undocumented. We are shut out of the U.S. social security. So then we don‘t have
access, and we thought of this as an alternative.
The government‘s Migrant Bank project has also been a motivating factor for home
country engagement. The FUIE, for instance, lists this as one of its primary organizational
objectives in its newsletter (Ecuamigrante 8/1/2008). Furthermore, during an October, 2009
public meeting between with Assemblyman Hagó, FUIE leaders, local Alianza PAIS activists
and leaders of other Ecuadorian civic organizations from New York and New Jersey pressed the
Assemblyman on the Migrant Bank issue, demanding to know if it was going to be operating by
the initial deadline of December, 2009.
The Casa Ecuatoriana‘s involvement in the migrant community has become a focal point
for many migrant organizations‘ engagement in Ecuadorian politics, for both those who support
or take part in the Casa‘s work as well as for those who have been critical of the Casa‘s activities.
Alianza PAIS members were, unsurprisingly, largely supportive of the work the Casa has been
carrying out on behalf of migrant constituents, and used the Casa as a rhetorical tool to garner
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support for the party. As the ruling party, Alianza PAIS activists I met with in my study spoke
highly of the work that the consulate and the Casa Ecuatoriana did on behalf of the New York
migrant population. Alex, for example, pointed to the Casa Ecuatoriana as an example of the
government‘s progress, during our interview:
They have an office here in Queens and they are trying to do their best to help
migrant families in this sort of situation. For example, if a family member has
passed away and they don‘t have sufficient resources to repatriate the corpse; they
go to the Casa Ecuatoriana, which somehow makes the effort to make the
repatriation possible. If someone has a legal problem, then the Casa Ecuatoriana
has a database of various attorneys, where any person can get a free consultation.
The President is aware that the majority of Ecuadorians who are living in New
York live in Queens, so being aware of this, he gave the order to open a Consular
Office in Queens.
The Casa Ecuatoriana‘s FORES workshops also helped foster support for the
government‘s work among the organizations which participated in the program. Participants in
my study that worked with the Casa Ecuatoriana were quick and tout the benefits of their
relationships with the Casa Ecuatoriana and less critical of the government. As Jorge Vivanco,
President of Nuevas Raices notes:
[FORES] centered me as more of a leader. It‘s possible that I was diverging for
many years. Now I know where I want to go and I do not have to go far …I now
realize that we could accomplish what we were doing, but I had to get to
SENAMI… If SENAMI had come up with this 30 years ago who knows where
we‘d be? I knocked on many doors with this dance thing. I could sell them on
creating a theater and mime group. But a group that denounces social problems
using art? I had no listeners.. And that‘s where I was stuck I should have knocked
on other doors and I would have saved myself 30 years. SENAMI expanded my
vision and now I am very clear that I want this folklore thing to be even
stronger…
Ronald Bautista, Vice President of Juventud Ecuatoriana, also noted the value of the SENAMI‘s
assistance through the FORES program for his organization. First he noted how the workshop
provided important lessons on organizing:
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In FORES we went to a Jewish community center and we asked them questions.
In our community there are a lot of different opinions and it‘s hard to bring them
together, so we asked them ―do Jews have the same problem?‖ They said ―yes, we
Jews have a saying: ‗two Jews, five opinions‘‖. And that‘s because everyone
opines and have different, quite varied opinions. And that‘s what happens. When
there are that many opinions, everyone wants to pull towards their side. No one
wants to let go. So the solution we received was, ―you have your mission and you
have your goal.‖
Other participants in the FORES I spoke with also touted the benefits of the program. At
the last session I spoke with a workshop participant from a Quichua cultural organization based
in New York City. I asked this gentleman how he felt about the work done in the FORES
workshops, to which he replied that in his view it was a very important tool for his and other
organizations to learn how to become more efficient and stable. He added that hopefully they
will be able to access some of the resources that the SENAMI is providing for organizations that
complete the FORES program, since most Ecuadorian organizations have limited funding
sources. This gentleman also said the fact that the SENAMI is doing this sort of outreach is
important, since for many years migrants have been neglected by the Ecuadorian government
only talked about migrants because of their importance to the national economy. He went on to
note that the SENAMI cannot address all of the community‘s needs, and that ultimately it will be
up to Ecuadorians themselves to take the initiative to address the problems that affect the
community, especially since there are so many problems that Ecuadorians in the US have to deal
with that make it necessary to be politically engaged.
Yet despite this some of the organizational leaders in this study were less optimistic about
the impact the Ecuadorian government would have on migrants‘ lives, and worried that migrants
would continue to be marginalized. Jorge Vivanco of Nuevas Raices said his organization was
taking a cautious approach to engaging in Ecuadorian politics because many members and
organization supporters were skeptical that the current government, including the U.S.-based
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assembly members, would aggressively pursue policies to protect Ecuadorians rights in the U.S.
or address their interests. Other organizations, such as the FUIE and the Pachakutik Indigenous
Movement New York chapter, denounced corruption in the consulate, the assembly members
and the Casa Ecuatoriana. At FUIE meetings and at a multi-organizational meeting to start a
recall movement against the elected officials, members of both these groups claimed to have
evidence that the Assembly members, the Consul General and the Casa Ecuatoriana were doling
out no-bid contracts to friends and family members, and refused to disclose how public funds
were being used.
During our interview, former Pachakutik candidate and Ecuadorian International Alliance
Director Walter Sinche characterized the government and elected officials work as mostly
hollow rhetoric:
What are the assembly members going to the U.S. and Canada for? They never
take a document to say ―look, here‘s what‘s being done in the assembly. This is
what we obtained in the assembly for you. As of now this is law. This is an
accomplishment. This is the work.‖ The other day they arrived saying that the
Higher Education Act was a reality, saying this and that…she [Assembly Member
Linda Machuca] came- and all the assembly members do the same abroad. To this
day there is no Higher Education Act... [It] doesn‘t exist. But she said that there is
a Higher Education Act abroad. That Ecuadorians living abroad could study. How?
How is it in practice? Are there universities in the U.S. that the Ecuadorian
government has agreements with to allow Ecuadorians to study there? They don‘t
discuss that…None of that is in practice, there‘s nothing to indicate this. So then
you have these non-operational projects that they claim are in effect. Those are
lies.
Other organizations criticized the efforts to ensure voter participation. During the general
election voting in Queens, a group of voters from an organization called Lucero de America38
arrived from Suffolk County, NY to publicly denounce the Consulate and the Ecuadorian
38

Lucero translates in English to ―Brilliant Light‖ or ―Beacon of Light‖, though the organization may have also
taken its name in honor of Marcelo Lucero, an Ecuadorian immigrant from Suffolk County who was murdered in a
bias crime in 2008.
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National Election Commission (CNE) to the media and voters present, alleging that the
Ecuadorian election process in New York was a flawed and fraudulent process for abandoning
Long Island residents. A spokesperson for the organization explained to me and members of the
press that the CNE and/or the consulate failed to provide any transportation for Ecuadorian
voters who lived out in East Hampton and other parts of Suffolk County. The spokesperson
added that people in Long Island were anxious to vote and wanted to support the government‘s
efforts, but faced many obstacles along the way, including a lack of information on how to
register, the lack of a registration process in Long Island, and the lack of a polling place for
voters in Long Island.
The Casa Ecuatoriana‘s efforts have also been the subject of criticism by migrant
organizations. The Casa Ecuatoriana Director himself acknowledged that support for their
efforts were far from universal, stating that they‘ve had problems working with organizations
because many people believed the Casa Ecuatoriana was a political recruitment tool and opted
to avoid involvement with the Casa.
The FUIE was the organization in this study which has been the most critical of the Casa
Ecuatoriana‘s efforts. While they continue to support the general template of rights and policies
laid out by the Correa government, they have expressed skepticism about the government‘s
commitment to make good on all of its campaign pledges to migrants in New York. Antonio
Arízaga noted the major shortcomings of the Casa Ecuatoriana despite its potential to help the
community:
Migrants are mentioned when [the government] needs votes, when they have to
create an organization that justifies the budget. But regrettably the proper
attention hasn‘t been given… There was hope that the Casa Ecuatoriana, which
was created abroad, would possibly be the organism that would help solve many
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of the Ecuadorian‘s problems. But we now see that‘s not the case… I‘d just ask
you to call one of these days… you can dial all the extensions and no one will
answer, only to leave a message. The Casa Ecuatoriana is just a lot of
propaganda. To this day they‘ve been announcing that they provide legal
assistance to migrants in any situation. They don‘t even have a lawyer. In the Jose
Sucuzhanay case or the Marcelo Lucero case, they provided not one single lawyer.
It was a personal lawyer that they had to get from somewhere else. [The issue]
isn‘t that the Casa Ecuatoriana doesn‘t have a lawyer; it‘s that they show up on
television standing with the family, but they‘ve done absolutely nothing. No help
or consultation whatsoever.
Walter Sinche was also pessimistic about the impact of these political changes on the
fortunes of the Ecuadorian migrant community, mainly because of the lack of commitment he
observed as a candidate in the 2009 election and in subsequent dealings with the newly elected
assembly members. During our interview he noted the same lack of commitment by the Casa
Ecuatoriana and to providing genuine aid to the families of Jose Sucuzhanay and Marcelo
Lucero. Sinche also noted the lack of responsiveness by the Casa Ecuatoriana and other
SENAMI officials to the interests of his and other organizations who reached out to the
government to work with community leaders.
If a public official from any government, can be Ecuador or any other, I think has
to be at the service of their people. Not in the case of the Ecuadorians. In fact
there are certain organisms that currently are carrying out their tasks, but in the
case of the Casa Ecuatoriana …. When they could have been working, and could
do a joint community project with us [Ecuadorian International Alliance]… they
didn‘t do it. It all becomes political.
Yet regardless of how migrant organizations assess the effectiveness of Ecuador‘s
migrant policy, the whole process of the government‘s engagement with migrant organizations in
New York has reinforced the dual marginalization that migrant leaders have identified with.
Efficacy aside, the advocacy efforts made by the government to address migrant abuse in the U.S.
are a reminder by the government that many Ecuadorians have and continue to be marginalized
in the U.S., and look to the Ecuadorian state to intervene on such matters. By the same token, the
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changes within Ecuador to integrate migrants have also affirmed migrants‘ status as a
marginalized population group within the state. They recognize that they now have opportunities
to demand rights as a marginalized group; yet in many cases the organizations in my study also
see the lack of genuine commitment by the state to meet migrants‘ needs as proof that they
remain marginalized.
Dominican organizational responses
Dominican organizational leaders, including those with whom I spoke, appear to be quite
ambivalent about the Dominican government‘s migrant policy. While Dominican migrant
leaders are encouraged by the changes in rhetoric and external voting rights, skepticism abounds
on whether expanded voting rights will actually come to pass and what impact, if any, it will
have on migrant‘s marginalization in both countries. Many organization leaders acknowledge
that skepticism and even cynicism about the government‘s commitment to migrants-including
with the changes approved by the government- is pervasive throughout the community, which
makes organizing migrants to participate in Dominican politics a difficult sell. For those leaders
who were fully engaged in Dominican politics, the government‘s current policies were seen as
inadequate and only reinforced the necessity of making demands as a minority group in the
Dominican Republic.
Some organization leaders with whom I spoke sought to see the benefits the Dominican
government‘s currently policies had for migrants. Radhamés Pérez noted during our interview
that the political discourse among Dominican politicians was changing for the better as it
pertains to migrants:
I do see how this has really started to change and they try, in their discourse also,
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to articulate some sort of proposal that within the realm of legal insecurity that I
mentioned, of a return policy, helps Dominicans…. For example, on the return
policy, what have we been saying? ―Listen, if I‘m going to return to my country,
why do you have to charge me as a foreigner just because I live in another
country?‖ Because if I live in Santiago and I‘m moving to San Francisco de
Macoris you don‘t have to charge me money. So basic issues like that are now
showing up in politician‘s speeches.
Pérez was cautiously optimistic about the potential benefits of external voting:
One other aspect… which would really become a reality is that the Dominican
vote from abroad will be of a higher quality than the Dominican vote in the
country. Why? Because we don‘t depend on a government position to live or to
pay rent here [in the U.S.], so that my girls can go to school or to eat. My vote
here is freer. My vote doesn‘t depend on whether you as a candidate in the
Dominican Republic, come before election day with five pounds of rice, a sack of
beans, two sausages, a bottle of rum, those sorts of things.
Other migrant leaders in the U.S., however, have expressed frustration over a lack of
genuine commitment by the Dominican government to provide representation to migrants, and
see it as an attempt to marginalize the migrant population. A recent editorial from a Dominican
community newspaper in Florida accused the Dominican legislature of purposely delaying the
implementation process to deny migrants a chance to elect candidates in 2012, as well as of
striking down a proposal to provide migrants seats in the Dominican Senate (―Amenazas contra
Representantes Dominicanos en el Exterior‖, El Poder de Miami 5/12/2009). Similarly, the
Dominican Embassador to the UN also criticized the Dominican legislature for rejecting a
measure to create senate seats for migrant constituents (―Embajador critica rechazo a senadores
por Ultramar‖, Al Momento 6/1/2009).
Organizational leaders with whom I spoke in New York noted similar frustrations. PRD
leader Manuel Félix sought to remain optimistic about the potential for the changes that have
gone into effect to bring substantive changes in political power for Dominicans abroad, but also
recognized that the experience with migrants who have previously returned to the Dominican
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Republic to run for elected office has thus far been discouraging:
It‘s a more complex process. But whether within that complexity I believe we can
clearly define how we participate in government. I‘ll give you a concrete example.
In the current administration of Leonel Fernández there are two senators that are
products of New York City: Senator Heinz Vieluf of Montecristi, and Alejandro
Williams of San Pedro de Macorís. And both of them have been a complete
frustration. One is a prestigious dentist and the other an entrepreneur. And both
have legislated for their own particular interests. They haven‘t represented this
city, and yet they are a product of this city.
Other migrant organization leaders with whom I spoke had a more pessimistic assessment
of the changes enacted by the Dominican government. Many were unsure if these changes would
even incentivize migrants to engage in Dominican politics, let alone actually empower migrants
in the Dominican Republic. Marino Mejía, also of Alianza País (D.R.), offered a rather sobering
assessment of the viability of external voting during our interview:
The Dominican vote from abroad, from a financial standpoint, is suffocating. This
is because a migrant vote, for the Dominican taxpayer, is going to be very
expensive- maybe 20 or 30 times more than a Dominican vote in the country. It‘s
said that there are a little over one million Dominicans in the U.S. In the last
general election we cast 53,000 or 54,000 votes, which means that it‘s
insignificant from a qualitative standpoint. And yet millions of dollars were spent
to run those elections and to get to where we are. In other words, it‘s a vote that‘s
very costly to taxpayers…It‘s a victory of extraordinary value that we can vote
from here, yet it‘s not reflected on election day because people don‘t vote. The
traditional partyocracy‘s behavior, which has been so irreverent, so opportunistic,
so corrupt, so vandalistic, has taken away the younger generation‘s desire and
political to go vote for these corrupt people.
Mejía also points to the opportunistic and antagonistic attitude of the ruling parties in the
Dominican Republic towards migrants as the reason for why the government has stalled in
extending rights to the migrant population, and why Dominicans are reluctant to become
engaged in Dominican politics:
The traditional partyocracy has always opposed voting abroad. [Migrants were
seen] as a source of income in exchange for nothing more. And that was a long
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lasting process, in which many politicians put together a sort of political platform
of seeing us as some miserable money box to send a few pennies. Over time that
approach has fallen apart and the fact that we send remittances…has given
politicians a motive and a reason to make the concessions that have been made up
to now.
Former PRD leader David Williams (who now belongs to a smaller Dominican political
movement) also expressed ambivalence about how external legislators will be able to help
Dominicans noting that while it provides greater accountability, it also has limits. He discussed
the way clientelism and patronage limit the effectiveness of external representatives:
Remember, the representative is elected by your province, and if he doesn‘t
receive you or if he doesn‘t give you the necessary attention, come election time
you‘ll oppose him…The representative doesn‘t manage a budget, but does have
some resources they can use. And that gives them certain economic power to say,
―Look, tell so and so that I can‘t see him, but to go to finance so he can get $300
and leave, to pay for his ticket.‖ Then you‘re not as dissatisfied [as a constituent].
Williams also noted the skepticism that many in the migrant community have towards the new
external voting changes:
It could strengthen us or it could weaken us…If we simply go to occupy a space,
people won‘t value it- in fact, I‘ve been in debates from even before the
constitutional reform was approved, and over here there are a large number of
people who were opposed to assigning congressional seats to Dominicans abroad,
because they said that all these people will do is go to collect a paycheck. They
will not solve any of the problems that affect us here, because we live here, not
there.
For Dominican organizations that are not part of the electoral process there is even
greater skepticism that these changes will have a significant impact on migrants‘ lives. Zenaida
Méndez of the NDWC noted during our interview that more the rights migrants currently have
will probably not mean much in the grand scheme of things for her organization or the
Dominican migrant community more generally:
So we can participate, but I think we‗ll have to see [if it works]. I think that
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Leonel Fernández is the one that has engaged the most with Dominicans here,
because he grew up here. But at the same time he is like everybody else. He‘s just
using Dominicans to his advantage. ―I need to run,‖ [so] he comes here and
collects enough money for his campaign. He had this comité39 or something and
he gave people titles where they have no power at all. The only power that they
have is maybe presidential palace telephone, so they can call. But they can‘t stop
a deportation… So people put a lot of emphasis on voting, but I don‘t know [if it
matters.]
Zenaida would go on to acknowledge that her cynicism about what migrants can get from
participating in Dominican politics is part of the reason the NDWC largely avoids addressing
political issues in the Dominican Republic.
Still other figures in the Dominican migrant community see little point in relying on the
Dominican state to act on behalf of migrants in the U.S. Dominican scholar Bernardo Vega
(1997), for instance, noted in a public speech that he considers it inconvenient for the migrant
community to look to the Dominican government for any sort of political organization.
Specifically, he noted that creating a Migrant ministry would lead to migrant political
organization in the U.S. being undermined by Dominican political interests. He also rejected
creating migrant advocacy groups at the consular level or delegating such tasks to Dominican
political parties, since such efforts would fall prey to Dominican partisan politics at the expense
of migrants‘ needs.
Even those organization leaders with whom I spoke that were fully engaged in
Dominican politics claimed the changes that the government has made in its migrant policy do
not adequately address migrants‘ demands, nor do they put an end to migrants‘ marginalization
in the Dominican Republic. Manuel Félix explained how the external voting changes made in
2008 fall short of really addressing migrants lack of rights and demands, and noted what other
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policies were needed to really address migrants marginalization:
We have congressional elections this year [2010], and there‘s no representation.
That was a total deception. No one knows when that will go into effect. In other
words, the PLD is once again mocking the Dominican community; because if the
point was for Dominicans abroad to have a legislator, representing the diaspora‘s
interests, why then did we not participate as of now in the electoral process? That
was approved in the constitution as a feature, but no one knows when we will be
elected to those positions. These newly elected officials were elected for six years.
So now we have to wait six years to elect representatives from the diaspora in the
congress? That was a media-driven reform for us Dominicans living abroad. But I
personally believe that more than being represented in congress, we need to
represent a government. We have to be represented in all facets of the national
government; it‘s more than just having a figure in congress, it‘s having
participation in all aspects of the government.
Félix also explained what migrant leaders within the PRD were proposing in order to address
migrants‘ marginalization:
I think we‘ll have to create a ministry, not just an office for Dominicans abroad.
We are advocating investment programs, government support, and that the
Dominican central government outlines a policy to create a ministry for
Dominicans abroad that deals with all their needs. Especially for the Dominican
who goes back, who is tired and retired and wants to return and integrate himself
into Dominican daily life, or into the country‘s economy. We‘re outlining the
parameters for that ministry. It will no longer be an office for migrants abroad, but
rather at the cabinet level. And it will be directed by both Dominicans here as well
as from different parts of the world.
Similarly, David Williams explained that having a representative alone was not going to
improve migrants‘ status in the Dominican Republic, and discussed the kinds of things migrant
legislators and the Dominican government should do if they are genuinely committed to
empowering migrants as citizens:
I am proposing something in my agenda. Dominicans who are retired over here,
they get Medicaid40 here [in New York] and they want to move to Florida. They
go and Medicare covers their medicines and everything else over there. So then
40

Presumably Williams was referring to Medicare, since he discusses retirees and refers to Medicare later in the
discussion.
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why can‘t each country sign a treaty so that if you want to go to Jurumucú, which
is your province, the Dominican government, in agreement with the U.S.
government through some sort of coordinated effort between governments, allows
you to collect over there? Who would benefit? The Dominican government would,
because the dollar is a strong currency and they want lots of dollars to come into
the country. Those should be the tasks that properly belong to an external
representative. Make life easier for their constituents and at the same time
preserve their rights over there.
On the one hand, Dominican migrant organization leaders recognize the opportunity that
expanded external voting rights offers to articulate their demands to the Dominican government.
At the same time, however, these same leaders feel that migrants‘ transnational political
engagement is nevertheless hindered by what they perceive to be attempts by the political elite in
the Dominican Republic to limit migrant‘s political incorporation. Migrant leaders point to the
delays in extending these rights, as well as the neglect on the part of politicians in the Dominican
Republic to addressing migrant issues as proof that migrants are still largely unwelcome in
Dominican political society and therefore marginalized by the state.
As a result, for some groups, such as the NWDC, their political efforts are almost
exclusively directed at making demands for rights and recognition in the U.S., since the
government is neglectful and resistant of migrants‘ demands and concerns. Meanwhile for those
groups who are invested in Dominican politics, like the PRD and Alianza PAIS activists in New
York, the Dominican government‘s policies and involvement in migrant affairs has compelled
these groups to demand rights as a marginalized or disadvantaged group within the Dominican
state. Furthermore even these groups harbor skepticism that they can successfully garner and/or
sustain enough support from migrants to effectively engage in transnational political activism.
Conclusion
A comparison of migrant policies in Ecuador and the Dominican Republic not only
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reveal a number of differences in the scope and depth of each country‘s involvement with their
migrants, but also that the way in which each state has chosen to engage its migrant populations
influences migrant political engagement in very specific ways. State policies not only shape the
opportunities for migrants to use transnational political activity as a means to address their dual
marginalization, but also affect the manner in which migrants identify themselves within the
political sphere of their respective home countries, either directly or indirectly in the case of
these two populations.
In the case of the Ecuadorian migrant community, the Ecuadorian government‘s decision
to pursue a rather aggressive policy to reincorporate its migrant population in the nation-state
through changes to the rule of law, expanded voting rights, a wide range of programs and a new
pro-migrant discourse incentivize transnational political engagement by migrant organizations.
Some of this is due to a positive response by migrants towards the new rights they are guaranteed
by the constitution and by the government‘s rhetoric that is inclusive of migrants. However, part
of this incentive to engage transnationally is also in response to the effectiveness of policies and
programs put in place, which have a direct impact on migrants‘ welfare. Thus, among
Ecuadorians, even if certain organizations are critical or disapprove of the government‘s efforts
to empower migrants in the face of marginalization, they nevertheless see it as increasingly
necessary to participate in Ecuadorian politics and recognize that the political sphere in Ecuador
is more favorable for migrants to find a remedy to their marginalization. The state‘s rhetoric also
influences migrants‘ engagement by formalizing their status as a minority group. As such,
migrants frame their participation as a minority group in a dual context. Finally the fact that
Ecuadorian migrant politics has been almost exclusively crafted at the national level has
necessarily led organizations to direct their political activities at the national level of Ecuadorian
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politics.
By contrast, the Dominican government‘s migrant policy seems to provide considerably
less incentives for transnational participation for migrant organizations. This is partially due to
the fact that many of the measures that would allow migrants to effectively take part in
Dominican political life-such as external voting and government institutions to craft migrant
policy- have been slow to materialize. However the larger issue lies in that there is a contentious
relationship between migrants and the Dominican state that persists to this day, which not only
limits the scope of what the government can and will do to reincorporate migrants, but also
fosters a significant amount of skepticism and mistrust among migrant organization leaders that
migrants actually stand to benefit in any substantive way from transnational political engagement.
While this context also reinforces migrants‘ marginalization within the state, more groups are
compelled to forego participating in Dominican politics altogether. And those that do are more
pessimistic about their long term viability because of the obstacles that exist in the Dominican
Republic. This may explain why most of the transnational political activity among Dominican
migrants in New York is limited to political parties, while other non-partisan groups such as
hometown associations, and operate at the local level in the D.R.
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CHAPTER 5: MOBILIZING FOR STRATEGIC CITIZENSHIP: ECUADORIAN AND
DOMINICAN MIGRANT ORGANIZATIONS, AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT
The previous two chapters discussed how transnational political activism among
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in my study takes places through a process I call strategic
citizenship; or selective claims for membership rights in home our host country based on
migrants‘ perceived standing and the opportunities available to successfully articulate demands
for rights in each country. Chapter Three argued that strategic citizenship by New York-based
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations to pursue a transnational political program is
driven by a narrative or discourse of dual marginalization employed by organization members, as
well as by the perceived opportunities available for migrants to demand citizenship rights that
address their marginalization in both countries. Chapter Four, in turn, discussed the role the
Ecuadorian and Dominican governments play in shaping both the dual marginalization narrative
and the opportunities for migrants to demand and obtain citizenship rights to challenge dual
marginalization. The goal of these two chapters has been to demonstrate how transnational
political engagement by this set of collective actors is shaped by structural and ideological
factors, which create both opportunities and constraints to demand rights in both the U.S. and
their countries of origin.
This chapter further expands on the strategic citizenship argument by exploring how a
number of different civic and political organizations in the Ecuadorian and Dominican
communities engage in transnational political activity. In this chapter I examine three different
Ecuadorian migrant organizations41 and three separate Dominican organizations, all based in

41

It is worth noting that two of the Ecuadorian organizations examined here, while based in New York, aim to
represent Ecuadorian migrants across the entire U.S.
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New York, that take part in political activities. I use my observations and analysis of these
groups to argue that the nature of migrants‘ strategic citizenship is dictated in considerable
measure by the dynamics of these organizations, which determine the scope and the intensity of
transnational political engagement. Each of the organizations examined in this chapter
demonstrate that organizations affect political participation in terms of (1) the opportunities the
organization provides migrants through framing and networks to mobilize and make claims upon
both home and host country governments, and (2) by the institutional capacity for organizations
to empower migrants to have a tangible impact on political processes in home and/or host
countries.
The chapter first discusses the existing body of research on migrant transnational
organizations, the majority of which has focused on the phenomenon of hometown associations
(HTAs), and briefly assess the strengths and limitations of this work. I then provide a rationale
for a comparative examination of migrant civic and political organizations, and provide a brief
overview of key works on organizations that inform this chapter‘s analysis. The remaining
portion of the chapter presents findings based on my study of six different migrant organizations
in New York‘s Ecuadorian and Dominican communities. Specifically, the chapter first examines
three different organizations in New York‘s Ecuadorian migrant community, which include: (1)
Alianza PAIS42: The current ruling electoral movement in Ecuador, which operates a U.S.
politburo based in New York City; (2) the United Ecuadorian Immigrants Front (FUIE43): A
grassroots social movement organization based in New York City and with chapters across the
Diaspora; and (3) Juventud Ecuatoriana44 (JE): A 501c (3) non-profit organization based in the
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Translation: Proud and Sovereign Homeland Alliance
Frente Unido de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos in Spanish
44
Translation: Ecuadorian Youth
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New York metropolitan area whose work focuses on civic empowerment for Ecuadorians and
regional economic development in Ecuador as a solution to migration.
The chapter also focuses on three Dominican organizations (1) the Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD): One of the two main political parties in the Dominican Republic, which has a New
York chapter; (2)Alianza País (A.P.): A leftist political movement that participates in
Dominican elections, but actively works with other community and advocacy organizations in
the New York Dominican community, with no relation to the similarly named Ecuadorian
movement; and (3) the National Dominican Women‘s Caucus (NWDC): A non-profit
organization focused on Dominican and other Latina women‘s participation and representation in
U.S. politics, but also does advocacy work in the Dominican Republic.
This chapter assesses the degree to which the Ecuadorian and Dominican organizations
in my study are able to seize on opportunities available to them in home and host countries; their
capacity to appropriate organizational resources; and employ repertoires of action or tactics to
effectively advance their claims against both the U.S and home country governments to address
their marginalization. Specifically I discuss how the organization‘s ideology/public discourse,
structure, leadership, membership, material resources and networks with other actors enable
them to become viable political actors in the U.S., their home countries, or both, and to what
extent.
There are at least two ways in which political participation can be understood and/or
examined. First, at the individual level we identify individual political behavior as an actor‘s
propensity to vote or partake in political activities, as well as their ideological persuasions or
attitudes on policy issues. The benefit of using an individual-level analysis is that it allows us to
discern the overall level of political engagement and to understand collection actions such as
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voting trends on issues. As it relates to this research, studies on individual level migrant
participation (DeSipio, Pachon and Lee 2003; Waldinger 2008; Itzighsohn and Villacres 2009)
are particularly useful, since they not only focus mainly on external voting processes, but also
use other measures such as familiarity with home and host country policy issues, and financial
contributions to political activities in the home country. Most of these studies found transnational
political participation remains relatively small in scope. These studies provide a realistic
assessment of how prevalent transnational political practices are in terms of external voting, and
caution readers not to overstate the transnationalization of migrants‘ political life.
A second level at which to examine political engagement is at the organizational level.
While individual voting is the most basic level at which the majority of people in democratic
societies participate, a substantial amount of political engagement is influenced and takes place
within organizations. Scholars as far back as Tocqueville (1835/2000) have noted how voluntary
organizations play an important role in political engagement. Contemporary scholarship has
confirmed organization‘s relevance to political participation, either directly by mobilizing
individuals into collective action (Lipsett 1960; McAdam 1985; Wilson 1973; Tarrow 1998), or
indirectly by providing individuals the opportunity to become part of groups that foster solidarity
and trust, which help nurture political mobilization among organization members (Putnam 1996
and 2000)
The findings in this study show that the organizations examined in this analysis have
different experiences and outcomes of transnational political organization. The structure of each
organization, including its membership, hierarchy, resources and networks each provide distinct
advantages and limitations in either articulating or sustaining a political agenda that fully
addresses migrants‘ dual marginalization. As a result some organizations may lean towards
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engagement in one country over another, or face barriers in one or both states in their political
goals.
Migration, Organizations and Transnationalized Political Engagement
Organizations are consistently shown to be a vital part of the migrant experience. The earliest
sociological studies on migration, such as the Polish Peasant in America (Thomas and Znaniecki
1918) and Old World Traits Transplanted (Park and Miller 1921), each of which discuss the role
that cultural and patriotic societies had not only on migrant adaptation but also on their political
engagement during the early 20th century- a point which Foner (2000) noted in order to highlight
the historical trajectory of home country ties in the migrant experience. Other scholars (Walker
1998/1971; Goldring 1998; Landolt, et al 1999; Levitt 2001; Smith 2006) have emphasized the
emergence of hometown associations (HTAs), or civic organizations created by migrants hailing
from the same town, city or province. These organizations originally emerged to provide
migrants a vehicle for fraternization and cultural events, but many have evolved to become
influential actors in home country politics, often locally, but sometimes at higher levels of
governance. Smith (2006) for instance, notes the impact that an HTA created by Mexican
immigrants in New York City were able to influence voters in their hometown to successfully
defeat a long-standing incumbent mayor. Other scholars have described how HTAs influence
local and regional economic development policy in their home countries, by entering into
collaborative agreements with governments to fund various infrastructure and local development
projects (Levitt 2001; Orozco and Lapointe 2004; De la Garza and Lowell, 2000).
HTAs play an important function in migrants‘ political aspirations and effective
engagement. These particular organizations provide important resources and influence that make
them a vital part of how migrants are able to effectively participate in political processes. Given
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the nascent and often limited nature of external voting procedures set in place for migrant
populations by home country governments, HTAs provide an opportunity for migrants to lobby,
mobilize voters and collaborate directly with government entities.
Existing studies on migrant transnational organizations also have their limitations.
Findings in this study reveal that HTAs are not used by Ecuadorian migrant respondents.
Juventud Ecuatoriana President Eduard Miranda explained that HTAs have not caught on as an
organizational form among Ecuadorian migrants, though they sought to promote that sort of
organization in Ecuador:
The hometown association…in which individuals who left the country from the
same area start giving back to their community back in their country of origin, to
get them [migrants] involved. So there haven‘t been those actors who are like,
―okay, let‘s get together, unite those in Ecuador and those in the U.S., and let‘s
interact‖, which is the model that we want to create.
Many Ecuadorian migrants are nevertheless actively involved in politics through a
variety of different civic and political organizations. This also is true for Dominican migrants
this study, given the presence of political parties, community-based organizations and non-profit
organizations that take part in Dominican and U.S. political affairs. While HTAs studies have
yielded important findings about how civic organizations can be effective vehicles for
transnational political engagement, they provide only a specific, undifferentiated view both of
how migrants organize as well as how different organizations influence transnational political
activities. Without other forms of organization by which to compare HTAs there is no
consideration of organizational context, and thus no way to assess whether HTAs are more
effective than other forms of organization in helping migrants deal with dual marginalization
It is for this reason that this study compares transnational political engagement among
different organizations in the Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant populations in the New York
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City metropolitan area. Each of these organizations approaches transnational engagement
differently. Some orient most of their activities towards home country affairs; others are mostly
committed to political empowerment in the U.S., while the remaining groups seek mutual
political engagement in the U.S. and their home countries. These differences are driven in large
measure by the dynamics of each organization, both among its members as well as how the
organizations as a whole are able to interact with other political actors in the U.S. and their
respective home countries. While a qualitative study such as this does not allow for
generalizable findings regarding the effectiveness of organizations, it nevertheless provides a
comparative insight on how different types of organizations, by virtue of their composition and
resources, shape the way in which members of these groups participate in transnational politics.
In making this argument Chapter Five draws upon two key works. One is Moss Kanter‘s
(1977), Men and Women of the Corporation, an ethnographic study of a major U.S. corporation
that explores how organizational structures impact the behavior and actions of its members. The
other is Dynamics of Contention by Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam (2001) where the authors expand
on the theoretical model of collective action to show how collective actors engage in contentious
politics based on a confluence of ideological and structural factors that enable actors to make
claims against the nation-state. Moss Kanter‘s study provides important insight to this study on
the manner in which the composition and dynamics of an organizations shape how its members
perceive their roles and actions, while also illustrating how organizations enable or limit
members chances of achieving their goals Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam‘s study, in turn, provide a
theoretical framework that shows how collective actors‘-which includes organizations-capacity
to successfully make claims to a nation-state are predicated upon external and internal factors
that allow them to obtain and capitalize on opportunities to become effective political actors.
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Kanter (1977) found in her study that those who had opportunities to advance in the
corporation demonstrated greater commitment to organization success and/or negotiating the
corporation‘s internal politics to continue to advance. Those who lacked the opportunity to
advance or whose path to success was thwarted often displayed resistance or disengagement
from the organization. The corporation in Kanter‘s study also influenced employee behavior by
having embedded systems of power, defined in this instance as the capacity for individuals to
influence others to obtain autonomy of action. The capacity to obtain and exercise power within
the corporation allowed those in leadership positions to gain credibility among other leaders and
subordinates. Access to power also permitted individuals to create other sources of power in the
organization. Finally, Kanter found that the power sources embedded within the organization
fostered a sense of dependency by all employees, leading the less powerful to align with
powerful actors, who are able to empower other employees to varying degrees.
While the organizations examined in this study are considerably different from the
corporate structure outlined by Kanter‘s (1977) study, her work informs my findings in that it
demonstrates how personnel structures and interpersonal relations extensively determine how
organizations work, and the extent to which a given organization satisfies the goals that members
have upon joining. Though there is no general pattern of how organizational dynamics help or
hinder migrants in their transnational political endeavors, there are aspects of each organization
in my study that either empower or hinder its members, and the organization as a whole, from
effectively advocating for migrants to remedy their perceived dual marginalization. Some
organizations like Ecuador‘s Alianza PAIS, the FUIE and the Dominican Alianza País have
membership structures that make it easier to generate support, while others like Juventud
Ecuatoriana and the National Dominican Women‘s Conference are structured in such a way that
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makes it harder for them to have larger memberships, which leads them to pursue different goals.
Similarly, differences in leadership between groups like the Dominican Revolutionary Party and
Juventud Ecuatoriana create different outcomes in terms of whether each organization can
successfully articulate an effective political agenda on behalf of their respective migrant
constituencies.
The theoretical model of contentious collective action presented by Tarrow, Tilly and
McAdam in Dynamics of Contention (2001), as well as Tarrow‘s New Transnational Activism
(2005) is also important to analyzing the findings in Chapter Five. In the former, the authors
offer a unified model applicable to both institutionalized politics and non-institutionalized
politics (such as social movements). By focusing on contentious politics, or ―episodic, public,
collective interaction among claims makers and their objects, when (a) at least one government is
a claimant, an object of claims or a party to claims, and (b) the claims, if realized, affect the
interests of at least one of the claimants‖ (Tarrow, Tilly and McAdam 2001:5). The authors
identify the dynamic elements of the classic social movement agenda (i.e. opportunities,
mobilizing structures, framing and repertoires) in relation with each other.
According to the Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam model, actors involved in contentious
politics capitalize on opportunities they recognize as being available for them to act, appropriate
and employ organizational structures to mobilize people, and frame collective action based on
broader interpretation of the context that leads to contention. Actors also have generally
established previous relations- contentious or not- to other collective actors, which have shaped
internal structures of actors and helped generate their stories., Finally, Tilly, Tarrow and
McAdam contend that contentious action is driven by a combination of three elements:
brokerage (a unit that connects actors from two unconnected sites), category formation, which
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creates political identities, and object shift, or a change in relations between claimants and the
object of claims. Tarrow (2005) later updated this theoretical model to analyze how activist
groups effectively engage in collective borders across nation-state boundaries by emphasizing
the importance of networks between groups across multiple polities. These networks, according
to Tarrow, are critical to allowing activists to creating opportunity structures and to frame their
actions across various sites, which help mobilize people locally and to challenge governments
and other political elites.
Ultimately this chapter aims to contribute to the broader argument of strategic citizenship
by noting how the structure and internal dynamics of the organizations in which migrants
participate play a significant role in shaping the direction and scope of migrants‘ political
engagement. They also create different opportunities for migrants to effectively make claims that
address migrants‘ marginalization in both the U.S. and their countries of origin.
The chapter first examines three of the Ecuadorian organizations I observed during my
field research, in order to show how and to what extent organizations have sought to capitalize
on the opportunities provided by the Ecuadorian state for migrants to make claims for greater
rights, based on organization leadership capacity as well as the networks and resources
organizations have to effectively participate in both Ecuadorian and U.S. politics. The chapter
then analyzes three Dominican organizations to demonstrate how Dominican organizations face
greater challenges in mobilizing migrants and/or making claims on behalf of migrants, either
because of their ties to much-maligned political actors in the Dominican Republic or leader‘s
reluctance to seek significant engagement in Dominican politics.
Case Studies of Transnational Migrant Organizations in New York City
I. Ecuadorian Organizations
Alianza PAIS
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Alianza PAIS is the governing political movement in Ecuador, created by President
Rafael Correa (2006-present) after his election. Alianza PAIS has local chapters called politburos
that operate across Ecuador‘s various political jurisdictions. This also includes election districts
that have been created by the Ecuadorian government for migrants in the U.S. and Canada
(which are grouped together into a single election district for voting purposes), Europe and South
America. The national movement leadership in Ecuador sets the movement‘s principles and
objectives, while the local politburos select candidates and identify the constituency‘s policy
items.
Many aspects of how Alianza PAIS is structured affect how the organization mobilizes
migrants in the U.S. The first aspect is PAIS‘s legal status as a political movement, rather than a
political party. Although it is the electoral organization used to support Rafael Correa, U.S.
politburo director Luis Ortiz explained the particularities of being a movement and how it differs
from a party:
A political party [in Ecuador] has the power to establish strict membership
requirements, and to have more closed meetings. A movement has, in my opinion,
a more open character, since it not only impacts members, who we call adherents.
It also includes…We‘re using the word sympathizer, which means that, maybe
you‘re not in agreement with everything, but in general... you sympathize with the
movement and in some way support [it]. Adherent has more of a membership
character; you have to attend a minimum number of meetings, be consistent and
contribute ideas to generate income for the movement so that it can finance itself.
By opting to officially remain a movement, Alianza PAIS leaders believe they have the capacity
to exert a broader influence on the migrant community by allowing for flexible membership
terms. The relatively loose membership standards help accommodate a relatively wide set of
political positions within the U.S. politburo. Alex, my principal contact and PAIS organizer, and
Assemblywoman Blanca Ortiz, for example, identify with a more traditional socialist political
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discourse of state-led redistributive politics. Other leaders such as Luis Ortiz have more
moderate views, saying: ―We don‘t want a Soviet Union. We know those models have not
worked. We belong to a globalized neoliberal financial system and we have currency…So we
have to do things to improve, and many of those things are pragmatic.‖
Alianza PAIS‘s close association with President Correa also shapes the U.S.-Canada
politburo‘s efforts in mobilizing the migrant community. Correa‘s populist appeal has been the
focal point of PAIS‘s mobilization strategy, which as Luis explained is due to the movement‘s
trajectory:
The movement started with a strict electoral character, because we didn‘t actually
have a movement. …Alianza PAIS was created with only a presidential candidate
knowing that we wanted a new constitution, new rules to the game so we started
the movement with just a presidential candidate and we won those elections... All
of the force in the movement was concentrated in the Presidential campaigns.
This reliance on Correa‘s charismatic leadership presents both advantages and disadvantages for
U.S. politburo leaders. On the one hand, because Alianza PAIS is so closely identified with
President Correa, PAIS activists in New York have drawn upon Correa‘s popularity among a
broad cross-section of the country‘s population and his administration‘s accomplishments to
mobilize the Ecuadorian migrant population.
Henry, a volunteer during PAIS‘s 2009 election campaign, told me that because of
Correa, Ecuador is now one of the few countries whose migrants not only have voting privileges,
but tangible political power through legislative representation, which inspired him to sign up. I
posed the same question to two older volunteers at another canvassing event, including a
volunteer affectionately called ―Big Chief.‖ Both men said that the president has gone to great
lengths to end corruption and create a more democratic society in Ecuador and break with the
political corruption of the past, which includes migrants. Alex also repeated told me that his
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motivation for joining PAIS was to support Correa and his revolutionary project, not to be part of
partisan political activities per se. Correa‘s popularity has been such that even PAIS rivals such
as the FUIE and the Immigrants in Action (MIA), another migrant-based political movement,
frequently made it clear that they supported Correa, despite opposing PAIS.
Alianza PAIS‘s ties with the Ecuadorian government also provided New York leaders
access to considerable resources that aided their mobilization efforts, relative to other Ecuadorian
migrant organizations. Ecuadorian electoral movements currently have access to limited funds
for campaigning in the U.S. PAIS activists; however, have a variety of other resources they draw
upon. New York leaders had access to the Ecuadorian Consular Services Office in Queens,
which they used as a base of operations. Alianza PAIS leaders also used visits from top-level
government ministers and elected officials in Ecuador to boost their standing with migrants. I
observed both Alianza PAIS assembly candidates campaigning in Queens alongside National
Assembly President Fernando Cordero, SENAMI45 minister Lorena Escudero and Ecuadorian
Internal Revenue Service director Carlos Marx Carrasco. PAIS leaders also had support from
local migrant entrepreneurs that donated space, labor and/or supplies to the movement46.
Yet some of the same aspects of Alianza PAIS‘s organizational structure that enabled its
early success also created limitations for migrant leaders to pursue a transnational, migrantspecific agenda. New York leader‘s efforts to articulate a migrant-specific platform have been
subsumed by the movement‘s national political goals in Ecuador. This is partially due to the
difficulty PAIS activists in New York have separating themselves from President Correa and/or
the Ecuadorian government. Some of the Alianza PAIS activists in New York City acknowledged
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Secretaria Nacional del Migrante, or National Migrant Secretariat
One notable example of this is Delgado Travel, a large travel and multi-service agency for migrants in New York
City, which provided space at one of its main branches in Queens and airtime on its radio network to allow PAIS
candidates to speak and to canvass voters.
46

164
the challenge they faced in articulating a migrant identity and political agenda within the larger
movement. During the 2009 election campaign, Alex suggested that assembly candidate
Francisco Hagó‘s main competition was actually from the Correa government itself and
specifically the SENAMI. Alex was concerned that SENAMI representatives, who wanted to be
seen as the main advocate for migrants, would take up too much of the public spotlight during
the campaign, making it difficult for Hagó to make a claim to voters that he and PAIS leaders in
the U.S. could effectively advocate on their behalf of migrants in the U.S47.
Other comments illustrated the struggle between migrants‘ demands and national
movement goals. When I asked Alex to mention migrant-specific issues the politburo was
pursuing, Alex fell back on discussing the Correa government‘s accomplishments thus far:
Personally what changes would I like to see at the migrant level? That there‘s
some sort of organism that worries about worker‘s exploitation, or that workers
who need help some sort of place where someone can provide that assistance
Well… the Casa Ecuatoriana already exists, …The new consulate in Queens also
exists, which was the President‘s idea48... the political work carried out by Alianza
PAIS is to ensure, this type of information gets out to people, to the community,
so that they are informed about these advances.
Ximena Peña, another Alianza PAIS coordinator in New York City, acknowledged that the
migrant community‘s interests aren‘t always reflected in the manner in which the movement
carries out its political goals:
I think there are very valuable people here, prepared migrant people with a great
desire to collaborate… I told Jorge [López, the consul general] this. But sadly the
Casa Ecuatoriana Director came straight from Ecuador. If we [the migrant
47

It is important to note here that while all of the data was based on PAIS‘s political activities in New York City,
Alex‘s comments refer to the fact that the migrant candidates who are elected to the Ecuadorian National Assembly
are elected to represent all migrant voters living in the entire United States and Canada. Hence Alex‘s comments
identify the entire constituency
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Alex is referring to the Main Consulate near the United Nations. The Queens consulate Alex alludes to is an
extension office that provides limited services to migrants, such as documentation and voter registration.
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community] had been unified, we could have put out a name and said ―this person
is worth hiring.‖ And if that would have gained momentum and then maybe we
could have gotten something…Sadly, we don‘t have political power and a lot
of things are assigned to us from there. There are political interests that come
from Ecuador. There are also problems in the community here that we can‘t
reconcile because we are selfish.
Furthermore, during the 2009 election campaign PAIS leaders and candidates in New York were
sometimes overshadowed by President Correa‘s image, making it hard for voters to distinguish
between the two. Many voters with whom PAIS volunteers met on the campaign trail said their
support for Correa was their reason for voting, saying or knowing nothing of Hagó‘s candidacy.
PAIS migrant candidates also relied heavily on President Correa‘s popularity to garner support
from migrant voters. Most of Hago‘s talking points only highlighted the President Correa‘s
achievements on behalf of migrants.
Alianza PAIS‘s composition as an electoral movement also creates obstacles towards
being effective transnational political actor by relying on a hierarchical leadership model, where
success within the organization is predicated on moving up the political ladder. Long term
success for members, including migrant activists, is measured by the extent to which one is
rewarded with government posts and/or the opportunity to run for elected office as a PAIS
candidate. This creates strong incentives for many of the U.S. politburo‘s migrant leaders to
focus on advancing up the party structure.. Francisco Hagó‘s campaign was a reward for his
organizing efforts in the 2006 and 2008 elections. Luis Ortiz was appointed to government post
in the Interamerican Development Bank. These are just a couple of examples.
Alianza PAIS‘s hierarchical mobility structure has strained the U.S. politburo‘s leadership.
After the 2009 election, constituents at public meetings criticized Hagó and the other politburo
leaders for demanding migrant unity, arguing that both PAIS and the community lacked
leadership. Eventually, Hagó admitted that he could no longer focus solely on what goes on
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within Alianza PAIS while serving in the Assembly. Luis Ortiz also acknowledged the problems
that his and Hagó‘s departure pose for the movement:
Problems began to emerge within the provinces, which included us [in the U.S].
[People said] ―Luis Ortiz has been sub-director since 2006.‖ ―This is not a
dictatorship.‖ ―Other people should be in place.‖ ―Where is Luis?‖…So then the
politburo here has been questioned…They have a right to question because the
movement director, Francisco [Hagó], is an Assemblyman. He already left. Aside
from that there‘s also my absence, since I came to D.C. It‘s been hard for me to
go to New York every weekend. So right there it was unclear who took charge.
It‘s a bad precedent and it‘s an undemocratic precedent to say, ―I‘m going over
here, you stay in charge.
The leadership void has also led to infighting within U.S.-Canada politburo, particularly
between Hagó‘s team and Assemblywoman Linda Machuca‘s team. During the 2009 campaign
Alex proclaimed Hago the preferred candidate back in Ecuador. Hagó‘s team was also not
enthusiastic about Machuca‘s election victory, arguing that she and her New Jersey supporters
represented interests that diverge from politburo‘s goals. The two candidates made few
appearances together during and after the election.
Conflicts also emerged between Assemblyman Hagó and his alternate, Blanca Ortiz, over
her role. Ortiz acknowledged her tenuous standing early on, stating: ―When I was approached to
run, I felt that Hago, Jorge and Luis wanted me to run mainly to have someone to stand up
against Machuca.‖ Ortiz also described how she was marginalized within the movement after the
election:
I quickly realized that Jorge, Luis and Francisco really just wanted to use me as a
stepping stone for their own political aspirations, and had no interest in what I
might have to offer substantively. As soon as the election was over and we won,
Francisco told me not to speak to the press or engage in any sort of community
work. From there things only got worse and I became increasingly marginalized
by the PAIS leadership, to the point where I was nearly denied access to
Consulate in Manhattan …Furthermore Ximena [Peña] was assigned as my office
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director mainly because she is a levantamano49 that goes along with what Jorge,
Luis and Francisco want. Their efforts to maintain control not only involve
marginalizing me, but also limiting Linda Machucha's influence. The rivalry
between Machuca and Hagó is a power struggle over control of the Casa
Ecuatoriana.
These internal conflicts eventually began to undermine PAIS‘s credibility among the migrant
community. Constituents began to denounce Blanca Ortiz‘s marginalization at public meetings
with Assemblyman Hagó. PAIS migrant leaders also fell under attack by other political actors
like the FUIE, Alianza Ecuatoriana and Pachakutik, over accusations of excessive patronage,
corruption and lack of commitment to migrants as internal conflicts within the politburo
persisted.
Observable internal conflicts may have also stalled PAIS‘s efforts to create networks with
political forces in the U.S. I found no clear evidence that the movement had any significant
contacts or networks with political actors in the U.S. or even locally in New York. As noted in
the Chapter Four, U.S.-Canada politburo leaders were criticized by migrant community leaders
for their limited support for hate crime victims, and for not supporting local groups in such
efforts. Alex confirmed Alianza PAIS‘s lack of networks with U.S. actors during our interview,
and explained both the need and the challenges PAIS faces in networking with U.S politicians.
Well, the movement as such, no… Just now we‘re in the process of [getting ready]
for the President to take office again… and the problem I see is that the two
primary Assembly members won‘t be around to make contacts with
representatives from the North American governments50. But we still have the
alternate Assembly members, and through them we‘ve approached some [elected
officials]. But eventually those sorts of conversations or approaches will have to
be made [by PAIS].
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Translation: hand raiser. A derogative term used for a blind loyalist
Ecuadorian legislators currently representing the U.S. migrant community also represent migrants residing in
Canada.
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Some PAIS leaders have established networks, such as Blanca Ortiz, who said she had ties to the
mayors of Elizabeth and Newark, NJ, the State Board of Education, the Newark Street Vendors
Association and an advocacy group called PROSID. However, according to Ortiz, it has been
difficult to use these networks to shape Alianza PAIS‘s policy agenda with the New York
migrant population. Furthermore, given Ortiz‘s weak standing with politburo leaders it is
difficult to imagine that she will be given the opportunity to help PAIS build its networks with
U.S. elected officials.
PAIS‘s U.S.-Canada politburo‘s viability as a vehicle to exercise strategic citizenship has
been compromised. An emergent leadership void and infighting among aspiring leaders have
tarnished Alianza PAIS‘s public image among a substantial part of the migrant community, and
may have stymied networking efforts with U.S. politicians Some leaders, such as Alex and
Ximena, have started to push for greater capacity building and loyalty mechanisms through
popular education campaigns modeled after Chavez supporters in Venezuela (called
Revolutionary Defense Circles). But it remains to be seen whether these efforts can repair the
damage done to PAIS‘s image among migrants.
FUIE
The FUIE, or United Ecuadorian Immigrants‘ Front, is a grassroots political organization
started by Ecuadorian migrant activists in 2000 (Ecuamigrante 2:4, 2008). FUIE is made up of
various smaller civic and political organizations who share a common commitment towards
advocacy for greater civil and political rights for Ecuadorians in both Ecuador and the various
host countries where Ecuadorians have migrated. The FUIE has an executive board elected by its
members, raises its own funds, and sets its own agenda. The organization and its executive
committee are based in New York City, but the FUIE has smaller chapters operating in London,
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Madrid, Milan and Caracas. Though it has participated in Ecuadorian elections and created a
non-profit service organization, leaders with whom I spoke to characterize the FUIE as a social
movement organization with a progressive or radical-left political ideology, whose goal is to
advocate for migrants‘ rights (including those of non-Ecuadorians) both in Ecuador and abroad.
The FUIE‘s structure as a grassroots social movement organization allows it to make
demands that address migrants‘ dual marginalization in both Ecuadorian and U.S. politics. In
particular, its members‘ strong ideological commitment, its movement-based structure and its
coalition-based mobilizing tactics create opportunities for the FUIE to participate in both U.S.
and Ecuadorian politics. However, these same aspects also impose constraints on the scope of
their activities, and have driven the FUIE to adopt survival strategies that may affect its political
participation.
The FUIE stated mission is to protect the rights of workers and families among the entire
Ecuadorian migrant population through mobilization and direct action (Ecuamigrante 2008). The
FUIE‘s ideological purpose has not only allowed the organization to establish a presence in
Ecuadorian politics, but also avoid internal tensions among its members. According to current
FUIE President Antonio Arígaza:
It‘s made up of people from the left and many people who perhaps had that
trajectory in Ecuador or had democratic ideals… There‘s this problem in New
Haven51? Then everyone goes to New Haven. There‘s a problem that‘s happing
over here? Everyone goes there…everything works that way. …So among us
there‘s a sharpened ideological identity with a desire for change which has helped
move us. Maybe that‘s what has given us results in the FUIE. Here‘s what
happens in all of the Ecuadorian organizations. You don‘t have people who are
committed; there are no consistent people, no honest people or people with the
ideology who are willing to renounce their material position. The organizations
51

Antonio is referring to a 2009 incident in which a group of immigrant rights activists, many of whom were
Ecuadorian migrants, were confronted and harassed by an anti-immigration group during a rally in New Haven, CT
demanding immigration reform legislation be passed by the U.S. Congress.
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fall apart in two or three years...Those things don‘t happen with us. That‘s
because our composition has other characteristics.

My own observations of FUIE activities seem to confirm Antonio‘s assertions. During all of the
meetings I attended there was almost always consensus on the positions that the organization‘s
leaders proposed. Public events, such as demonstrations and outreach efforts during the
Ecuadorian National Assembly election (in which the FUIE ran candidates), would consistently
have around 20-30 volunteers present to support the organization‘s mission and ideology.
The FUIE‘s ideological orientation has made it possible for the organization to position
itself as an advocate for migrants‘ rights in both Ecuador and U.S. On the U.S. side, former FUIE
President Vicente Mayorga explained how the group has been able to form working relationships
with various organizations in the U.S. to incorporate Ecuadorian migrant issues into broader
social justice campaigns carried out by these organizations:
We also believe in the interconnecting lines of unity with non-profit organizations
and sectors, diversity organizations here in the U.S. and of other countries, with
progressive people, with students and with workers of different sectors. This has
made the Front… become part various coalitions, of vindicative struggles that
have been carried out here in the U.S. We are part of the New York Immigration
Coalition, of the NYCPP52 and of the National Council of La Raza, which is at the
national level.
The FUIE‘s ideological stance has also created opportunities to participate in Ecuadorian politics.
In the 2009 Ecuadorian general election, the FUIE fielded candidates for the two National
Assembly seats from the U.S.-Canada external constituency, running as a migrant-oriented, more
progressive alternative to PAIS. In their campaign platform, the FUIE listed among its policy
priorities enacting a Distance Education Law for migrants abroad, equal representation for
migrants in all government ministries and agencies, a public fund to aid deportation victims and
52
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to repatriate deceased migrants, and greater oversight of migrant-oriented public services such as
customs offices, the consulates and the Casas Ecuatorianas53. During the campaign, Alex and
Luis both noted that while Alianza PAIS was on good terms with the FUIE (since they supported
President Correa), they nevertheless acknowledged that the FUIE was ideologically to the left of
Alianza PAIS, and therefore a rival group.
Since the 2009 election the FUIE has increasingly has been able to parlay its ideological
position to legitimize itself as an advocate against migrants‘ dual marginalization. During the
FUIE‘s first meeting after the Ecuadorian election in October, 2009, organization leaders and
members took highly critical positions towards the Correa government and the Assembly
members from the U.S. Antonio Arízaga argued that the current government‘s mandate is being
undermined by people who are aligned with the right in Ecuador. Vicente Mayorga denounced
the lack of oversight on the consulates and the kind of service they‘ve been providing, arguing
that many of the services are very costly for migrants such as customs fees or getting legal
powers. He also blamed PAIS leaders for failing to respond to these growing concerns from the
community on consular issues as well as other larger issues affecting the migrant community, or
for responding to the FUIE‘s accountability requests with hostility.
The FUIE was eventually able to use its ideological position to capitalize on growing
dissatisfaction among constituents and other political activists in the Ecuadorian community. By
August, 2010 the FUIE successfully convened a ―Citizen‘s Assembly‖ of all Ecuadorian
organizations in New York, in which they were not only able to create a Citizen‘s Oversight
Council with representatives of various community organizations (including Pachakutik,
Fundación del Migrante, The Ecuadorian Civic Committee of Danbury, CT and a newly
established Ecuadorian street vendor movement), but also generate momentum for a movement
53
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to recall both of the Ecuadorian assembly members representing the migrant community in the
U.S.
The FUIE‘s ability to sustain organizational cohesion and thus effectively articulate its
migrant-centric political agenda is also partly aided by its coalition-based movement
organization structure. It was not uncommon to find that many FUIE members also belonged to
other Ecuadorian organizations. Former President Vicente Mayorga was also affiliated with the
Ecuadorian Popular Democratic Movement (MPD), a leftist political party. Former FUIE
assembly candidate Carlos Cordova is also the President of the Ecuadorian Civic Committee of
Danbury. Other FUIE members I met were also members of Pachakutik and Fundación para el
Desarollo Social y Economico Camino Del Inca54, an Ecuadorian organization in New York City
working on local economic development issues in Ecuador and the U.S. By maintaining such a
fluid membership structure, the FUIE can more easily maintain its ideological focus, as members
with other political interests can pursue
This organizational structure also allows the organization to successfully operate on a
volunteer basis. There are no incentives within the movement to deviate from the ideological
mission of the movement which, according to Antonio Arízaga, is what has allowed the
organization to be successful in carrying out its political advocacy:
All the meetings are different, all of them, because one person can [go] one time,
but not the next time. In other words, and since there‘s no imposed obligationrather, the obligation is a moral one. It‘s a personal obligation. There is no
pressure or sanction. So then people mobilize that way.
Finally, the FUIE‘s social movement organization structure has also given it the
flexibility to adopt different tactics to challenge migrants‘ marginalization in both the U.S. and
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Ecuador. Much of the political activism carried out by the FUIE was characteristic of movement
organizations. They mobilized members for May 1 immigrant rights rallies in Manhattan in 2009
and 2010. The FUIE also took part in a lobbying and rally effort in conjunction with a coalition
of New York immigrant organizations coordinated by Make the Road New York. At the same
time, the FUIE also did not hesitate to participate in the 2009 Ecuadorian elections by fielding its
own Assembly candidates in order to advance its mission and bring the front added exposure.
Arízaga explained during our interview the logic behind the FUIE‘s decision to participate in the
electoral process despite not being an electoral movement:
…whatever the advantages or disadvantages were, we believe that by forging the
path, by daring to participate in the electoral process, was in itself a victory,
because we proved that community organizations are capable of not just carrying
a message, but even to win elections.
Arízaga also noted that participating in the electoral process also helped the FUIE gain new
volunteers, identify new leaders, and new organizations that are aligned with the movement.
Arízaga was also quick to note, however, that this was not indicative of the FUIE‘s desire to
transition into an electoral movement or party, but rather one of many strategies the FUIE is
open to using to carry out its mission. As he noted, ―our outlook is not electoral. Our work is
permanent. And we aren‘t thinking about the 2014 or 2020 elections… We‘re not interested in
something personal. Our commitment is with the community.‖
At the same time, however, he FUIEs structure as a movement organization has also
placed certain constraints on the organization‘s capacity to mobilize. As a grassroots movement
organization it has been difficult for the FUIE to secure financial and material resources, which
not only limits the organization‘s work to mass mobilizations, but also their capacity to project
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itself to a broader segment of the migrant population. Vicente Mayorga discussed some of these
limitations in detail:
The fact that we‘ve existed only as a voluntary group means that we haven‘t been
able to develop the work agenda to the degree that we should. Since we all have
to work, we all work, or better put, the free time that we have is dedicated to
organizational activities for the FUIE… we haven‘t, for example, developed our
own campaigns, due lack of full time personnel. We are part of some campaigns
with some established organizations… but if during this next stage we can set up
an office, I think we can make progress in that goal. But it‘s not easy to work with
only volunteers.
Antonio Arízaga also said that financially the FUIE relies mainly on volunteer work since they
currently cannot pay for full time staff. Arízaga explained that people have remained involved
because of their ideological commitment to the issues that the FUIE works on, but he
acknowledged that people still have to work to take care of their families. The FUIE‘s lack of
material resources means that Arízaga has no office space and could not afford to travel to
Europe and South America to organize other Ecuadorian communities. Arízaga said that as a
result he relies on email, blogs and video conferencing to communicate with organizers in Spain,
Italy and Belgium, though added that it was not a perfect substitute for face-to-face interaction
Other resource limitations abound. The FUIE‘s membership meetings are currently held
in a makeshift conference room in a converted basement of an old apartment building in Queens
that a FUIE member worked in as the superintendant. While the space was regularly available
and free of cost, it was also small, dimly light and lacked proper ventilation or a/v equipment of
any sort. Furthermore, where larger organizations such as Alianza PAIS had access to different
mass media sources and ample resources for both print and electronic media, the FUIE relied on
the most basic forms of communication, such as a basic electronic mailing list and photocopied
fliers which they distributed only at rallies. They also lack the resources to hire a staff person to
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update their internet blog, and as a result their website is only updated once every several
months55. They now rely mainly on a Facebook page to maintain an internet presence as a more
cost-effective approach56.
The organization‘s reliance on volunteers has also been a hurdle for the FUIE‘s ability to
effectively carry out political engagement in both the U.S. and Ecuador. Organization meetings
were infrequently held. Current President Antonio Arízaga has a full-time job running a jewelry
shop in New Jersey, and all the other officers also have full-time jobs. Though the organization‘s
leaders continued to make public appearances, at one point, the organization went nearly a whole
year between meetings.
The FUIE has found ways to overcome their resource limitations to carry out its
transnational political activism though this often compels the organization to compromise
aspects of its work. One strategy has been carrying out coalition work with other organizations.
For instance, the FUIE worked with Make the Road to participate in an immigration reform
lobbying session and rally in Washington, DC. Ultimately, though the FUIE was only able to
secure eight spaces for their volunteers to ride to DC, and as a result their presence was much
smaller than they had originally planned.
The FUIE also recently created a new entity called the United Immigrant Front (FUI), a
501 (c) 3 non-profit organization that will work to provide free legal, workforce development
and other professional services to Ecuadorian and other immigrant groups in New York City.
While the work that will be carried out by the non-profit organization is consistent with the
FUIE‘s overall mission of working to combat migrants‘ marginalization and will have FUIE
members on its board of directors, the FUI‘s mission will not deal with direct political
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engagement, largely because federal law prohibits 501(c) 3 to have any direct involvement in
partisan political activities. Vicente explained the non-profit‘s mission:
We are going to open an office here in the U.S. to provide legal, professional and
guidance services, in a public way, open. We need, of course, to look for
resources, since staff is needed… We think that‘s necessary, because many of our
people don‘t know who to turn to, and that leads to frauds and schemes…We are
now in that stage, and if we‘re ambitious to also develop productive projects.
Productive projects imply that we want to show people do develop businesses, but
collective ones, not individually-owned… .
Antonio Arízaga added that this new project would not detract from the FUIE‘s participation in
Ecuadorian politics, though it would be two separate operations:
We will continue to make pronouncements with respect to situations that are
occurring in Ecuador; we will still address those as the FUIE. The other legalized
organization can‘t take on that role, because that has to comply with a strictly
community service role and we don‘t to mix it up with political affairs. Those are
two completely different things.
FUIE leaders are hopeful that by being able to apply for grants for their new non-profit, they can
also their resources to support their political work. Arízaga was hopeful that their fundraising
efforts to get an office space would soon be met to have a permanent base of operations The
FUIE achieved this goal in the summer of 2011, when they successfully secured a shared office
along with a Filipino immigrant community organization in Queens (Ecuamigrante 2011.)
The FUIE‘s non-profit operations may provide some financial stability for the group,
which would make it easier for them to address migrant marginalization in the U.S. The
possibility exists, however, that this tactic may also reduce their engagement in Ecuadorian
politics. Beyond the restrictions that U.S. laws place on non-profits for partisan political
activities, there is a possibility that the FUI‘s service provision work may limit the time that
FUIE leaders will have to pursue extensive political engagement. This is observable, for example,
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in the cases of older New York-based Dominican migrant organizations such as Alianza
Dominicana and the A.C.D.P., both of which started as civic organizations that promoted
Dominican political engagement, but in recent years have dedicated themselves almost
exclusively to service provision (Aparicio 2006). Whether the FUIE can successfully sustain
separate political and non-profit operations remains to be seen.
A final hurdle rests in the fact that a significant number of their supporters are
undocumented immigrants. While this has less bearing on their participation in Ecuadorian
politics than in U.S. political engagement, it nevertheless has implications across the board for
their political engagement. Vicente Mayorga conceded that working in coalitions with groups
like Make the Road New York was critical because many in the FUIE are not yet citizens and it
was important to tone down their leftist rhetoric to avoid scrutiny from the government
authorities. The FUIE also had problems organizing a civil disobedience action for immigration
reform, since many members were advised not to do civil disobedience, risking deportation.
Overall, as a social movement organization, the FUIE has been able to maintain internal
cohesion, successfully positioning itself as a legitimate advocate for migrant rights in both the
U.S. and Ecuador, and adopting different tactics to carry out their political activism, including
mass mobilization, coalition building work, and even electoral participation. However their
decision to continue operating at the grassroots level, coupled with their membership‘s varying
citizenship statuses, has also created challenges in generating resources, which has limited what
they can do and how consistently they can carry out actions. While the FUIE has looked to
chartering itself as a non-profit to address their financial constraints, it remains to be seen
whether this tactic will impact their political engagement in the longer term.
Juventud Ecuatoriana
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Juventud Ecuatoriana (JE), or Ecuadorian Youth, is a 501 (c) 3 chartered non-profit civic
organization that was established in 2006 and is based in New York City. Since its inception, the
organization‘s mission has been, according to acting President Edward Miranda, to develop
solutions to address the problems associated with adaptation, integration and underrepresentation
among Ecuadorian migrants in the U.S. The organization is run by a seven-member board of
directors that establishes the organization‘s mission, while the daily operations and project
creation and development are handled by a four member executive board. While it is a
membership organization, much of the JE‘s project planning and execution is carried out by its
executive board, since the organization only has 18-20 active members- a factor that has a
significant impact on the organization‘s activities
JE has carried out various community-oriented projects, including a scholarship program
for Ecuadorian students in New York, a relief effort for natural disaster victims in Ecuador, free
computers donations for low-income Ecuadorian families, English classes for adult learners, and
free seminars on topics such as immigration law, homeownership, financial advisement voting
and labor issues.
JE‘s status as a chartered non-profit organization has a significant influence on how the
organization and its leaders approach political engagement. Similar to the non-profit arm of the
FUIE, as a 501(c) 3 organization JE cannot engage in partisan political activities. While JE‘s
leadership often used the word apolitical to describe their organization, they have as a goal to
make JE a civil society organization that is free from partisan political affiliations in both the U.S.
and Ecuador. JE President Edward Miranda explained how he and others in JE envision the
organization‘s political role within in the Ecuadorian migrant community:
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When we use the term apolitical it means we don‘t have a partisan inclinationDemocrat, Republican, say here, or in Ecuador, Partido Social Cristiano, or other
denominations…apolitical …means you have to know how to get involved with
decision makers, because that‘s the way in which we are going to get ahead…We
don‘t have a strong political voice. As an organization we can‘t endorse a
politician ….But as individuals, we can advocate with a particular ideal... I
contacted Senator [José] Peralta57, who is the elected official from the district
with the largest Ecuadorian population; to get his support on the scholarships …
We are pushing Francisco Moya58, who is of Ecuadorian descent… Letting him
know what problems we have in the community and what we would like him to
do as a political leader for his community. …this is the political voice we want.
Eduard also explained how JE‘s projects also work to empower Ecuadorian migrants and
encourage their involvement in the political process:
I want to support individuals through these scholarships, so they can continue
their studies, and that a leader comes out of that who knows that his communityin this case Juve59- put in a grain of sand to help him graduate, and that he has a
commitment to give back. He could become a councilmember, a community
board member, go from the lowest levels of government… and eventually become
the mayor of one of our cities… After all, there are a lot of Ecuadorians, large
concentrations in different cities. So there‘s that possibility, if we foster a culture
of registering to vote. What‘s important is to participate in democracy; to know
who to elect, who is pro our interests. So we give information to our community
about the politicians who are, as we say, our choices.
JE‘s leaders see their role as community leaders and as an organization to create and shape a
cohesive Ecuadorian migrant constituency, and to help formulate a policy agenda for the migrant
community. Operating as non-profit may thus reflect a strategic decision by JE leaders to carve
out a space as a non-partisan actor within Ecuadorian migrant civil society in New York. Their
non-profit status also forces JE to develop different strategies for political engagement beyond
becoming appendages of the political machines in Ecuador as well as in New York City. .
57

New York State Senator José Peralta, whose electoral district includes the areas of Jackson Heights, Elmhurst and
Corona, which is the geographic hub of the Ecuadorian community in New York City.
58
Francisco Moya won election to the New York State Assembly seat previously held by now State Senator Peralta.
Moya‘s district includes parts of Jackson Heights, Elmhurst and Corona, Queens.
59
Juventud Ecuatoriana is often referred to colloquially as Juve by its members and within the migrant community.
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The organization‘s leaders recently started trying to parlay their reputation as an
Ecuadorian civic organization to help create a transnational policy agenda that will address
issues related to migrants‘ marginalization. JE‘s executive board members have used their
newfound status as civic leaders to create relationships with local and state elected officials in
order to advocate for migrant-specific issues and create political influence for the Ecuadorian
community.
Furthermore, as previously noted in this study, JE‘s active involvement on community
development and empowerment issues led a number of PAIS leaders and activists (including
Alex) to join JE prior to their eventual transition to electoral politics. This has allowed JE to
establish networks within the Ecuadorian government officials in the New York metropolitan
area, which in turn has created new opportunities for the organization to work with Ecuadorian
government officials to address migrant marginalization. JE helped push through a joint initiative
with the Ecuadorian Consulate and another migrant non-profit, The Migrant Foundation, to
establish a pro bono legal service program for migrants in the U.S. and in Ecuador. JE was also
one of the most active participants in the SENAMI‘s FORES civic organizational development
workshop, and helped educate migrants about services offered by the SENAMI.
JE has also set its sights on more ambitious political projects. In 2009, JE successfully
negotiated an agreement with the Azuay provincial government in Ecuador to help create
economic development and education initiatives in the province, as a way to reduce the pressures
for residents to migrate. Edward Miranda described the motives behind JE‘s co-development
agreement in Azuay Province:
Something has to be done regarding migration. We have to create structures.
Incentivize the productive sector. Create a better migration policy for the families
that are there [and] the individuals who have left. After a few meetings with
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provincial authorities, we were able to sign a co-development agreement with the
Azuay Province. It‘s to make it so that migrants‘ experiences over here help our
country as well. It‘s not just about what they call ―cash transfers‖ by way of
remittances… but also transferring ideas…All those people we have with a lot of
skill, who can create new jobs, create new firms, innovate… And also try through
resource transfers to get people to think differently, so that we can start to create
and make better structures for ourselves…We want to start a pilot program, have
that experience and then multiply them in different provinces.
Eduard‘s description of the logistics behind the co-development initiative reveal how he and the
other organizational leaders view JE as an interlocutor between different actors to channel
resources to shape development policy in Ecuador:
We are getting universities in Quito and the U.S. involved; people in academia,
individual social actors here and there, and authorities here and there involved. So
it‘s really a new model for how social actors identify problems and want to get
involved…we‘re uniting a lot of places, different minds, different perspectives,
towards the same path, which is to see in what way we can improve structures in
these zones, which are marked by high migration.
While the notion of migrant actors spearheading co-development projects has actually
been observed in Mexico, for example (Orozco and Lapointe 2004), what is key here is that JE
has been able to use its reputation as a reliable and efficient civic group to create political capital
with both Ecuadorian government officials, as well as up-and-coming elected officials in New
York. The organization‘s structure also allows its leaders, Edward and Vice President Ronald
Bautista, to shape JE‘s work.
JE‘s membership composition, however, also presents obstacles for the organization‘s
ability to shape policy. While Ronald Bautista initially suggested that there were approximately
20 active members in the organization (meaning individuals who help volunteer and plan
activities), Edward Miranda later said d the number was actually lower. Edward acknowledged
the need, and also to be more diligent at recruiting members, saying: ―Lately perhaps we haven‘t
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been created enough events to get support. We are looking to concentrate more on those sorts of
events.‖ As a result of its small membership, the onus of the much of the organization‘s work
lies on the executive board, and in particular Eduard and Ronald, who not only conceive and plan
most of JE‘s events, but must also act as the public face of the organization. Their small
membership base also reduces their access to financial resources, since the organization partially
relies on member dues. This means that the executive board members must also work full-time
jobs in addition to their duties at JE. The organization‘s size also limits their projection within
the migrant community. While JE has tried to enlist social media technology such as Facebook to
raise awareness of the organization and its activities, Ronald acknowledged its limited
effectiveness, stating that ―Facebook is a good information tool but it‘s not entirely efficient…
when we post events on Facebook many people-are so bombarded with events on Facebook that
they don‘t pay attention or they simply click ‗I‘m attending‘, but in reality there‘s no way to be
sure that the actual number of people who said they would actually go.‖ Nevertheless, JE
continues to explore the potential of social media to project itself within the Ecuadorian migrant
community.
The other issue of concern regarding JE‘s size is the extent to which the organization will
be able to adapt to the migrant community‘s needs and demands. While in its current form JE‘s
leadership has considerable influence on the organization‘s direction, it is worth considering
whether JE can include and foster new ideas in the longer term. As young leaders, Edward and
Ronald are receptive to innovative policy solutions for Ecuadorian migrants‘ issues and concerns.
But in the longer term JE may require new leaders and new ideas, which can only come from a
broader membership base from which they can recruit and shape new leaders.
II. Dominican Organizations
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Partido Revolucionario Dominicano/Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD)
The PRD is currently the second largest political party in the Dominican Republic. It was
originally founded by former Dominican President Juan Bosch as a populist, progressive
political party after the fall of Rafael Trujillo‘s right-wing authoritarian regime in the early 1960s.
After a short-lived term in power with Bosch‘s election (which was cut short by a military coup,
the 1965 Civil War and subsequent U.S. military intervention), the PRD underwent a rift in 1973,
when Bosch left the party to establish the more centrist Dominican Liberation Party (which is the
current ruling party in the Dominican Republic and of a more center-right ideological
orientation). After Bosch‘s departure the PRD was re-oriented towards a liberal democratic
ideology under José Francisco Peña Gómez‘s leadership, who is now regarded as the party‘s
seminal figure. However after Leonel Fernández‘s first term as President in 1996, the PRD has
found itself at something of a crossroads, with an older guard that remains committed to Peña
Gómez‘s liberal democratic principles, and a more centrist wing headed by former President
Hipólito Mejía, who in 2010 successfully won the PRD primaries for the 2012 Dominican
Presidential election.
The PRD‘s structure abroad is largely influenced by the political context that migrants
face in the Dominican Republic. In other words, the fact that Dominican politicians in general
have an ambivalent and opportunistic attitude towards their migrants abroad (as noted by many
of the Dominican respondents in this study) is manifested in the party‘s organization. On the one
hand, the PRD has established a highly bureaucratic organizational structure for its U.S.
operations. There is a Federal Committee for the U.S. which in addition to its own executive
board includes PRD national committee members living in the U.S., as well as various
representatives from each of the local chapters, called sectionals (Estatutos Generales 2009). The
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PRD has local party chapters, also called sections that operate in each of the areas abroad with
large Dominican population groups including New Jersey, New York, Boston, Providence and
Miami. Manuel Félix, one of the PRD‘s main coordinators stated that: ―We are a municipal
committee. The New York Sectional has the same importance as a Dominican province.‖ He also
noted that New York sectional has local-level organization in all five of the city‘s boroughs.
Thus, much like the Dominican government‘s approach to migrant incorporation, the New York
PRD Section has also established a rather extensive bureaucratic structure in order to recruit
migrants into the electoral process.
The PRD‘s New York Sectional also has a tiered membership structure, which Manuel
Felix said includes official members and sympathizers, much like Alianza PAIS. Official
members, according to Félix, pay quotas, are expected to attend regular official party activities,
and are organized into regional or zone committees within the New York party section.
Sympathizers in turn, are non-member supporters who the party tracks through a database, and
calls on them to turn out for elections and other activities where the PRD needs to mobilize large
numbers of supporters, such as rallies.
This combination of a flexible membership structure coupled with the bureaucratic
appears to be effective in the PRD‘s efforts to mobilize the Dominican migrant community.
According to Félix, the PRD has been able to recruit approximately 40,000 active militants and
another 70,000 supporters in New York City, though I was unable to verify these figures.
Anecdotal evidence from my field research; however lends some credence to the PRD‘s claims. I
attended three separate events organized by the PRD or where the PRD was present, including a
public training session for new and veteran supporters, a rally to support the party during the
2010 mid-term elections in the Dominican Republic, and a float at the 2010 Dominican Pride
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Parade in the Bronx. All of these events had significant numbers of supporters, ranging from
about 100 or so persons at the training session, to several hundred for the mid-term election rally
(which is noteworthy in that at this time Dominican migrants still had no representation in the
Dominican national legislature), which suggests that the party has the capacity to mobilize a
good number of supporters for activities.
Another important feature of the PRD‘s organizational structure is that the New York
Section operates largely autonomously from the national leadership in Santo Domingo. This is
not to say that the PRD‘s national leadership in the Dominican Republic grants New York
leaders special privileges or does not try to assert its leadership abroad. In fact, for one of their
training and recruitment seminars in 2010 the national party leadership sent an organizer directly
from the Dominican Republic to address supporters on matters of party discipline and
parliamentary procedures that are to be used for all official PRD meetings, which he stressed are
critical to improving discipline among party militants. His presence and presentation reflected an
effort by national party officials towards achieving cohesiveness and asserting some measure of
authority with the New York Section.
Yet David Williams, a former leader in the PRD‘s New York Section, explained that in
the past and even now PRD New York Section have considerable leeway to pursue their own
political objectives, without fear of reprisals or punishment from national party leadership,
should they oppose what migrant leaders do or propose::
PRD-istas here, in relation to the PRD-istas in Santo Domingo, have more
independence than those over there. That is, you can adopt a more defined, more
consistent political stance than people over there, sine those over there are
subjected to discipline. Not so for those over here. Over here discipline is relative.
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Williams also offered an anecdote on his own experience dealing with party discipline and the
relatively loose authority structure under which migrant leaders operate:
We enjoyed certain freedoms that leaders over there didn‘t enjoy. For
example …I once said because [former President Joaquín] Balaguer‘s police took
the luxury of travelling to Puerto Rico, and … beat a comrade, that the Dominican
exiles could feel obligated to exact revenge. And that led the [U.S.] State
Department to call [former PRD president] Juan Bosch or informed Bosch
through the Dominican chancery that his people in Puerto Rico were making
threats. And that led Bosch to suspend me for three months…And we didn‘t
accept that suspension as valid or as having any force. If that had been in Santo
Domingo, I would have been obligated to accept it. In Puerto Rico, nobody dared
stop me from entering the PRD headquarters or speak on behalf of the PRD. In
other words, that created a sort of independence.
The loose authority structures within the PRD are likely shaped by the ambivalence that
politicians in the Dominican Republic have towards migrants, as was noted in Chapter Four. This
allows the PRD New York Section leaders to craft their own political agenda, much of which
focuses on working with Dominican elected officials in New York City and in the state
legislature. Mr. Félix described some of the projects that he and other PRD New York Sectional
leaders were focusing on at the time of our interview:
We have three major challenges here. These are unemployment, the gang problem
and housing. The city just announced that 8,000 residents of upper Manhattan will
lose their Section 8 [vouchers]… So we have to design strategies to accommodate
or relocate these people, orienting them towards different parts of New York
City…We have to reorient our dropout youth or potential school dropouts. We are
going to double our efforts with incumbent elected officials [in New York].
We‘ve given them our support, our vote. And they have to respond to the
integrated participation programs that we want to develop for the community…
We hope that the schools, the elected officials and the community agency
directors collaborate with us on the integration of high school dropouts.
According to Mr. Félix, the PRD New York Section has also garnered support from a number of
local community leaders in northern Manhattan to support their mobilization efforts. This
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includes an executive in the Washington Heights-Inwood Coalition (a non-profit social service
provider), and various executives at the Audubon Partnership for Economic Development (a
community development non-profit organization.) Mr. Félix, also offered a broader explanation
for why the PRD New York Section was heavily invested in supporting and establishing
relationships with local leaders, particularly elected officials in New York City and state
government.
Those are our people, and they aspire to be in a position where they can help
Dominicans and Latin Americans in the long term. So we have to be coparticipants in that great aspiration. We can‘t be strangers to their cause. If they
are elected officials, it‘s because they represent the community. And each one of
these elected officials is a product of the Dominican diaspora, a product of the
heart of our community, which is why we have a moral and political obligation to
give them our support
The financial aspect of the PRD‘s operations in New York also seems to play an important role
in how the organization formulates its agenda. PRD activists in New York said they have never
relied on the national party or the Dominican government for financial support. Félix explained
how the PRD funds its New York operations:
In the past we had to provide assistance to the country, to the [national] party. But
now the Central Election Board finances political activities… It wasn‘t like that
before, but now we‘re totally independent. The section has its finance director.
We meet every four months to evaluate a fundraising plan…

Former PRD leader David Williams confirmed the lack of financial support for New York
operations, but explained how the need to independently fundraise offered the section more
freedom to act:
Back then we organized ourselves into zone committees. For example, there was a
zone committee [I belonged to] here called the Luis Manuel Caraballo Zone
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Committee. That zone had the luxury of telling [PRD national President] Peña
Gómez, ―look, here‘s $20,000‖…because we had a $100 fixed quota when we
had 87 members… and when we had come to realize we had some
incommensurate economic resources. And with those economic resources you
gain political power since politics is basically, and especially in countries like
ours, defined by economics. We had a lot more power than activists over there,
and more independence; much more independence.
The leaders of the PRD New York Section, by virtue of the weak disciplinary structures and
overall ambivalence of politicians in the Dominican Republic, have been able to operate with a
considerable amount of autonomy from the national party leadership in the Dominican Republic.
The PRD‘s decision to work on local issues is also driven by the relative lack of opportunities
that party leaders in New York have to take part in substantial engagement in Dominican politics.
Comments from the Dominican contacts in this study that were presented in Chapters Three and
Four reflect the perception among migrant political leaders that the Dominican government is
largely unresponsive to migrants‘ demands. Manuel Félix acknowledged the lack of dialogue
between PRD leaders in New York and the current Dominican government:
This government has been very curt… very distanced from us... In the last PRD
administration we appointed officials from the other parties to be advisors to the
President. This administration has totally distanced itself from us. They don‘t
want, don‘t need us, I believe. There‘s no mutual development project, no mutual
participation. Yes, there is dialogue. We meet through the consulate, through the
Central Election Board. We participate in whatever has to do with the election
process. But in terms of concrete development projects, there‘s none.

Félix also described the current government‘s efforts at creating external legislative
constituencies as ―mutilated‖, since the government procrastinated in passing legislation to create
these constituencies in time for the 2010 Dominican congressional elections60. While Félix‘s

60

external legislative districts in the U.S. are expected to be established in time for the 2012 Dominican general
election
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comments are driven in considerable measure by partisan political differences, they nevertheless
reflect the fact that migrant activists face obstacles in articulating demands on behalf of migrants,
which reinforces feelings of marginalization. This also confirms the skepticism expressed by
other Dominican migrant activists towards the government‘s commitment to incorporating
migrant populations, as noted in Chapter Four. At a minimum, partisan politics dictates which
groups, if any, will have opportunities for substantive political engagement in the Dominican
Republic. More likely, however, is that for government and elected officials in the Dominican
Republic, migrants have only an ancillary role in the country‘s political life. These barriers to
engagement have therefore driven the PRD‘s New York activists to direct much of their energy
towards engagement in U.S. politics, through support for elected officials of Dominican descent.
Furthermore, because Dominican migrants currently lack legislative representation, the
PRD New York Section‘s leadership capacity is further limited, since the organization cannot
mobilize voters to elect a migrant legislator from New York City.. Manny Félix, for his part,
believes that the proposed legislation to create external legislative constituencies in New York
will help create more opportunities for the PRD and other migrant groups to obtain tangible
power in Dominican politics, and ultimately opportunities to make demands on behalf of
migrants:
It will radically change things, based on the experience we‘ve gained. I think we
will have to create a migrant ministry, not just an office of overseas61 affairs.
We‘re pushing for support programs, for contributions from the government.
We‘re demanding that the Dominican central government outline a policy to
create a Ministry for Dominicans Abroad that addresses the necessities of
Dominicans living abroad, and especially for Dominicans who return, who want
to return and incorporate themselves into normal Dominican life, or into the
productive life of their country.
61

Literal translation of the word ultramar, which is the term used in Dominican politics to discuss matters related to
Dominican migrants living abroad
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David Williams was less optimistic, however, as to what external legislators will do to help the
PRD or other political groups. As noted in Chapter Four, Williams said that many Dominican
migrants are leery that an external legislator will simply go run for office in order to collect a
paycheck and neglect their constituents. These views were also echoed a degree by Mr. Félix.
Félix remained confident that congressional representation for migrants in the Dominican
Republic would help. Yet as previously noted in Chapter Four62, he also acknowledged that
previous migrants who have returned to run for elected office in the Dominican Records have
left a bad impression on migrants.
Other aspects of the PRD New York Section‘s organizational dynamics also create major
obstacles in effectively mobilizing migrant constituents. One major problem is the perception by
party members that there is no clear cut meritocratic system in place that rewards loyalists with
the opportunity to move up the organizational ladder. Rather, financial influence plays a big role
in who becomes a decision maker or candidate within the New York Section. My observations
and interviews with members of the PRDs New York Sectional revealed inconsistencies between
what the party rhetoric about leadership opportunities and the reality of the situation as
experienced by other activists. For example, during the PRD‘s public training workshop I
attended in northern Manhattan in 2010, Mr. Félix told new and old supporters that Dominican
parties select members based on their capacity to make concrete contributions to the party's
mission,. Félix added that individuals selected to join the PRD are ones who are able to
contribute to the party‘s social ethic.
Yet David Williams offered a very different and more sobering take on how one moves
up in the Section which often involves patronage and financial influence more than grassroots
mobilization and ideological loyalty:
62
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[Say] all of a sudden, I show up, the owner of a chain of 16 supermarkets, eight
supermarkets, or four mega laundromats, or a real estate business. I show up and
say ―what does the PRD need here?‖ Three computers are needed; this or that is
needed. So I say, ―Here, buy it.‖ Pa! Pa! Pa! Done. And I put myself at your level
in less time than you did- a lot less. So now apparently we‘re competing on equal
standing. But in reality I have the advantage because I have resources. When
television and propaganda resources are going to be used, I will use them. You
won‘t. You‘ll rely on the sympathy of the people in the party who have known
you for a lifetime, which, if these people don‘t have this in place [Williams
pointing to his head], will turn against you to support the new person….So that
has a major effect, because I will create disillusionment. And that‘s the norm. If
you‘re from the Bronx and I‘m from Brooklyn, and I beat you because people
from the Bronx turned out in larger numbers for me than those who turned out for
you in Brooklyn, you can say ―he beat me, but he worked for it.‖ But if I beat you
because I own supermarkets and I have funds to pay more supporters to distribute
propaganda, to pay for television ads, to pay for more press releases, you‘ll say
―Let him win if he can, because I‘m not going to do work in Brooklyn.‖
Small entrepreneurs such as those Williams describes do in fact have considerable influence in
the PRD. On July 3, 2011, a PRD blog called Red del Partido Revolucionario Dominicano
PRD63 reported that 2012 PRD Presidential candidate Hipólito Mejía met with a group of
Dominican supermarket owners in New York to garner support (Red del PRD, 8/3/2011). While
this case reflects lobbying more so than the sort of corruption and/or patronage that Williams
referred to, it nevertheless shows the influence that these ethnic entrepreneurs have within the
party
It is not simply the lack of transparency or meritocratic criteria in selecting leadership
posts, however, that leave migrant activists dispirited. Williams also described the pattern he saw
with many supporters and activists within the PRD that have made it harder for the PRD and
other political parties (including his own new party) harder to mobilize Dominican migrants to
participate in the Dominican electoral process:
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Many get frustrated and don‘t continue. They leave. And when, you talk to them
they say ―don‘t talk to me about politics‖, or ―I‘m not into that mess‖ or, ―I went
to so and so‖, who‘s the governor of my province, ―and he didn‘t meet with me
and said he couldn‘t do anything…‖ Now that I‘ve been outside of the PRD for
some time I‘ve seen that new people have arrived. Those new arrivals are
unaware of the things that I told you as far as [politicians] being ungrateful, since
they haven‘t lived through it they don‘t know it. And since they don‘t know it,
they go all in. But after a while they realize that it‘s not what they believed.
Williams noted that there are exceptions where grassroots activists like him were able to exert
some power, but said this was hard to achieve, citing an incident with him and former President
Hipolito Mejía over a dispute Williams had with a government official:
Of course, at a certain level that doesn‘t happen. In my case, for
instance…Hipólito [Mejía] came to…a school in upper Manhattan and I told him
―Mr. President, look, this happened to me with the colonel‖, and he said ―How
can this be?‖… ―Wait, I am going to resolve this.‖ Pa! And he gave me a signed
letter to the civil-military authorities, ―Grant Mr. David Williams all of the
possible attentions, even in my antechamber.‖ Later I went and indeed, it worked.
But again, you‘re then at another level, because there are many levels. It‘s like a
ladder.
The PRD New York Section is also hampered in its mobilization efforts by the electoral process
itself, and the divisions that it has created within the national party which have manifested
themselves in the Section. Hipólito Mejía‘s decision to seek the PRD‘s Presidential nomination
against Miguel Vargas, the presumptive PRD candidate, became a contentious issue within the
party. For some, Mejía‘s candidacy meant a retreat from a more liberal stance towards the center.
Williams said this was one of the reasons he opted not to return to the PRD and instead join a
smaller political movement:
Hipólito‘s people came here when decided to run for reelection, and he said to
me, ―coño64 David, the man says he will take care of you. ―Coño, you support
64
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reelection.‖ And the thing is, if I support his reelection the first thing I would
have to do is take down everything related to Peña Gómez, because Hipólito
never supported him. Second, I have to face my family, because I raised them
with a certain consciousness. So I can‘t do that now, just because I got a contract
for supporting his reelection. That‘s immoral.
For other PRD activists in New York, Mejía‘s candidacy undermined what was perceived as a
rightful succession for a new generation of leaders. Editorial pieces on the PRD blogs reflected
the contentious nature of the primary election after Mejía‘s decision to run for the party‘s
nomination.
The PRD does gain legitimacy by being a viable electoral party in the Dominican
Republic. This legitimacy enables the New York Section to mobilize a good number of migrants,
particularly the more ideologically driven partisans as well as those with real aspirations towards
political power. Party leaders in New York, however, face a number of challenges to migrant
agenda, and thus allow its migrant members to exercise strategic citizenship. The first is the
general ambivalence from political elites in the Dominican Republic towards the migrant
community in general and to their full incorporation into the Dominican political system, which
makes it hard for migrants‘ demands to resonate among the national party leadership. This
ambivalence also makes it hard for the PRD activists in New York to advocate for migrants,
since they have no formal representation at this time (though this may change in 2012.) The
second issue is the persistence of clientelism and cronyism within the PRD, which breeds
cynicism and frustration among other activists who invest their time and efforts to support the
party. As a result of these factors, much of what the PRD activists have done to concretely
advance migrants‘ demands is to support Dominican candidates for elected offices in the U.S. In effect, to operate as a lobby group in the U.S. While PRD New York Section activists may be
able to parlay their name recognition and organization resources to support political
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empowerment in the U.S., its constraints make it a less effective transnational actor. While it is
possible that national party officials wish to see the Section play this role, respondents did not
suggest that this was the case. These constraints may be indicative of what DiMaggio and Powell
(1983) refer to coercive institutional isomorphism, where organizations resemble other units in
the same context or environment. According to DiMaggio and Powell, one of the ways in which
organizations, and particularly political organizations, tend towards isomorphism is due to
coercive pressures by other organizations upon which a particular organization is dependent for
resources and/or legitimization. In this case, though PRD activists in New York claim to have
autonomy of action because distance (which weakens central party discipline) and independent
fundraising (which lets them organize without direct reliance from the central party), because
their legitimacy within the migrant community and their access to power within the Dominican
state are predicated on their ability to be identified as official party leaders, they face pressures to
adopt the organizational structure already in place for the PRD. Hence PRD New York activists
must commit resources to electoral campaigns in the Dominican Republic (even though they as
of yet have no direct legislative representation), and must submit to the party‘s bureaucratic
processes in order to maintain their legitimacy.
Alianza País (AP)
Alianza País (AP) is a new Dominican political movement that emerged in 2008. It was
created by a group of political activists and leaders who belonged to various leftist political
movements in the Dominican Republic and the Dominican diaspora, and was conceived as a new
progressive alternative for the Dominican polity. While it bears no relation to the Ecuadorian
movement of the same name, Alianza PAIS, it is similar in that it outwardly attempts to craft a
transnational political movement to represent all citizens, including those living abroad. AP tries
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to differentiate itself from other Dominican political movements by characterizing itself as a
proponent of transparent and decent governance for all Dominicans in its rhetoric.
AP leaders in New York believe that the organization‘s commitment to a new and
inclusive form of governance for Dominicans necessitates attention to migrants‘ demands. They
also believe that the organization‘s mission and composition offer the opportunity to incorporate
migrants‘ demands into a political program for the Dominican Republic. Marino Mejía, a
member of AP‘s New York Directorate, explained how AP necessarily has to adopt a bi-national
focus if they are to effectively carry out their commitment to decent and transparent government
for all Dominicans:
We‘ve not had good luck in terms of the elected officials we‘ve had… which at
the end of the day become corrupted and wind up in jail. The case of Miguel
Martínez65 and others who are close to being caught... So in that sense I see things
such that we have to work in two waters: As it relates to the Dominican Republic
in political terms, and as it relates to the Dominican community and even the
Latin American community here in North America. I think that for obvious
reasons, those two sectors have to be unified.
AP leaders in New York also claim that what also sets their organization apart from other
Dominican political movements is its broad ideological stance, which as Mejía notes is focused
on unifying people of all progressive political persuasions, noting that ―all of the progressive
forces, all of the forces on the left, the patriots, the people without any sort of partisan political
alignment, understand that the country is being mismanaged and heading down a bad path fit
within our movement.‖ AP leaders believe that they have benefitted from their broad based
ideological approach, as it has allowed them to recruit greater numbers of migrant activists who
65

Mejía is referring to former New York City Council member Miguel Martínez, who represented council district
10, which includes Northern Manhattan and parts of the Bronx, and which has a large Dominican constituency.
Martínez was indicted by federal prosecutors in 2009 after a federal investigation found evidence of Martinez
illegally embezzling through a fake non-profit organization in his district. Martínez resigned from his council post
after the indictment and was subsequently sentenced to five years in prison for his actions (source:
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/people/m/miguel_martinez/index.html.)
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do not identify with the Dominican left or who otherwise eschew partisan politics. AP‘s New
York Chief Coordinator Radhamés Pérez explained how this tactic has allowed the New York
AP activists to grow in a fairly short period of time:
Here in New York, for example, we have a group that, well, for me is incredible.
I‘m not saying that all are militant, but we have over 200 people who have joined.
That‘s a lot… We‘re not looking to build an amalgamation of already established
groups, we‘re looking for an amalgamation of citizens who really understand that
they can dedicate themselves to this…That‘s to say, there‘s space for people with
distinct ideologies and doctrines to come together to develop a common strategy
The open strategy that Radhamés refers to was on display during the 2010 Bronx Dominican
Parade, where AP organized a contingent to do outreach with the public in attendance.
Supporters ranged from people with no previous political affiliation to former activists from a
wide range of groups including the Dominican Worker‘s Party, the Dominican Communist Party,
the PRD (to which Mejía belonged until 2004) and even the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD).
A recent edition of En Movimiento, Alianza País‘s monthly newsletter, discussed a recruitment
effort in New York City, in which one of a half-dozen new members was quoted as saying: ―I am
a militant Catholic. I have never been part of a political party and I have never voted, so that I
wouldn‘t be taken for a fool‖ (En Movimiento, 41:2). Other news reports from Dominican
community press in New York City and articles from the organization‘s newsletter have also
noted the organization‘s recent success in attracting new supporters (―Atypical
political movement takes root in NYC‖, El Nuevo Diario, 3/28/2011; ―Nuevos Miembros
Ingresan Alianza PAIS‖, Noticias M. La Paz, 5/2011; Alianza País Juramenta Nuevos Miembros
en Nueva York, En Movimiento No. 39:3; Arrancó en Nueva York la Jornada de Afiliación, En
Movimiento No. 40:2 ) These examples suggest that in fact AP‘s wide-tent approach seems to
be attracting a broader base of support from the migrant community. Mejía also noted that AP
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has been successful in organizing Dominican migrants in Long Island, while AP‘s newsletter
also discusses successful recruitment efforts in Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, led
by Radhamés Pérez (En Movimiento 39:2).
Alianza País activists in New York also had success in engaging migrant voters by virtue
its organic linkages to city‘s Dominican community. In addition to his role as AP‘s General
Coordinator in New York, Radhamés Pérez, is also Executive Director of a non-profit service
organization in Northern Manhattan called Acción Communitaria La Aurora66. Pérez explained
how his trajectory as a community activist in New York City has given him credibility as a
migrant leader, which also aids AP organizing efforts:
So we have a link to the community. People know that I‘m on the left, but they
don‘t reject me. They don‘t really care what I really believe in and represent,
ideologically speaking, because at the end of the day what people see is what we
do on their behalf. For example, in 2006, during all the large pro-immigrant
demonstrations…we said ―look, let‘s deal with this issue.‖ We convened a
meeting, and a couple of groups showed up…And we said, ―Let‘s organize a
march. Let‘s do it in northern Manhattan.‖ Of course we had relationships with
churches, service organizations…the march was convened.…El Diario La Prensa
and a newspaper called Hoy said that there were 1,500 people at that
demonstration.
Similarly, Mejía explained how professional experiences in New York‘s migrant community,
have aided him in AP‘s recruitment and advocacy:
I worked as a laborer; as a taxi driver; I managed a multi-service agency67, until I
got my board of education license, where I worked for nine years …I worked at
various institutions, including one called… Working Education. I don‘t remember
exactly68. I worked there for three years as a consultant, directing in some
measure a study on the socio-economic impact of taxi drivers. I currently work
66

Translation: Aurora Community Action
Multi-service agencies are private companies that offer a variety of professional services for migrants, including
long-distance phone service, wire transfers, shipping services, check cashing and passport services, among others.
68
Mejía is referring to the Center for Worker Education, a division of the City University of New York that is
dedicated to providing college education courses for full-time laborers.
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with the New York Archdiocese, coordinating a food pantry. And I work at Mary
Mitchell teaching GED and citizenship classes. I also have a part-time job…at the
Autonomous University of Santo Domingo Alumni Association, where I am the
Executive Director, where we are…offering three levels of English… for
immigrants.
AP leaders in New York believe that their own experiences as migrants along with their past
commitments to working with Dominican and even other migrant populations in New York not
only give them a clear understanding of migrants‘ needs, but also an organic connection to the
community that permits them to recruit Dominican migrants into AP. In fact, during the 2010
Bronx Dominican Pride Parade, Pérez, Mejía and other AP activists were well received by the
public in attendance along the parade route as they chanted in support of their movement and
greeted individuals to discuss AP‘s mission. New York AP leaders have also been recognized by
national organizations such as the National Dominican American Roundtable for their
commitment to civic engagement (En Movimiento 28:1.)
AP activists have started to capitalize on their growing appeal among Dominican
migrants to begin organizing Dominican migrants. They have, for instance, demanded the
creation of external legislative districts for migrants in the Dominican Congress (En Movimiento,
37:6). AP has also successfully organized public demonstrations at the Dominican consulate to
demand legislation in the Dominican Republic to require a baseline public education budget for
education equivalent to four percent of the country‘s GDP (En Movimiento, 35: 2). Furthermore,
as AP‘s General Coordinator, Radhamés Pérez has criticized the Dominican government for lack
of effort in aiding Dominicans deported from the U.S. to reintegrate into the country‘s labor
market (En Movimiento, 23:6). Finally, AP has started to make efforts to support the election of
Dominican candidates to elected offices in the U.S.
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While it appears that Alianza País‘s New York Section has made noticeable progress in
establishing itself as a viable transnational political actor, its composition as an electoral
movement imposes a number of limitations to its capacity to strategically demand rights in both
home and host country. One limitation that AP leaders acknowledge is the bureaucratic obstacles
created by Dominican law that works against their movement. While Radhamés Pérez expressed
confidence in the grassroots approach that AP was using in New York by bringing together
different local community activists, he also noted that the election laws impose stiff criteria for
AP must meet in order to have any sort of electoral relevance in the 2012 Dominican elections:
There are various requirements for recognizing a political party. First you need to
have two percent of the total vote from the previous presidential elections. In our
case that means 82,000 Dominicans who have to sign, to say that yes, you have
the right.. Second, you have to have…people who come out to say that they are
from your party in each of the 31 provinces and the capital district, which is how
the Dominican Republic is administratively divided. And you have to have locals
in each of the 32 provinces. In other words it‘s a hard task for people without
economic resources.
Marino Mejía adds that AP activists also realize that the current lack of migrant representation in
Dominican politics, affects the organization‘s work:
We have people in different boroughs and some towns, like in Long Island. And
we‘ve been organizing certain programs, such as economic empowerment…We
have a number of important professionals…who without being organic members,
make a quota contribution because they believe Alianza País is a new
organization… And we do all of this in order to deal with problems over there,
because neither Alianza País nor any other party can run candidates from here.
Some AP leaders remain confident that the proposed legislation to create external legislative
constituencies will come to fruition by 2012, so that they can participate in the electoral process.
At the 2011 New Jersey Dominican Affairs Conference, Pérez attempted to persuade Dominican
migrant community leaders that external representation not only represented an opportunity for
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the Dominican government to pay a historical debt to migrants, but also as a chance for migrants
to channel their talents and experiences to create the political capital to enhance democracy for
all Dominicans (En Movimiento 37:6). Other AP activists, however, expressed concern that
external representation will fall short of expectations if Dominican political culture doesn‘t
change. Freddy Galarza, an AP activist from New York, argued in an editorial piece that so long
as the PRD and the PLD remain the primary political forces in the Dominican Republic, who
have violated the constitution and other laws for political expediency, external representation
will fail to meet migrants‘ demands (En Movimiento 38:5).
The challenge created by the Dominican political system for AP‘s New York activists is
exacerbated the skepticism from migrant constituents towards participating Dominican politics.
As noted in Chapters Three and Four, many Dominican migrant activists with whom I spoke
discussed how many migrants felt that little was to be gained from participating in Dominican
politics while living in the U.S. Radhamés Pérez noted how the challenge this presented: :
There‘s even a sector that questions the utility and presence of partisan
Dominican activism, because they say- and mind you, I who am a lifelong
militant within partisan Dominican politics find some merit to this- because they
say that all that does is further divide the Dominican community.. If Dominicans
pay more attention to Dominican politics that will just lead them to get more
involved in their party‘s dynamic and not in the dynamic of protecting their rights,
improving their living conditions and getting representation over here [in U.S.
politics.]
Mejía echoed Pérez‘s assertions regarding the ambivalence that exists within the migrant
community.
Alianza País has a lot of work in terms of convincing voters that we have to
remove those corrupt leaders from there…the vote from abroad is partly a myth.
First, that out of a little more than a million Dominicans abroad, that only 54,000
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vote is a tiny amount that tells you that it‘s not worth the effort, that the
government makes the financial effort so that people don‘t show up to vote.
The AP leaders with whom I spoke also recognize that their organization also imposes limits on
how they can engage in New York electoral politics. Marino Mejía explained to me how this
would be the case:
Taking part in U.S. politics by running candidates with an Alianza País profile
would cause us major harm. I considered running for District 7769, back when
Alianza País didn‘t exist. If that were now…Alianza País could mobilize all of its
members, so that Marino Mejia gets to the Assembly. But then Marino Mejía isn‘t
an organic member of Alianza País; he‘s a candidate for the Democratic Party, or
the Independence Party, or the Republican Party.
Finally there is the question of whether migrant issues actually resonate among the AP
national leadership in the Dominican Republic. On the one hand migrant-related issues and
organizing efforts are prominently featured in AP‘s monthly newsletter, and are given consistent
coverage. This coverage is carried out by migrant activists themselves, so that their voices and
opinions are given adequate space to be considered by party supporters. At the same time,
however, an examination of the coverage of AP‘s Presidential candidate Guillermo Moreno
reveals that while he has met with AP supporters and activists in New York and other parts of the
U.S. on multiple occasions, there is little in his public statements that speak directly to specific
migrant concerns or demands. While this does not clearly delineate Moreno‘s commitment to a
migrant policy agenda, it does raise questions as to whether migrant issues are relevant to AP
activists and supporters in the Dominican Republic, and whether migrants will are guaranteed the
space they are seeking to make claims to address dual marginalization should AP have long term
electoral success.
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Alianza País thus finds itself in a somewhat complicated situation as a result of its
composition as a political movement involved in the Dominican electoral process. On the one
hand, they have embraced a broad-based ideological approach and adopted a rhetoric that seeks
to be inclusive of all Dominicans, which has resonated with migrant voters of various political
persuasions that have become disenchanted with the major parties. AP has also benefitted from
building its New York operation with leaders who have strong ties to the migrant population and
a proven track record of migrant advocacy. Furthermore, AP‘s New York Section finances its
own operations, which grants the organization considerable independence to act, similar to
PRD‘s New York Sectional. These factors have allowed AP to have early success in mobilizing
voters to demand rights for migrants in both the U.S. and the Dominican Republic, and even to
insert migrant issues in the U.S. into the Dominican political debate. At the same time however,
as an electoral movement they face many obstacles in pursuing their transnational agenda. Some
of these revolve around the electoral system, which not only favors the major parties that
command major resources, but also largely restricts migrants‘ participation in Dominican politics.
Furthermore, AP‘s New York activists also have to overcome the apathy and cynicism in the
political process that has become pervasive among a considerable number of migrants (which is
also reflected in low external voting turnouts.) As a result, despite important ideological and
membership differences vis-à-vis the PRD, as an electoral movement there currently appear to be
significant limitations that Alianza País faces moving forward.
National Dominican Women’s Caucus
The National Dominican Women‘s Caucus is a non-profit advocacy organization based
in New York City that was founded in 1991 by Zenaida Méndez, a Dominican migrant with an
extensive history of community organizing. According to its mission statement, the NDWC
seeks ―to ensure the equitable participation of Dominican women in all aspects of life in the
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United States of America and to explore the impact of critical changes in public policies on the
ability of members of the Dominican/Latino communities to address their needs and the ability
of the nation to respond to these needs‖ (NDWC, 2011). The NDWC also claims to be the first
Dominican women‘s advocacy organization in the U.S. and looks to advance an agenda of civic
and political empowerment for women (Ibid.) According to Méndez, while the NDWC
originated as a movement to represent the interests of the Dominican community, it eventually
took on a more expansive view to focus on all Latinas and address issues affecting women more
generally, such as discrimination and violence. The NDWC sees itself as a political organization
and devotes much of its work to matters of civic and political representation, as Mendez explains:
The focus of the Caucus was to identify women who could run for office, for
school board, who can be commissioner, anything that had to do with civic life
and participation. We also were very fortunate that we got a grant from the New
York Women‘s Foundation to do a college counseling program, so we also work
with young women to make sure that they go to Ivy League colleges in the U.S.
As a small non-profit advocacy organization, the NDWC‘s agenda is a reflection of Méndez‘s
own political vision and trajectory, as she noted:
In the neighborhood where I live we had a nursery school... when I went to leave
my daughters there; they told me they didn‘t have enough room because of a lack
of funds. So I asked ―what can I do?‖… I organized the parents in the building
and went to the city council, to the YWCA, and some months later we got it open.
I went back to college, got involved in the day care center. That led to getting
involved in the community. I saw there was an organization, which I didn‘t know
what they did. I went inside, right here on 10th Avenue…where I live. I went and
I asked what they did. They told me, we organize tenants and advocate for tenants
rights…. To make a long story short, I was there for four years. They hired me
after two semesters as an intern and I did, from tenant organizing to [running] the
food coop, to the community newspaper, you name it.
Méndez then explained how her community organizing experiences led her into electoral politics.
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David Dinkins became Manhattan Borough President and they called me. They
said, ―We would love for you to join our staff.‖ I wasn‘t ready to work for an
elected official, because I was always picketing in front of elected offices. But
even my co-workers said, ‗no, you need to take the job‘, ‗it‘ll be good for you to
be there‘. I was very involved in this community in every which way and that‘s
the reason they wanted someone who knew the community. And I happened to be
black and Latina, so it was perfect. So I took the job with David Dinkins… I was
a liaison to Community Board Four70 for several years …in 1991, I founded the
Dominican Women‘s Caucus because I saw that there were several women
organizations but none of them were focusing on women‘s political power.
The influence that Méndez has in her role as the NDWC founder and Executive Director means
that her views on issues shape the organization‘s agenda. As noted in Chapter Four, Méndez
feels that migrants have little to gain from participating in Dominican politics because of the
corruption and lack of commitment on the part of government and elected officials in the
Dominican Republic. Despite her skepticism, Méndez made nevertheless made some efforts to
use her influence as NDWC‘s Executive Director to promote transnational ties. For instance,
Mendez sits on the board of the Dominican Bridge Fund, a transnational philanthropic
organization that promotes economic development in the Dominican Republic from Dominican
communities in the U.S (Dominican Bridge Fund 2011). The NDWC itself also carries out a
small number of advocacy campaigns in the Dominican Republic, including advocacy around
reproductive rights and deportation of Dominican migrants who were raised in the U.S. Mendez
also said that she has traveled with delegations to the Dominican Free Trade Zone to see how
women are treated there in the work area. .
The NDWC and its leaders are therefore not definitively opposed to transnational civic
engagement or advocacy; rather, its concerns (and more specifically those of Méndez, the
NDWC‘s founder), is that the state of electoral politics in the Dominican Republic is such that
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for the NDWC, there are few incentives to invest time in the political process, or to promote
migrants‘ participation in Dominican politics. Beyond this, as noted in below, Méndez and the
NDWC believe that as an organization they best serve the interests of Dominican migrants by
concentrating on mobilization efforts in the U.S. where they can more easily devote time and
energy to being effective advocates for their constituents:
My focus is here. Our focus is very clear because contrary to what people think,
we‘re not doing that well. Latinas still make 58 cents to the dollar compared to a
white man, so we are not doing as well as people think. And I don‘t like to dilute
my energy.
The profile of the NWDC‘s remaining leadership also plays a role in directing their political
advocacy and empowerment work towards the U.S. political system. Board member Marisol
Alcantara sits on New York City Community Board No. 9, and previously worked as a Regional
Legislative Coordinator for the New York State Senate (Womenelect.org, 2011). Another board
member, Judith Amaro, is the daughter of Miguel Amaro, a long-time Dominican activist in New
York and founder of the New York Dominican Parade (Miguel Amaro Foundation, 2011). These
deep ties to the New York political establishment lead the NWDC to favor empowerment. The
fact that the NDWC is an organization with small membership also means that the board
members, much like the case of Juventud Ecuatoriana, have considerable latitude in putting their
own personal mark on the organization‘s agenda.
The ties that the organization has to other political actors also shape the NDWC‘s
political engagement. The organization has also established coalitions with various advocacy
groups in the U.S. to carry out its political agenda, according to Méndez:
We do a lot of work with the National Organization for Women, the National
Women‘s Political Caucus. We do a lot of work with an organization called the
Sister Song, out of Atlanta, with those reproductive rights justice. We follow a lot
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of legislation, make sure that women know what are the legislation that are
affecting women in New York State and nationally. We‘re getting ready to go to
the NOW national conference in Boston, next weekend. We‘re going to be doing
two workshops there.
The relationship with these organizations runs even deeper than simple coalitions and
collaborations. This is particularly true of the NDWC‘s connections with NOW. In addition to
her role as the NDWC‘s Executive Director, in 2004 Mendez was named NOW‘s Director of
Racial Diversity Programs. Pulling double duty between NOW and NDWC has created a
symbiotic relationship between the two organizations, and places the NDWC on path towards
deeper political engagement in the U.S.
While the NDWC‘s connections and leadership experience have allowed the organization
to become an effective political actor in the U.S., these same factors have also pulled the
organization further away from being an advocate for the Dominican population, particularly in a
transnational context. As a small non-profit organization the NDWC‘s agenda and identity are
shaped in large measure Méndez. Her lifelong commitment to community activism and to
creating an organization to politically empower Dominican and other Latina women in New
York appears to be the key factor in the NDWC‘s success as a political actor. The NWDC has
been able to create programs such as leadership training for Dominican and other Latina women,
while also cultivating partnerships with national and local elected officials, as well as other
influential women‘s advocacy groups such as NOW, to provide Dominican women a path
towards political engagement and power in the U.S. At the same time the NDWC has also
remained active in advocating for women‘s issues in the Dominican Republic, albeit in a more
limited fashion and more in the fashion of transnational activist groups akin to those examined
by scholars such as Tarrow (2005), and Keck and Sikkink (1998).
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Yet in addition to the same obstacles that other Dominican organizations in this study
face, including limited avenues for political engagement and growing ambivalence about
participating in Dominican politics by migrants in New York, the NDWC is also limited by its
composition as a small non-profit organization. Because the organization‘s work is highly
dependent on the vision and leadership of its leadership, the organization is mostly tied into the
U.S. political process given that Mendez herself has been mostly active in U.S. politics. Her
skepticism about political engagement in the Dominican Republic also explains the
organization‘s limited engagement. Finally, the fact that the organization is not member driven
also raises questions as to the overall impact that the NWDC can have on overall political
engagement by Dominican migrants- a criticism that is also true of Juventud Ecuatoriana.
Conclusion
This chapter has sought to incorporate an analysis of organizational dynamics in order to
understand how transnational political engagement and more specifically the process of strategic
citizenship unfolds for the Ecuadorian and Dominican organizations. Organizations- whether
political parties, social movement organizations, home town associations or non-profit
organizations- are a central part of how people participate in political activity, particularly in
democratic societies with a strong or emergent civil society. As such, in order to better
understand how the transnationalization of migrants‘ political engagement develops, some
understanding of how organizations permit or prevent migrants from articulating their demands
and address their marginalization in both home and host countries is necessary.
The findings in this chapter indicate that for each of the six migrant organizations that
were part of this study, their composition played very specific roles in their capacity to aid their
members in their efforts to address migrants‘ dual marginalization. An organization‘s rhetoric or
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ideology, membership composition, leadership structure, and financial resources either fostered
bi-national engagement, as in the case of FUIE, Juventud Ecuatoriana and Alianza PAIS (D.R.),
or limited such mobilization, such as with the NWDC, the PRD and to a lesser extent Alianza
PAIS. The organization‘s resources, including its linkages with government actors in home and
host country, as well as with other political actors, also serve to either enable or limit these
groups from articulating a migrant-specific agenda to address dual marginalization. Finally the
political context created by home country governments under which each of these organizations
act also shaped the structure of opportunities for the transnationalization of migrant political
engagement to take place, with Dominican organizations in this study facing greater obstacles
than Ecuadorian organizations in this regard. Ultimately the ability and/or desire to mobilize
migrants for transnational political engagement and make effective demands for rights to end
migrant marginalization is an important part of what accounts for strategic citizenship. If the
organizations have the means and the opportunity to demand rights for marginalized migrants in
both home and host country, they seem to ready to do so, but will favor action in one site over
another where they can project the most power.
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters of this dissertation, I have attempted to probe the phenomenon
of migrant transnational political engagement, using the experiences of the leaders of various
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant civil society organizations in New York City. The research
was driven by three key questions. First, what role do civil society organizations play in
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants‘ political participation? Second, does participation in civil
society organizations enable their voices to be heard by host and home country governments?
Third, how do these forms of political participation inform our understanding of what it means
for Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants to be citizens? My overarching interest was to better
understand the different ways that migrants organized to pursue transnational political agendas,
and whether this sort of organizing empowered migrants to address the social, economic and
political issues they have faced as a result of migration.
Based on my findings, which are drawn from 18 months of participant observation
research, interviews with members of eight different civic and political organizations and
analysis of primary and secondary sources, I conclude that in order to fully understand how
migrant transnational politics unfold it is necessary to examine how the different organizations
migrants create for political activities determine how and why migrants opt to pursue politics in
both sending and receiving countries. Despite research that has described how migrant
transnational politics occurs and its forms (Østergaard-Nielsen 2009; Itzighsohn and Villacres
2009; Waldinger 2008), as well as studies on the political dimension of organizations such as
hometown associations (Levitt 2001; Orozco and LaPointe 2004; Smith 2006), transnationalism
scholarship has not devoted sufficient attention to what organizations do to enable, constrain and
define transnational politics.
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Rather than simply being vehicles for political participation, organizations are a critical
part of how transnational politics occurs through appropriating narratives, creating political
identities and structuring the demands migrants make and to whom they direct such demands.
Organizations are a central to what I refer to as strategic citizenship. Strategic citizenship, I argue,
is the response by Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant political organizations to a condition I call
dual marginalization, where migrants feel culturally, economically and politically excluded in
both home and host countries. Organizations appropriate the dual marginalization narrative to
create a political identity, where they label themselves as visible minority groups in both the U.S.
and their home countries, and proceed to make claims citizenship rights in each country as a
minority or vulnerable population group.
Migrant organizations are also central to strategic citizenship in that migrants make
decisions on how and where to focus their demands for rights based on how the organizations in
which they take part provide opportunities (in the way of resources, networks and ideological
frameworks) and pose limitations (by virtue of resources, organizational structure and
membership dynamics) on how they can and do act. Finally, strategic citizenship is further
shaped by state, and particularly home country government responses to migrant claims. This is
specifically observed through government rhetoric, laws and policies towards migrants, and
relations with migrant organizations, all of which shape both the opportunities migrants believe
they have to demand citizenship rights, and what sorts of demands migrants make on the sending
state.
As noted in Chapter One, strategic citizenship bears some similarities to Aihwa Ong‘s
(1999) concept of flexible citizenship in understanding how migrants move between states in
response to the realities of contemporary capitalism. In her work, Ong argues that flexible
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citizenship is a phenomenon where migrants reposition themselves across multiple nation-states
and adapt to new social conditions in order to strengthen their place in capitalist accumulation,
while also circumventing discipline by the state. While flexible citizenship includes actions such
as holding passports and establishing relations with political leaders in various countries, Ong‘s
theory is ultimately focused on how citizenship reflects creating a cultural sense of belonging in
everyday practices. Strategic citizenship more directly reflects how migrants mobilize to seek
membership in both migrant-sending and receiving countries, and the various elements that
migrants must negotiate in order to achieve full citizenship rights.
Strategic citizenship shares Bauböck‘s (2007) view of transnationalism as subjects who
are mutually incorporated in multiple territories or at the least who with their practices aspire
towards that goal, since they have vested interests in both sending and receiving countries.
Strategic citizenship, however, includes states as well as migrants‘ discourses, along with the
organizations as key determinants in the emergence and development of transnational political
practices. By combining all of these elements into strategic citizenship I seek to show how this
phenomenon can be understood as a new expression of established citizenship theories rather
than a radical transformation of citizenship Strategic citizenship, as a response to dual
marginalization ties into Brubaker‘s (1990) idea of citizenship as an instrument of social
inclusion and exclusion. At the same time the interplay between discourses, organizations and
states also reflects both Marshall‘s (1950) and Mann‘s (1987) view of citizenship as the
institutionalization of social conflicts between the ruling elites of a territorial jurisdiction and its
subjects, therefore an institution that is historically contingent based on how relations between
the rulers and the ruled change over time and context.
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Strategic citizenship by Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations highlights a
current social conflict that has emerged in the contemporary global economic system. Because
international labor migration from low-income to wealthier countries has become an integral part
of economic activity for both migrant-sending and receiving countries, strategic citizenship, as a
way of interpreting migrant transnational politics, embodies the social conflicts that have
emerged from migration. This can be observed not only in how migrants mobilize to demand
rights for inclusion in both home and host countries, but also in the response by political elites to
migrants‘ mobilization and the structural factors (in this case organizations) that shape the
outcomes of these conflicts. This dissertation explores the concept of strategic citizenship and,
how it reflects the social conflicts between migrants and political elites in the U.S. as well as
Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, respectively
Chapter three of this study introduced the concept of strategic citizenship by focusing on
the context that accounts for transnational political engagement and mobilization by Ecuadorian
and Dominican migrant civil society organizations in the New York City metropolitan area.
Based on findings from my interviews with various civic and political leaders, as well as a year
and a half of participant observation work, I found that Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant
transnational political participation is driven by a perceived dual marginalization that both
migrant organization leaders and constituents face as they participate in the social, economic and
political life of both home and host countries. The subjects in the study frequently referred to
problems such as anti-immigrant discrimination, xenophobic violence, exploitation by coyoteros,
landlords and employers, and lack of access to basic education and health services as evidence of
their marginalization in the U.S. At the same time, these same migrants often felt equally
marginalized by their home country governments, who have failed to protect migrant citizens
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living abroad, lack policies to address migrants‘ interests, have been slow to extend full political
and civil rights to migrants, and have done little to combat migrant prejudice from non-migrants.
Dual marginalization, which for a number of organization leaders reflected their personal
experiences, is also informed by various structural conditions that characterize the Ecuadorian
and Dominican migration experience. This includes the expansion of the remittance economy,
the growing tensions over immigration in the U.S. and the presence of large concentrations of
both Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in New York City. These factors provide a context that
helped shape migrants‘ collective political has allowed for the dual marginalization narrative to
take hold.
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant political activists in New York City, including
politicians and civic leaders, have seized on the notion of dual marginalization to help forge a
distinct migrant political identity that has helped give shape to their transnational political
activities. Specifically, migrant activists have sought political engagement in both the U.S. and
their respective home countries by self-identifying as a visible minority in both countries.
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant activists in my study are part of the broader immigrant rights
struggle in the U.S., which members and supporters view as a civil rights issue. At the same time,
home country political engagement for these organizations focuses on demands for greater
political equality through legislative representation, full voting rights and equal representation in
government institutions; legally guaranteed civil rights for migrants abroad; and rights to social
programs that provide migrants educational, health care and social security benefits.
Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations attempt to make demands in both the
U.S. and their home countries, but do so based on their perception of how successfully they can
demand and obtain rights as a minority group. While Ecuadorian migrant organizations leaders
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see bi-national engagement as a necessity, many organizations have emphasized political
involvement in Ecuador because of the changing political landscape in Ecuador that currently
favors migrant incorporation. This is more favorable given the high percentage of non-citizens in
the U.S. which results in more limited opportunities for U.S. political engagement. Dominicans,
however, while also demanding rights in both countries, seem to be more optimistic about their
prospects arising from political participation in the U.S., due to the historical tensions between
migrants and the Dominican government and persistent patterns of cronyism and clientelism in
Dominican politics.
Chapter Four transitioned from how migrants respond to dual marginalization through
political organization based on minority rights in both home and host countries to the role of
states in shaping migrant political practices. Specifically this chapter sought to show not just that
nation-states shape transnational practices, but also that the various dimensions of state policy
condition citizenship claims. Chapter Four accepts the premise that both sending and receiving
states continue to play a pivotal role in shaping migrant transnational practices, but attempted to
examine the full extent of migrant policy to see exactly how state actors seek to assert control
over migrants as they make claims from abroad for greater citizenship rights.
Both the Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants in this study are based in the same city, and
subject to the same host country immigration policies, particularly limited legal rights as noncitizens and risks of deportation for many members of both populations who reside in the U.S.
with an irregular/undocumented migratory status. Chapter Four therefore examined Ecuadorian
and Dominican government policies towards migrants abroad, in order to demonstrate how the
rhetoric of state officials, changes to the rule of law, and legislative policy all shape the scope
and nature of migrants‘ transnational engagement and demands.
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Particularly since Rafael Correa was elected President in 2006, Ecuadorian migrant
policy has been one not only of rapprochement with its migrant population, but in fact has
embraced a progressive rhetoric that seeks to champion the rights of all migrants, both
immigrants living in Ecuador and their own nationals living abroad. This aggressive courting of
migrants is, as I argued in my description of strategic citizenship, an effort by the Ecuadorian
government to assert greater control over its migrant population and more specifically over their
remittance income, as a source of revenues. This is particularly important for Ecuador, which has
only recently weathered a severe financial crisis that spurred a mass migration abroad in the past
decade. However, the migrant policy changes in Ecuador also respond President Correa‘s
Citizen‘s Revolution, which aims to expand political power and welfare state programs for
disaffected segments of the population including working class, Afro-Ecuadorian, indigenous
persons and migrants. This is reflected in all three of the aforementioned aspects of Ecuadorian
migrant politics, through government public discourse, recent constitutional reforms granting
citizenship rights to migrants, and legislative policies targeted at migrants. These same state
practices that seek to incorporate and advocate for migrants also reinforce dual marginalization
among nationals living abroad.
The Ecuadorian government‘s discourse has sought to validate migrants by proclaiming
them an integral part of the national body politic and victims of the failures of past governments
to whom the state has an obligation, rather than as expats who have abandoned their homeland.
The state‘s pro-migrant discourse also advocates for migration as a universal right under
international law and for international norms to protect the rights of all international migrants.
The government‘s discourse has helped to create an environment that incentivizes migrants to
feel they are invested in the polity and in Correa‘s citizen‘s revolution.
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Changes to the rule of law enacted by the Correa government have also stimulated
migrants‘ involvement in Ecuadorian political life. The current government successfully carried
out national referendum that ratified a new constitution that embodied the progressive ideologies
embraced by President Correa. The new constitution (which was drafted by migrant
representatives in the constituent assembly), not only cemented dual citizenship and external
voting as fundamental rights, but also provided migrants abroad direct representation in the
national legislature and established equal rights and protections for migrants abroad as a
fundamental mandate of the state. Aside from the clear incentive for migrants to exercise their
new political rights, these reforms also validated in the minds of many of this study‘s subjects
that the state recognized migrant contributions and involvement.
Finally, the Correa administration enacted policies that create or extend various public
programs and services specifically to all citizens living abroad. These include voluntary social
security enrollment distance education programs, remittance-sending incentives and small
business lending, as well as the creation of cabinet-level ministry for migrant affairs, which
administers direct service programs for migrants abroad through the Casa Ecuatoriana network.
These policies provide a policy agenda that fosters migrant political involvement. Additionally,
the Ecuadorian government has also enacted programs such as the FORES program, to work
directly with organizations on capacity building, which simultaneously creates support networks
and loyalties with participating organizations, while also imposing organizational forms that
potentially limit their range of actions, including mounting political campaigns in Ecuador.
At the same time, however, the same government actions that have sought to incorporate
and in some measure empower migrants within Ecuador have also shaped their political
engagement by reinforcing marginalization and the kinds of citizenship demands made by
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migrants. Government rhetoric has also perpetuated migrants‘ marginalization through a
victimization discourse. The state legitimizes migrants‘ citizenship status, but also views them as
a disadvantaged group that requires protections from the state. Many organization leaders and
migrant constituents alike in this study have internalized this identity to make demands upon the
state for greater protections, including direct support for migrants who are victims of xenophobic
discrimination and violence, and affirmative action programs in Ecuador for migrants.
Constitutional reforms also reinforce migrants‘ marginalization by legally recognizing
them as a visible minority and mandating the state to provide equal protections for migrants.
Migrant organization leaders in my study have seized on these new constitutional rights and
protections to make demands for equal representation in all government bodies beyond the
legislature, such as government ministries, as well as for guaranteed representation in the newly
created Citizen‘s Participation Council, an elected body designed to ensure government
accountability.
Finally the Correa administration‘s policy implementation efforts have had perhaps the
most immediate impact on migrants‘ engagement and in reinforcing marginalization. A number
of migrant leaders viewed the government‘s efforts to provide direct services for the migrant
community (such as pro bono representation and consular services) as half-hearted and thus
reflective of migrants being treated as second-class citizens by the Ecuadorian state. Many
organization leaders in this study also said that state policies did not go far enough to protect
migrants, such as the access to distance education or excessive requirements for social security
eligibility, which added fuel to the notion of dual marginalization. Ultimately though, despite the
reinforcement of marginalization, Ecuadorian government policy has nevertheless incentivized
Ecuadorian migrants to remain highly involved in home country politics, perhaps to a greater
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extent than in U.S. politics, because they have tangible interests and rights that they can use to
obtain a wide range of rights and a stronger political voice.
The Dominican Republic‘s migrant policy, in turn, is more fraught with tensions than that
of the Ecuadorian government. Like Ecuador, the Dominican government under President
Leonel Fernández has recently taken concrete steps to engage and politically incorporate their
migrant population abroad through a combination of political reforms and policy initiatives.
There are noticeable differences, the Dominican government‘s migrant policy and that of
Ecuador‘s that have tempered migrants‘ enthusiasm towards participating in the Dominican
electoral process to advance their interests. Current migrant policy in the Dominican Republic
and the tepid response by migrant organization leaders are colored by historical tensions between
Dominican migrants and the Dominican state, stemming from years of political violence and
repression that forced many Dominicans to leave in the 1960s and 1970s and mobilization by
political exiles to challenge authoritarian regimes under Rafael Trujillo and Joaquin Balaguer.
One noticeable difference between the two countries lies in the rhetoric or political
discourse used by Dominican government officials to deal with migrants. While Dominican
political discourse has increasingly acknowledged migration as a relevant experience since
Leonel Fernández‘s first Presidency in 199671, political elites in the Dominican Republic
continue to reinforce separation between migrants and non-migrants in their rhetoric. Dominican
politicians eschew the term migrant, opting instead for descriptors such as Dominicans abroad
and diaspora. Relations with migrants are characterized by the state as alliances or partnerships
rather than state-subject relations. Furthermore, the tone of much of the government‘s rhetoric is
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Fernández has served three non-continuous terms of office, having been elected in 1996, and
then elected for two additional terms in 2004 and 2008, after a constitutional amendment was
passed repealing one-term limits for the presidency
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instrumental in character, focusing almost exclusively on the economic benefit of remittances
when discussing migration. Finally Dominican politicians have qualified migrant incorporation
by raising questions about their loyalty. Such rhetoric appears to reinforce social distance
between migrants and the Dominican state.
Recent changes in the Dominican Republic‘s rule of law have started to respond to the
demands made by Dominican migrants for greater citizenship rights. However these measures
are considerably smaller in scope than what the Ecuadorian government has done to expand
migrant citizenship rights. Constitutional reforms approved by the Dominican government in
2008 now acknowledge the right to dual citizenship, and have outlined provisions for the
creation of direct representation in the lower chamber of the Dominican national legislature (not
in the Dominican Senate). However unlike the Ecuadorian constitution, the Dominican
government does not acknowledge migrants as a protected group nor provide specific sets of
rights for migrants other than limited political representation. This has led some migrant leaders
to denounce the Dominican government for relegating migrants to a second-class citizenship
status.
Finally Dominican policy programs have been limited in nature. Few government
policies or programs are in place that actually do direct outreach or service provision for
migrants outside of standard consular services. The most significant policy program enacted by
the government has been the CONDEX; an inter-agency government body (largely under the
direction of the Dominican State Department) designed to conduct outreach and consultation
with different sectors of the Dominican migrant population. While CONDEX has established
dialogues and working agreements with a number of New York-based Dominican migrant
organizations, these partnerships have not yet produced concrete policy initiatives or legislation
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sponsored or endorsed by migrants in the Dominican legislature. The Dominican government,
unlike their Ecuadorian counterpart, has not introduced programs to expand services to migrants,
nor provide resources for migrant citizens living abroad. Not surprisingly, many Dominican
migrant leaders, including some who took part in this study, have denounced the government‘s
lack of attention to migrant affairs and adopt a pessimistic tone with respect to what migrants can
expect to gain from continued political engagement in the Dominican Republic in their efforts to
demand greater citizenship rights. As a result the organizations in this study, including the
Dominican political party chapters in the U.S., have concentrated much of their political activity
on securing and expanding Dominican representation in various state and local elected offices in
the U.S.
That sending states craft policy in response to the impact of migration and attempt to
exercise some sort of social control over migrants has been noted by a number of scholars
(Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Smith 2003 and 2008). This study, however, seeks to show that
states do more that simply adopt policies that outline the terms of membership-in this case,
sending states take an active role in shaping the consciousness, identity and goals that migrants
employ when they opt to pursue transnational political engagement, which ultimately informs
how Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations demand citizenship rights. In this respect
migrants‘ transnational practices are strategic in that they adapt and respond to the states‘
attempts to control migrants as subjects. Furthermore, state policies and migrant organization‘s
responses bring into focus how citizenship embodies the social conflicts between ruling elites
who seek to control subjects and the subjects who make demands for greater inclusion in the
state.
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Chapter Five examines the last major element in strategic citizenship- the organizations
in which migrants carry out their political activities. As noted in the chapter, most political
activity, outside of casting a ballot or speaking with an elected official (in democratic societies),
is carried out through organizations. Numerous scholars (Lipset 1961; Almond and Verba 1963;
McAdam 1980; Wilson 1973; DiMaggio and Powell 1984; Putnam 1996 and 2000; Keck and
Sikkink 1996; Tarrow 2005) have noted in different ways that organizations have a tangible
impact on how people mobilize to make political demands or participate in electoral politics.
This chapter sought to illustrate that in order to better understand how migrants become involved
in transnational politics it is necessary to consider how organizations mediate the process. The
chapter provides in-depth analysis of three different Ecuadorian and three different Dominican
organizations, including electoral parties, social movement organizations and non-profit
advocacy organizations. In doing so I argued that each of the organizations examined in the
chapter demonstrate that organizations affect political participation in terms of (1) the
opportunities the organization provides migrants to mobilize and make claims upon both home
and host country governments, and (2) by the capacity for organizations to empower migrants to
have a tangible impact on political processes in home and/or host countries. I focused
specifically on the personnel structures and interpersonal relations, coupled with the structure of
and resources available to each organization that help structure the opportunities that are
available to effectively make claims upon both home and host countries for citizenship rights that
address their dual marginalization.
One key factor that emerged in the research was the role that membership dynamics
played for each of the organizations present. For larger groups such as Alianza PAIS and the
Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), large membership numbers provided greater legitimacy
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among migrant constituents and enabled these groups to command greater resources for political
activities in New York. This allowed these groups to command considerable attention among
migrants and shape the political discourse in the migrant community. At the same time, however,
having so many members also made internal conflicts and divisions among leaders and members
more prevalent, which hindered their effectiveness in engaging with migrant constituents‘
concerns, and thus leading to increasing resentment and distrust in these organizations as
effective representatives of migrants‘ interests. The smaller organizations such as the Frente
Unido de Inmigrantes Ecuatorianos72(FUIE), the National Dominican Women‘s Caucus
(NDWC) and Juventud Ecuatoriana73 (JE) were more effective in maintaining cohesive
membership and ideological unity, and thus able to advance specific political goals. These
smaller organizations also had more stable leadership structures that made it easier to mobilize
members and supporters. Small size also meant having a limited scope of activity and/or lacking
resources to make major inroads in mobilizing migrants or keeping a steady pace of activity.
This circumstance often compelled these organizations to either foster networks with other actors
or adopt new tactics such as seeking non-profit status, which potentially undermines or changes
the focus of the organizations‘ original mission.
A second observable factor that impacted transnational political participation was the
structure of organizations, and in particular the tendency towards isomorphism (Dimaggio and
Powell 1984). This tendency was particularly evident among the electoral movements, where
their orientation towards electoral politics often proved constraining. On the one hand these
organizations, such as the aforementioned PRD, Alianza PAIS (Ecuador) and Alianza País (D.R.)
instantly tapped them into home country politics and provided access to political elites to help
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Translation: United Ecuadorian Immigrants‘ Front
Translation: Ecuadorian Youth
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advance migrant interests. Yet their composition also meant being beholden to central party
discipline and imposed home country political interests at the expense of articulating a migrant
agenda. The hierarchical structure of these electoral movements also bred intense competition
among members to move up the movement/party ladder, which created leadership voids (as with
Alianza PAIS) and fostered resentment from lower-level operatives at perceived patterns of
clientelism and patronage politics.
Non-electoral movements were often able either to create more transparent forms of
leadership (FUIE), or organize themselves in such a way as to allow appointed leaders to shape
their mission with few constraints (JE, NDWC). Yet some of these organizations, because of
their size and/or structure, have found themselves compelled to resort to non-profit status as a
tactic for long-term survival, ultimately restricted the scope of their political activities. There is a
precedent for this among older Dominican civic organizations that started as political
organizations and become non-profit groups. That Ecuadorian organizations have started to
adopt this tactic seems to point to an isomorphic trend that is fostered by the structural conditions
under which many migrant-based organizations operate, particularly in terms of financial
resources.
Contributions
This research has sought to make substantive contributions in a number of areas,
including contemporary migration, citizenship, transnationalism and political organizations.
This study has sought to demonstrate that the experiences of both Ecuadorian and Dominican
migrants in New York reflect the interconnectedness of these issues.
The genesis of this project was an interest on my part to better understand what role
organizations played in mobilizing migrants into transnational political activities. My research
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suggests that organizations require greater attention in the study of transnational practices,
including political engagement, since they not only provide resources that enable or limit
transnational activities, but also foster structured relationships that help define migrants‘
collective consciousness and their overall goals in seeking out transnational political engagement,
which vary according to the organization.
These findings have also contributed to the area of transnational studies by employing
collective action frameworks to better understand how migrants engage in transnational political
practices. This theoretical approach has been advocated by Vertovec (2002) as a way to expand
on transnational studies. While Keck and Sikkink (1996) and Tarrow (2005) have applied this
theoretical framework to studying transnational activist networks, I have attempted to use a
similar lens to look at migrant mobilization, which in many ways varies because of their
relationships to their home countries. By taking this approach I also hope to make a contribution
to the field of political sociology by examining the relationship between organizations and
political engagement among migrants. The findings from this study note how, for Ecuadorian
and Dominican immigrants, many of whom remain non-citizens, transnational practices become
a potential vehicle for community empowerment. The extent to which the organizations in which
migrants participate are able to tap into resources and networks that permit them to effectively
make claims in both home and host countries provide Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants with
avenues to address conditions they face in both the U.S. and their home countries, as the
examples of the organizations in this study illustrate.
A second area where this study has sought to make a contribution is in our understanding
of citizenship- a central concern as it relates to migration and migrant transnational practices. By
arguing strategic citizenship embodies Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants‘ response to
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exclusion within the contemporary global political economy, I endeavor to reintroduce the
arguments spelled out by Marshall (1947) and Mann (1983) that citizenship is ultimately the
embodiment of social conflicts between ruling political elites and the subjects over whom they
seek to rule. The current iteration of the global economy has in fact altered citizenship in certain
ways, though not, as has been argued by some scholars (Soysal 1995; Jacobson 1996), through
eroding state sovereignty in a meaningful way. Rather, contemporary forms of citizenship,
including dual citizenship, mean that citizenship rights reflect the current social conflict between
elites in both sending and receiving countries who seek to control migrants for their economic
value as labor power and remitters and migrants who seek to empower themselves as mobile
subjects within the system of global capitalist accumulation. This assessment adopts Marshall
(1950) and Mann‘s (1987) interpretation of citizenship as crystallization of social conflicts
between elites and the governed, but argues that for migrants the struggle for rights crosses
multiple nation-states.
A third area in which this project aims to make a scholarly contribution is in
understanding how strategic citizenship, as a reflection of transnational political engagement, has
changed the political landscape of Ecuador and the Dominican Republic, as a starting point
towards a broader evaluation of how politics and governance in Latin America have adapted to
migration. As noted in this study, Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants‘ claims for citizenship
rights are a direct response to the fact that political elites in each country have crafted policies
that seek to incorporate migrants sufficiently so as to secure remittances as a form of direct
investment, and thus preserve migrant labor power as a source of capital accumulation.
Migration has thus altered government development strategies in light of changes to the global
economy, where low-income economies like Ecuador and the Dominican Republic are critical
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providers of labor. At the same time, the emergence of a migrant minority political identity
among both Ecuadorian and Dominican migrants reflects the emergence of new social categories
that not only inform how subjects of these countries organize themselves. But in the case of
Ecuador in particular, they have engendered changes to the rule of law that have further
expanded the scope of the politics of representation in these two Latin American countries.
Whether this is a particularity of these two countries or indicative of a broader trend among Latin
American migrants remains to be seen.
Finally this study has also sought to add to the body of research on contemporary
immigration in the U.S. by bringing much needed attention to the dynamics of Ecuadorian and
Dominican immigration. As noted earlier in the dissertation, Ecuadorians are the second fastest
growing Latino immigrant population in New York City since 1990 (Caro-López 2011),
outpaced only by Mexican migrants and surpassing Dominican migration during this period.
Furthermore, as Bergad (2010) has noted, the Ecuadorian population in the United States has
increased nearly 20-fold since 1970, from a mere 35,000 to over 600,000, and has almost
doubled in the past decade. Yet despite this dramatic surge in Ecuadorian migration, there is a
surprising dearth of scholarship that documents this new population group, with Jones-Correa‘s
(1998) study of Latino political engagement in Queens (which included Ecuadorians among
other groups) and Pribilsky‘s (2002) study of early Ecuadorian migration to New York being the
only notable studies on Ecuadorian migration carried out to date. Yet even these studies leave
room for significant exploration of the Ecuadorian experience, and in particular how Ecuadorian
migration and transnational political engagement has changed with the rapid expansion of the
Ecuadorian migrant population, and the accompanying political changes in Ecuador and the U.S.
that influence how Ecuadorians have started to mobilize transnationally. This study aims to show
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Ecuadorians‘ increasing relevance in the social fabric of New York City and the U.S., including
the impact that this population will have on ethnic politics and civic participation.
Similarly, despite the growing body of scholarship on Dominican immigration and
political engagement (Pessar and Grasmuck 2001; Graham 1996; Levitt 2001; Aparicio 2006;
Gonzalez-Acosta 2009; Itzighsohn and Villacrés 2009), these studies have not fully explored the
confluence of structural and ideological factors that shape transnational political engagement.
This study seeks to show, as previously noted, that their political engagement is predicated on a
particular shared understanding of why they must organize transnationally, and the political
identity that informs their political participation in each country as well as how the Dominican
government has conditioned their activities.
Limitations and areas for future research
This study sought to offer a broader perspective on migrant transnational political
activities by employing a comparative framework between Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant
experiences. The fact remains, however, that as a qualitative and largely ethnographic project,
the perspective offered here remains relatively narrow in scope. The decision to employ a
qualitative methodology was made in order to demonstrate how the subjective lived experiences
of organization leaders shape the identity construction process that informs their political
objectives. This approach also permitted me to observe how organization dynamics influence
transnational political activities.
Yet because of this the study focuses on the experiences of a relatively small number of
actors, given the plethora of Ecuadorian and Dominican migrant organizations both in New York
and across the U.S. This study therefore cannot, by design, speak to the general experience of all
organizations within each population. According to Pablo Calle of the SENAMI, there are over
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200 documented Ecuadorian organizations operating in the New York City area alone.
Dominican organizations are also quite numerous, based on a scan of community news sites and
anecdotal accounts from some participants in this study. Other organizations may be driven by
other considerations when they opt to participate in transnational politics, if they do at all, or
have different dynamics that lead to different outcomes.
A related issue is the fact that my research subjects did not include migrant hometown
associations (HTAs), which is one of the more important organizational types currently involved
in transnational practices. Many of the existing studies on transnational practices, including those
which have informed my own research (Orozco and Lapointe 2004; Goldring 1998; Levitt 2001;
Landolt and Baires 2001; Smith 2006) have demonstrated the importance of HTAs in enabling
transnational economic and political practices. The fact that there is not an HTA present in the
study should be noted as a limitation, given how important these organizations have become in
the context of transnational activities. In the case of the Ecuadorian migrant population, however,
as noted by Juventud Ecuatoriana President Edward Miranda in Chapter Five, HTAs do not have
a significant presence in the Ecuadorian migrant experience- a point confirmed by the lack of
mention of HTAs by Ecuadorian government officials. HTAs are, however, more visible in the
Dominican migrant community, and as Levitt (2001) has noted, play a significant political role at
the local level, by mobilizing resources for community development projects and to elect
candidates to local office. Time constraints made it difficult for me to network sufficiently within
the Dominican community to connect with New York-based HTAs. Nevertheless, in addition to
missing a relevant organizational form, the lack of a HTA also made it more difficult to take into
account the question of scale in political engagement. With the exception of Juventud
Ecuatoriana all of the organizations studied in both populations engaged at the national level in
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their home countries. Organizations like HTAs, which operate primarily at the local level, may
have provided a different perspective on why migrants opt to participate in transnational political
activities and what form their participation takes.
One avenue of future research to address this limitation is to develop a larger- scale
survey of organizations to measure the overall volume and form of transnational political
engagement, focusing or organizational types and other quantitative indicators such as
membership size and demographic profile, resources, size of networks and types of political
practices. This would help identify broader trends in political engagement and measure the
influence of structural factors. Itizghsohn and Villacrés (2009) recently sought to survey overall
transnational political engagement by Dominican migrants, mainly in the area of constituents
propensity to vote in Dominican elections. Their approach, while limited in scope, nevertheless
provides a way to study organized transnational political activities by migrants from a macrolevel perspective.
Similarly, the decision to focus only on New York-based organizations raises other
questions regarding the impact of host country politics that this study could not explore at this
time. While the decision to study two separate migrant populations made it possible to compare
the role of sending states in reinforcing dual marginalization and shaping strategic citizenship by
Ecuadorians and Dominicans, the host country context was similar. This did make it possible to
identify clear sources of marginalization that migrants felt by virtue of being in the U.S. and
compare how each population responded to the host-country context. However many Ecuadorian
and Dominicans have migrated to other countries, including Italy and Spain, where the host
country context is different, both culturally as well as in terms of immigration policy. The
present study is unable to speak to how differences in host country context impact the discourses
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and strategies that shape Ecuadorian and Dominican transnational practices, which may be quite
different in other countries, based on how migrants are incorporated elsewhere. This would be
the next logical step for this line of research, in order to provide a more comprehensive analysis
of how strategic citizenship manifests itself in varied host-country contexts. Østergaard Nielsen
(2003; 2009) has compared differences in how Turkish migrants engage in transnational
practices in different European countries. Expanding my research to examine Ecuadorian and
Dominican migrants in Europe would help contribute to cross-country comparative studies on
migrant transnationalism in different host-country contexts.
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Appendix A: Sample Interview Protocol
Open Ended Questions for Organization Members
I. General Information
1. How did you become part of the organization/movement?
2. How long have you been active in the organization's activities?
3. What are some of your major responsibilities in your current position?
 Mission and Constituencies
 What was the mission of the campaign?
 What do you see as the the current goals/priorities of the organization as an elected
official?
 How would you describe your constituency? Are there any specific sectors of the
immigrant community that you work for?
 Do you anticipate any changes in the organization's mission in the future? Why or why
not?
 Tactics
 How do the assembly persons and/or the movement come to a decision on how to
advance its goals?
 What methods or strategies are used by the movement/organization to carry out its
objectives?
 How does the organization/movement determine whether they have been able to advance
its stated objectives, based on the strategies or tactics employed?
IV. Resources
 What are the major resources the organization relies on to conduct its work?
 In the case of financial or material resources, how does the organization obtain the
necessary resources to carry out its objectives?
 How will having two assembly persons affect access to resources?
V. Relationship with government/state actors in home country
 What sort of engagements or interactions do you have with government authorities in the
home country? Which government authorities do you work with, specifically?
 How would you characterize your relationship with government officials in Ecuadorcooperative, neutral or conflicted? What are the reasons for that relationship?
 How reliant is the organization on collaboration with home country government officials
to meet its goals?
VI. Relationship with government/state actors in host country
1. How important is it for your organization to be engaged with government authorities in
the United States? Why is this?
2. What sort of engagements or interactions do you have with government authorities in the
US? Which government authorities do you work with, specifically? (IF APPLICABLE)
3. Are state or federal government authorities in the United States receptive to the
organization's political activities?
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VII. Relationships with non-government actors
1. Does the organization work with any non-government actors as part of its political
activity in the home country? If so, who?
2. How would you conduct your relationship with other non-government actors who work
on similar issues in the home country- cooperative, neutral, competitive or hostile? Why
would you characterize it this way?
VIII. Impact on Governance in the home country
1. Is the way that your organization deals with particular issues different from how home
county government officials deal with issues? If so how?
2. How have local residents responded to the manner in which your organization has tried to
deal with political issues?
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Appendix B: Sample Consent Forms
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Appendix C: Ecuadorian propaganda on the Citizen’s Revolution
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These images, along with those in Appendix C-2 are examples of the different ways in which the
current government has employed the concept of ―Citizen‘s Revolution‖ within its propaganda
disseminated within the migrant population abroad.
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Appendix D: Five Revolutions
Propaganda
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Appendix E: FUIE Electoral Propaganda: The flyer below illustrates the basic proposals
made by the FUIE candidates during the first ever vote to elect migrant candidates to the
Ecuadorian National Assembly. The flyer lists proposals that address many policy issues in
Ecuador as well as issues in the U.S. such as anti-immigrant hate crimes, family reunification
policy and comprehensive immigration reform legislation.
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Social Sciences” Section on Political Sociology/ Refereed Roundtable:
―Migration and Transnationalism‖ American Sociological Association Annual
Conference, San Francisco, CA.
Spring 2006

“Hometown Associations and Collective Remittances in Mexico and Dominican
Republic: Agents of Development or Dependency? Section on Migration/Refereed
Roundtable Eastern Sociological Society Annual Conference, Boston, MA

Spring 2005

The Minority Experience and Self-Reported Health: The Effects of Minority Men
and Women’s Life Experiences of Self Reported Physical Health.‖ Section on
Public Health Sociology / Refereed Roundtable. Eastern Sociological Society
Annual Conference, Washington, DC

MEDIA
Spring 2012

WZDC-CD, Telenoticias Washington. Contributor for news report on racism
and racial discrimination within the U.S. Latino population.

Fall 2009

WABC-7, “Tiempo” Latino Affairs Sunday Program. Participant in panel
discussion with spokesperson from Make the Road New York on health insurance
trends for Latinos in the United States. Presentation recorded and archived at
http://www.7online.com.

256
Fall 2009

StoryCorps Historias, held at Center for Puerto Rican Studies, Hunter CollegeCUNY. Participant in national oral history project, sponsored by NPR and the
American Folklife Center. Oral History recorded and preserved at the Library
of Congress.

SKILLS
Native English and Spanish Speaker
Intermediate-advanced quantitative analysis: Coding, bi-variate and multivariate analysis with
SPSS
Intermediate-advanced qualitative analysis: confidentiality agreements, interviewing, coding,
survey design
Basic geo-coding analysis: creating thematic maps with MapInfo
SERVICE
2011-

Fair Housing Tester, Equal Rights Center

2006-2010

Co-Chair, CUNY Graduate Center Latino and Latin American Students Assoc.

2000

Volunteer, Letelier-Moffit Human Rights Award Program, Institute for Policy
Studies
Student Representative, American University Diversity Initiative
Communications Director, American University Latino American Students
Organization (LASO)

1998
1996-1997

CURRENT MEMBERSHIPS
American Sociological Association
Eastern Sociological Society
Office of Ecuadorian Outreach

